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  Dennis Hackethal revised idea #4767 and marked it as a criticism.

Need time indicators again, for when an idea was posted, like we used to have. But shorter: something like ‘1h’

Need time indicators again, for when an idea was posted, like we used to have. But shorter: something like ‘1h’

  Dennis Hackethal posted idea #4767.

Need time indicators again, for when an idea was posted, like we used to have. But shorter: something like ‘1h’

  Dennis Hackethal revised idea #4730 and marked it as a criticism.

Not if the criticism is clear and concise. That should be incentivized somehow.

Not if the criticism is clear and concise. That should be incentivized somehow.

  Dennis Hackethal posted idea #4764.

In everyday English, we say ‘probably’ to leave room for error and communicate some uncertainty. That’s fine because everyone knows we’re not assigning actual probabilities in the sense of the probability calculus.

In math, we use the probability calculus to describe the frequency of outcomes for underlying processes that look random. Like a coin toss. That’s also fine because we know all possible outcomes and we have a measure for each.

Things go wrong when people use probability even though they don’t know the outcomes (because of the growth of knowledge, say, as you write in #4762) or they have no measure for them or the underlying phenomena don’t behave randomly (again because of the growth of knowledge). Like Elon Musk tweeting we’re 90% likely to see AGI in 2026. (Not a literal quote but he says stuff like that sometimes.)

Some people try to steal the prestige of math and hide their ignorance by using the probability calculus illegitimately.

See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc. It’s been years since I watched it but it’s bound to have related ideas.

  Benjamin Davies criticized idea #4759.

Events occur or don't, and conjectures are refuted or aren't. So is it irrational to say something will "probably happen?

#4759​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

(Steel-manning the common sense view)

We assign implicit probabilities as an expression of our current state of knowledge.

"In the summer desert it will probably be sunny this afternoon" tends to come from some who has no reason to think it won't be sunny, but maybe hasn't investigated it enough to be confident. It roughly translates to "everything I know points to it being sunny this afternoon, but I don't have a grasp of all the factors involved, so I am allowing myself the slim possibility (lol) that I will be surprised".

  Tyler Mills criticized idea #4761.

I will probably not want to learn a new language in the next year.

#4761​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

It is mistaken to apply probabilistic thinking to human affairs, because they involve knowledge, and the growth of knowledge cannot be predicted.

  Tyler Mills posted idea #4761.

I will probably not want to learn a new language in the next year.

  Tyler Mills posted idea #4760.

In summer in the desert, will it "probably" be sunny in the afternoon?

  Tyler Mills started a discussion titled ‘What's wrong with probability? ’.

I'd like to clarify the status of probability-related thinking and everyday terms like "probably", "likely", "expectation", etc.

The discussion starts with idea #4759.

Events occur or don't, and conjectures are refuted or aren't. So is it irrational to say something will "probably happen?

  Tyler Mills posted idea #4758.

Can there be people who are not Turing Complete?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4756.

This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.

#4756​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4751.

SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

#4751​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4749.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

#4748​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

  Tyler Mills criticized idea #4749.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

#4749​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

#4748​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4747.

(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

#4747​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4746.

(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

#4746​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4745.

(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

#4745​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4743.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

#4743​·​Tyler MillsOP revised 3 days ago

(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4741.

(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4739.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills posted idea #4740.

Assumption A1: Only programs that are people while running constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4738.

(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.

#4738​·​Tyler MillsOP, 3 days ago

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.