Dennis Hackethal
@dennis-hackethal·Member since June 2024
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If the court can force people to be jurors because it needs jurors, why can’t it also force people to be judges, lawyers, prosecutors, etc? Why can’t it force carpenters to make tables, chairs, and gavels? Etc. Why draw the line at jurors? Seems absurd.
#3542·Erik Orrje, 4 days agoElaboration:
The conflict in addiction is between short-term and long-term solutions.
The preference for short-term in addiction is caused by uncertainty/an inability to make predictions based on explanations.
This uncertainty can be real (e.g. increased heroin addiction during the Vietnam War) or learned from insecurity during one's early years.
Interesting. Do you think the conflict is always between short vs long-term preferences, or could there be addictive conflicts between two short-term preferences or even two long-term preferences?
#3555·Bart Vanderhaegen, 3 days agoYes. When you have program you can test a concept (incl. whether it is sufficiently defined to allow a program in the first place). But the other way around does not work: "If one does not have a program, then the concept is underspecified".
One way to program HTV could be to feed 2 explanations of the same phenomenon (in the form of text strings) to an LLM that is trained on seeking ETV patterns in text (things of the form "and then -all of a sudden- X happened ..." or "and Y (e.g. tears of a God) is kind of like Z (e.g. rain)" ) and seeking HTV patterns in text (e.g. Y happened because of X, with the LLM evaluating whether it is actual causation, whether if X did not happen, Y could not happen).And then the LLM could rank score the HTV-ness of each string (as a first approximation)
When you have program [sic] you can test a concept (incl. whether it is sufficiently defined to allow a program in the first place). But the other way around does not work: "If one does not have a program, then the concept is underspecified".
That isn’t what I said anyway. No disrespect but frankly I don’t think you know what you’re talking about.
I didn’t read the rest of your comment because you keep talking instead of coding. I’ll delete any further comments of yours that don’t contain code that at least tries to meet the bounty terms.
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No.
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No. For example, the theory of addition is sufficiently specified: we have enough info to implement an algorithm of addition on a computer, then run it, test it, correct errors with it, and so on.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
We’re getting off topic. I’m currently running a bounty requesting a working implementation of HTV.
If you think you can beat the bounty, do it. I’m not interested in anything else for now.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram [sic] cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)?
No, there are objective criteria.
#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoIsn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction
Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?
No.
#3547·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoHow is that a criticism ? What mistake does it point out/ argue for ?
The mistake is insufficiency. If someone gives you a recipe for baking a cake but doesn’t specify ingredients or bake time, that’s a problem.
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
"HTV is underspecified by Deutsch"
That isn’t a quote. Don’t put things in quotation marks unless they are literal quotations or obviously scare quotes.
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
It’s a criticism. Deutsch says to use HTV but never explains in sufficient detail how to do that.
#3543·Bart Vanderhaegen, 4 days agoDo you mean "HTV is underspecified by Deutsch" ? But that is not a criticism ? It does not point to a mistake/ contradiction with HTV ?
That’s only one of several criticisms.
#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 5 days agoI think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
That could work, yeah. What other criticisms of HTV can you think of?
#3524·Erik Orrje, 6 days agoYes, here's a new version:
Some minds with one coercive memeplex are more like dictatorships.
To make a new version of #3516, revise the idea. See that pencil button?
#3534·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 5 days agoI think the first question is whether HTV is a real concept (because if real, it is programmable, and via EC to arbitrary precision)
To understand if it’s real, we need to seek counterexamples/ counterarguments, not demand that a program can be written
What would such a program prove ? Not that HTV is real, but also not that we understand something about HTV.
That’s because Deutsch only says : no program = no understanding. That implies having a basic conception programmed can mean that you understand something. Take the season’s example, you could simulate that replacing Gods would not change the fact that they cry but that tears are not the same as rain etc. Granted, this would only be for 1 example, extending HTV to general examples would be needed. But with such basic program, for 1 example theory, we can’t conclude either that we do not understand anything about HTV.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step. Maybe examples of good theories with some ETV aspects (compared to rejected theories) in them could reveal some more.
Criticising HTV would anyway be the more important first step.
The linked blog post has several criticisms of HTV.
#3530·Fitz Doud, 5 days agoI think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the Paper:
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i)
it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii)
it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii)
it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm.
But he says to use hard to vary as part of a decision-making algorithm. As quoted in my blog post:
“we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
#3530·Fitz Doud, 5 days agoI think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the Paper:
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i)
it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii)
it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii)
it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
Hey Fitz, welcome to Veritula.
I realize that DD doesn’t think of it in strict, procedural terms, but I just don’t think that’s good enough, for several reasons. One is that it’s too vague, as I explain here. We don’t know how to actually do anything he says to do, beyond broad suggestions.