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Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No.
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No. For example, the theory of addition is sufficiently specified: we have enough info to implement an algorithm of addition on a computer, then run it, test it, correct errors with it, and so on.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 6 hours agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
We’re getting off topic. I’m currently running a bounty requesting a working implementation of HTV.
If you think you can beat the bounty, do it. I’m not interested in anything else for now.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 6 hours agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram [sic] cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)?
No, there are objective criteria.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 6 hours agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No.
#3548·Dennis HackethalOP, about 7 hours agoThe mistake is insufficiency. If someone gives you a recipe for baking a cake but doesn’t specify ingredients or bake time, that’s a problem.
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
#3547·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 7 hours agoHow is that a criticism ? What mistake does it point out/ argue for ?
The mistake is insufficiency. If someone gives you a recipe for baking a cake but doesn’t specify ingredients or bake time, that’s a problem.
#3545·Dennis HackethalOP, about 7 hours agoIt’s a criticism. Deutsch says to use HTV but never explains in sufficient detail how to do that.
How is that a criticism ? What mistake does it point out/ argue for ?
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 11 hours agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
"HTV is underspecified by Deutsch"
That isn’t a quote. Don’t put things in quotation marks unless they are literal quotations or obviously scare quotes.
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 11 hours agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
It’s a criticism. Deutsch says to use HTV but never explains in sufficient detail how to do that.
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, about 11 hours agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
That’s only one of several criticisms.
#3536·Dennis HackethalOP, 1 day agoCriticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step.
The linked blog post has several criticisms of HTV.
Do you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
#3040·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 month agoMy Conjecture
Conjecture: addiction is the result of the entrenchment of a conflict between two or more preferences in a mind.
Picture a smoker who wants to give up smoking but also really enjoys smoking. Those preferences conflict.
If the conflict is entrenched, then both preferences get to live on indefinitely. The entrenchment will not let the smoker give up smoking. He will become a chain smoker.
Solutions for the conflict may need to be found creatively, case by case. It depends on the nature of the particular entrenchment and the preferences involved. A more overarching answer for how to cure addiction might involve Randian ideas around introspection and getting one’s reason and emotions in the proper order.
Elaboration:
The conflict in addiction is between short-term and long-term solutions.
The preference for short-term in addiction is caused by uncertainty/an inability to make predictions based on explanations.
This uncertainty can be real (e.g. increased heroin addiction during the Vietnam War) or learned from insecurity during one's early years.
This didn't sound like a criticism of your own stance.
I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.
CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.
It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.
I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.
CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.
It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.
I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.
CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.
It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.
I think Lucas is right to reject that fragmentation but I don’t think it happens in the first place.
CR universally describes the growth of knowledge as error correction. When such error correction leads to correspondence with the facts (about the physical world), we call that science. When it doesn’t, we call it something else, like art or engineering or skill-building.
It’s all still error correction. There is no fragmentation due to correspondence.
#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 1 day agoI think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
That could work, yeah. What other criticisms of HTV can you think of?
#3524·Erik Orrje, 2 days agoYes, here's a new version:
Some minds with one coercive memeplex are more like dictatorships.
To make a new version of #3516, revise the idea. See that pencil button?
#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 1 day agoI think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step.
The linked blog post has several criticisms of HTV.
I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
But again, criticising HTV is the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 month agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
I think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
But again, criticising HTV is the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
#3530·Fitz Doud, 2 days agoI think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the Paper:
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i)
it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii)
it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii)
it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm.
But he says to use hard to vary as part of a decision-making algorithm. As quoted in my blog post:
“we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
#3530·Fitz Doud, 2 days agoI think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the Paper:
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i)
it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii)
it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii)
it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
Hey Fitz, welcome to Veritula.
I realize that DD doesn’t think of it in strict, procedural terms, but I just don’t think that’s good enough, for several reasons. One is that it’s too vague, as I explain here. We don’t know how to actually do anything he says to do, beyond broad suggestions.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 1 month agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the Paper:
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i)
it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii)
it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii)
it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
For something to be a core virtue, it needs to be a virtue that should always be applied in any situation where it can be applied. Forgiveness is not something that should be applied in relevant all situations, so I don’t believe it is a core virtue.
At best it would be an applied virtue, as an expression of Justice.
I actually think people are too forgiving in some ways.
I’ll think about adding it to the applied virtues list.
For something to be a core virtue, it needs to be a virtue that should always be applied in any situation where it can be applied. Forgiveness is not something that should be applied in all relevant situations, so I don’t believe it is a core virtue.
At best it would be an applied virtue, as an expression of Justice.
I actually think people are too forgiving in some ways.
I’ll think about adding it to the applied virtues list.