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  Ragnar Danneskjöld revised idea #3539.

This didn't sound like a criticism of your own stance.


I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.

CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.

It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.

I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.

CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.

It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.

  Ragnar Danneskjöld revised criticism #2340 and unmarked it as a criticism.

I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.

CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.

It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.

I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.

CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.

It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on criticism #3534.

I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)

To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written

What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.

That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.

Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised about 18 hours ago

Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

That could work, yeah. What other criticisms of HTV can you think of?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3524.

Yes, here's a new version:

Some minds with one coercive memeplex are more like dictatorships.

#3524·Erik Orrje, 1 day ago

To make a new version of #3516, revise the idea. See that pencil button?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3534.

I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)

To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written

What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.

That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.

Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised about 18 hours ago

Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step.

The linked blog post has several criticisms of HTV.

  Bart Vanderhaegen revised criticism #3533.

I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)

To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written

What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.

That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.

But again, criticising HTV is the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)

To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written

What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.

That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.

Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

  Bart Vanderhaegen criticized idea #3069.

My critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.

Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.

A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.

So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.

You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable

#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 month ago

I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)

To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written

What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.

That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.

But again, criticising HTV is the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3530.

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

#3530·Fitz Doud, 1 day ago

Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm.

But he says to use hard to vary as part of a decision-making algorithm. As quoted in my blog post:

“we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3530.

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

#3530·Fitz Doud, 1 day ago

Hey Fitz, welcome to Veritula.

I realize that DD doesn’t think of it in strict, procedural terms, but I just don’t think that’s good enough, for several reasons. One is that it’s too vague, as I explain here. We don’t know how to actually do anything he says to do, beyond broad suggestions.

  Fitz Doud criticized idea #3069.

My critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.

Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.

A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.

So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.

You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable

#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 month ago

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #3169. The revision addresses idea #3260.

For something to be a core virtue, it needs to be a virtue that should always be applied in any situation where it can be applied. Forgiveness is not something that should be applied in relevant all situations, so I don’t believe it is a core virtue.

At best it would be an applied virtue, as an expression of Justice.

I actually think people are too forgiving in some ways.

I’ll think about adding it to the applied virtues list.

For something to be a core virtue, it needs to be a virtue that should always be applied in any situation where it can be applied. Forgiveness is not something that should be applied in all relevant situations, so I don’t believe it is a core virtue.

At best it would be an applied virtue, as an expression of Justice.

I actually think people are too forgiving in some ways.

I’ll think about adding it to the applied virtues list.

  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2826 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #1865 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2897 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2823 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2825 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2820 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2653 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2624 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal archived idea #2529 along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2529 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2429 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2371 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2292 from the archive, along with any revisions.
  Dennis Hackethal restored idea #2289 from the archive, along with any revisions.