Is the Brain a Computer?
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With an account, you can revise, criticize, and comment on ideas, and submit new ideas.Anything that processes information is a computer.
The brain processes information.
Therefore, the brain is a computer.
A ribosome processes information. A ribosome is not a computer.
It is under that definition. Not the kind of computer people traditionally think of when they hear the term, like a laptop or desktop, but it’s a computer nonetheless.
Cool. Not sure I can criticise a syllogism. I can try push the definition ad absurdum...
- A light switch processes information. Therefore, a light switch is a computer.
- An OR gate processes information. Therefore, an OR gate is a computer.
Yes re OR gate.
Re light switches: as I understand it, they either inhibit or permit the flow of electricity. But there’s no information there, let alone processing of information. So the example is flawed, I think.
If we use Claude Shannon’s framework of information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it depends on subjectively definitions of states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
I'll have to tap out sorry. Possibly talking on different trajectories.
If an OR gate is conceived as a computer then the initial post about the brain being conceived as a computer is a banality / an uninteresting syllogism.
You may consider it banal but is it false?
An OR gate takes two bits of information and transforms them into a single bit of information by following a specific rule. It clearly processes information. And if that’s true for an OR gate, why not for the brain?
You're not understanding me. I'm not trying to argue such things don't process information.
I can't argue against "Is the brain a computer?" + "Anything that processes information is a computer" combination. If we're taking an essentialist definition of the word computer then we should ditch the term and the the title of the page should just be "Does the brain process information?" - which I have no interest in objecting against.
My original attempted criticism was against the statement that anything processing information is a computer. (Taking a deflationary concept of a computer is not what I presumed was meant in the title of the discussion).
Parking the word computer aside, based on the resultant thread, more interesting questions to me are:
1) What is the demarcation between something that processes information and something that does not?
2) What is the demarcation between something that processes information and the human brain?
What you deride as a “deflationary concept” is, to me, a vital approach to getting rid of the kind of biological mysticism that states brains have some special essence that computers could never have. Which then causes some people to think computers could never be creative or sentient, say.
As I recall, people used to think similarly about electricity: they discovered electricity in organisms before they figured out how to harness it through technology. Until then, they thought only organisms could produce electricity because they had some ‘special sauce’ that technology could never have.
Once we accept that brains are computers, there is no room left for this kind of mysticism. It’s really just taking computational universality seriously.
2) What is the demarcation between something that processes information and the human brain?
You wrote you “have no interest in objecting against” the notion that the brain processes information. Are you asking about how the brain differs from other information processors? If so, I suggest you edit the question accordingly.
the the title of the page
Minor quibble but there’s a double “the”. Consider revising your idea to fix this typo.
Nick, I think your criticisms are indirectly addressing my concerns. Would you say the framing of "The brain is a computer" does more to obscure and mislead than to illuminate?
We can invoke the word "computer" to say that the brain processes information.
But if that's all we're saying, then I'd say the word "computer" brings so much irrelevant baggage that it might be counterproductive.
Is this why you object to using the word "computer?"
I'm not objecting to the word computer per se, I just don't think a deflationary sense of the word is of any interest for comparision to the brain. The word could be of use to help illuminate what the brain is (and is not), but the comparison I sense would have to be with something more like a general purpose computer / universal computing device.
1) What is the demarcation between something that processes information and something that does not?
See #513. Something that processes information must be given some information (at least one bit) and then follow some rule for what to do with it. Then, optionally, return the result. Like the OR gate, but unlike the light switch.
Or is there something I’m missing?
I think you run into circular dependence if you exhaustively try to account for brain function by information processing. Even Claude Shannon’s definition of information depends on a «mind/perspective» defining a range of possible states. The world devoid of any perspective would have infinite states and systems depending on how you «view the world». An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) The Three-Body Problem. This computation depends on a mind defining states and logical relations.
I think you run into circular dependence if you exhaustively try to account for brain function by information processing.
It’s not meant to be exhaustive. I’m not saying the brain is a computer and only a computer. It does other stuff too but that alone doesn’t mean it’s not a computer.
An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) The Three-Body Problem.
Where?
An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) The Three-Body Problem. This computation depends on a mind defining states and logical relations.
I am not familiar with this example, but that sounds like an inversion of the real relationship between reality and consciousness. See Ayn Rand’s ‘The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made’. Certain types of computation give rise to the mind in the first place, so I don’t see how the mind could come before computation.
Or are you saying there are certain kinds of computation that require a mind?
Yes, and I can accept that the brain is a computer.
But, we might make a number of subsequent moves.
The mind is a computer. An individual person is a computer.
And yes, "not the kind of computer people traditionally think of when they hear the term, like a laptop or desktop," as Dennis states in #498.
But, the term 'computer' implies deterministic connotations.
David Deutsch and others talk about the 'creative program' each human possesses. This also implies determinism.
I know that David Deutsch and Karl Popper strongly side with free will in the free will / determinism debate.
But how do we articulate and explain a computer and creative program with freedom, free will, choice, agency, and autonomy?
The mind is a computer. An individual person is a computer.
No, the mind is a program. A computer is a physical object; the mind is not.
In a Deutschian understanding, ‘person’ and ‘mind’ are synonymous. So a person isn’t a computer, either. A person is also a program.
@nick-willmott, you objected to "a brain is a computer." Would you also object to "a mind (a person) is a program?" Why or why not?
Think we're going to get bogged down in unclear relationships to tackle this sorry...
If anything that processes information is a computer, do all computers have programs?
@tom-nassis asked:
[H]ow do we articulate and explain a computer and creative program with freedom, free will, choice, agency, and autonomy?
I think physical determinism (which the computer as a physical object must obey) and free will etc are not in any conflict because they describe different phenomena on different levels of emergence.
And I’d go one step further: not only do they not conflict, physical determinism is required for free will to exist. It is because computers obey physical determinism that they are able to run programs in the first place, including creative programs, ie programs with free will.
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
Alan Forrester1 says ‘no’, the brain is not a quantum computer but a classical one:
Quantum mechanics has almost no bearing on the operation of the brain, except insofar as it explains the existence of matter. You say that signals are carried by electrons, but this is very imprecise. Rather, they are carried by various kinds of chemical signals, including ions. Those signals are released into a warm environment that they interact with over a very short timescale.
Quantum mechanical processes like interference and entanglement only continue to show effects that differ from classical physics when the relevant information does not leak into the environment. This issue has been explained [in] the context of the brain by Max Tegmark in The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. In the brain, the leaking of information should take place over a time of the order 10−13 − 10−20 s. The timescale over which neurons fire etc. is 0.001 − 0.1s. So your thoughts are not quantum computations or anything like that. The brain is a classical computer.
Forrester is a former henchman of the very toxic Elliot Temple. Approach with extreme caution.