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Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
He also says that “good explanations [are] essential to science…” (thanks @tom-nassis for finding this quote). Recall that a good explanation is one that is hard to vary.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
#3811·Dennis HackethalOP, about 9 hours agoLiberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
It does sound like Deutsch thinks all these different criteria boil down to being about hard vs easy to vary, see #3807.
#3811·Dennis HackethalOP, about 9 hours agoLiberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
The quote may be false, but I don’t see how it’s misleading. I’m not quoting Deutsch in isolation or cherry-picking information or anything like that.
#3809·Dennis HackethalOP, about 9 hours agoI’m not saying hard to vary is a decision-making method. I’m saying it’s an integral part of Deutsch’s decision-making method. As I write in my article:
He argues that “we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
Liberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
#3808·Dennis HackethalOP, about 9 hours agoLiberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
I’m fine allowing user input to sidestep the creativity problem, see #3802.
#3808·Dennis HackethalOP, about 9 hours agoLiberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
I’m not saying hard to vary is a decision-making method. I’m saying it’s an integral part of Deutsch’s decision-making method. As I write in my article:
He argues that “we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
#3707·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days agoDeutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.
Liberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
#3806·Dennis HackethalOP, about 10 hours agofundamental
@zelalem-mekonnen suggested during a space (37:36) that hard to vary is just one mode of criticism.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
#3719·Dennis HackethalOP revised 3 days agoFrom my article:
[I]sn’t the difficulty of changing an explanation at least partly a property not of the explanation itself but of whoever is trying to change it? If I’m having difficulty changing it, maybe that’s because I lack imagination. Or maybe I’m just new to that field and an expert could easily change it. In which case the difficulty of changing an explanation is, again, not an objective property of that explanation but a subjective property of its critics. How could subjective properties be epistemologically fundamental?
fundamental
@zelalem-mekonnen suggested during a space (37:36) that hard to vary is just one mode of criticism.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now, given the strength and positivity of those terms, I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
Even if we allow creative user input, eg a score for the quality of an explanation, we run into all kinds of open questions, such as what upper and lower limits to use for the score, and unexpected behavior, such as criticisms pushing an explanations score beyond those limits.
Even if we allow creative user input, eg a score for the quality of an explanation, we run into all kinds of open questions, such as what upper and lower limits to use for the score, and unexpected behavior, such as criticisms pushing an explanation’s score beyond those limits.
#3797·Dennis HackethalOP, about 10 hours ago@dirk-meulenbelt suggested in a space (at 21:30) that a bunch of epistemology is underspecified. There are many epistemological concepts (like criterion of democracy, falsifiability, etc.) that we don’t know enough about to express in code.
As I write in my article:
… Popper did formalize/specify much of his epistemology, such as the notions of empirical content and degrees of falsifiability. So why couldn’t Deutsch formalize the steps for finding the quality of a given explanation?
#3797·Dennis HackethalOP, about 10 hours ago@dirk-meulenbelt suggested in a space (at 21:30) that a bunch of epistemology is underspecified. There are many epistemological concepts (like criterion of democracy, falsifiability, etc.) that we don’t know enough about to express in code.
Deutsch’s yardstick applies to computational tasks. It’s not meant for other things. It’s not clear to me that the criterion of democracy is a computational task.
#3797·Dennis HackethalOP, about 10 hours ago@dirk-meulenbelt suggested in a space (at 21:30) that a bunch of epistemology is underspecified. There are many epistemological concepts (like criterion of democracy, falsifiability, etc.) that we don’t know enough about to express in code.
Yes, many ideas fail Deutsch’s yardstick. But so what? That doesn’t make things better.
#3707·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days agoDeutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.
@dirk-meulenbelt suggested in a space (at 21:30) that a bunch of epistemology is underspecified. There are many epistemological concepts (like criterion of democracy, falsifiability, etc.) that we don’t know enough about to express in code.
#3795·Dennis HackethalOP, about 11 hours agoDuring a space, starting at around 15:00, @dirk-meulenbelt suggested that Veritula suffers from underspecification: it does not specify which kinds of criticisms users can submit. But there are lots, like Occam’s razor, hard to vary, lack of testability, etc.
Since I criticize Deutsch’s ‘hard to vary’ criterion for being underspecified, Veritula shouldn’t be underspecified either.
(Correct me if I misunderstood you here, @dirk-meulenbelt.)
Veritula and hard to vary are different in this regard. Deutsch claims that ‘hard to vary’ is epistemologically fundamental, that it’s at the core of rationality, and that all progress is made by choosing between explanations based on how hard to vary they are. In other words, he suggests (though only vaguely) a decision-making method.
Veritula has a different decision-making method: one of criticizing ideas and adopting only those with no pending criticisms. That decision-making method is fully specified, with zero vagueness or open questions (that I’m aware of).
Veritula does not pre-specify ahead of time what criticisms people can submit, this is true. But that’s not a problem. It’d be like asking Deutsch to specify ahead of time what explanations people can judge to be easy or hard to vary. That’s not the specification that’s lacking with hard to vary.
#3049·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 2 months agoHow Does Veritula Work?
Veritula (Latin for ‘a bit of truth’) can help you live a life guided exclusively by reason.
To reason, within any well-defined epistemology, means to follow and apply that epistemology. Unreason, or whim, is an undue departure from it. Epistemology is the study of knowledge – basically, the study of what helps knowledge grow, what hinders its growth, and related questions.
Veritula follows, and helps you apply, Karl Popper’s epistemology, Critical Rationalism. It’s a continuation of the Athenian tradition of criticism and the only known epistemology without major flaws.1
Critical Rationalism says that ideas are assumed true until refuted. This approach leaves us free to make bold guesses and use the full arsenal at our disposal to criticize these guesses in order to solve problems, correct errors, and seek truth. It’s a creative and critical approach. Critical Rationalism is a fallibilist philosophy: there is no criterion of truth to determine with certainty whether some idea is true or false. We all make mistakes, and by an effort, we can correct them to get a little closer to the truth. Rejecting all forms of mysticism and the supernatural, Veritula recognizes that progress is both possible and desirable, and that rational means are the only way to make progress.
Veritula is a programmatic implementation of Popper’s epistemology.
Veritula provides an objective, partly automated way to tentatively determine whether a given idea is problematic. It does not tell you what to think – it teaches you how to think.
Consider an idea
I:ISince it has no criticisms, we tentatively consider
Iunproblematic. It is rational to adopt it and act in accordance with it. Conversely, it would be irrational to reject it, consider it problematic, or act counter to it. (See #2281 for more details on rational decision-making.)Next, someone submits a criticism
C1:I | C1The idea
Iis now considered problematic so long as criticismC1is not addressed. How do you address it? You can reviseIso thatC1doesn’t apply anymore, which restores the previous state with just the standaloneI(now calledI2to indicate the revision):Revise I ------------> I2 | C1To track changes, Veritula offers beautiful diffing and version control for ideas.
If you cannot think of a way to revise
I, you can counter-criticizeC1, thereby neutralizing it with a new criticism,C2:I | C1 | C2Now,
Iis considered unproblematic again, sinceC1is problematic and thus can’t be a decisive criticism anymore.If you can think of neither a revision of
Inor counter-criticism toC1, your only option is to accept thatIhas been (tentatively) defeated. You should therefore abandon it, which means: stop acting in accordance with it, considering it to be unproblematic, etc.Since there can be many criticisms (which are also just ideas) and deeply nested counter-criticisms, the result is a tree structure. For example, as a discussion progresses, one of its trees might look like this:
I / | \ C11 C12 C13 / \ \ C21 C22 C23 / \ C31 C32In this tree,
Iis considered problematic. AlthoughC11has been neutralized byC21andC22,C12still needs to be addressed. In addition,C23would have neutralizedC13, butC31andC32makeC23problematic, soC13makesIproblematic as well.You don’t need to keep track of these relationships manually. Veritula marks ideas accordingly, automatically.
Because decision-making is a special case of, ie follows the same logic as, truth-seeking, you can use such trees for decision-making, too. Veritula implements unanimous consent as defined by Taking Children Seriously, a parenting philosophy that builds on Popper’s epistemology. When you’re planning your next move but can’t decide on a city, say, Veritula helps you criticize your ideas and make a rational decision – meaning a decision you’ll be happy with. Again, it’s rational to act in accordance with ideas that have no pending criticisms.
All ideas, including criticisms, should be formulated as concisely as possible, and separate ideas should be submitted separately, even if they’re related. Otherwise, you run the risk of receiving ‘bulk’ criticisms, where a single criticism seems to apply to more content than it actually does.
Again, criticisms are also just ideas, so the same is true for criticisms. Submitting each criticism separately has the benefit of requiring the proponent of an idea to address each criticism individually, not in bulk. If he fails to address even a single criticism, the idea remains problematic and should be rejected.
The more you discuss a given topic, the deeper and wider the tree grows. Some criticisms can apply to multiple ideas in the tree, but that needs to be made explicit by submitting them repeatedly.
Comments that aren’t criticisms – eg follow-up questions or otherwise neutral comments – are considered ancillary ideas. Unlike criticisms, ancillary ideas do not invert their respective parents’ statuses. They are neutral.
One of the main benefits of Veritula is that the status of any idea in a discussion can be seen at a glance. If you are new to a much-discussed topic, adopt the displayed status of the ideas involved: if they are marked problematic, reject them; if they are not, adopt them.
Therefore, Veritula acts as a dictionary for ideas.
One of the problems of our age is that people have same discussions over and over again. Part of the reason is widespread irrationality, expressed in the unwillingness to change one’s mind; another is that it’s simply difficult to remember or know what’s true and what isn’t. Discussion trees can get complex, so people shouldn’t blindly trust their judgment of whether some idea is true or problematic, whether nested criticisms have been neutralized or not. Going off of memory is too error prone.
Veritula solves this problem: it makes discussion trees explicit so you don’t have to remember each idea and its relation to other ideas. Veritula therefore also enables you to hold irrational people accountable: if an idea has pending criticisms, the rational approach is to either abandon it or to save it by revising it or addressing all pending criticisms.
Many people don’t like to concede an argument. But with Veritula, no concessions are necessary. The site just shows you who’s right.
Using Veritula, we may discover a bit of truth.
Popperian epistemology has some flaws, like verisimilitude, but Veritula doesn’t implement those.
During a space, starting at around 15:00, @dirk-meulenbelt suggested that Veritula suffers from underspecification: it does not specify which kinds of criticisms users can submit. But there are lots, like Occam’s razor, hard to vary, lack of testability, etc.
Since I criticize Deutsch’s ‘hard to vary’ criterion for being underspecified, Veritula shouldn’t be underspecified either.
(Correct me if I misunderstood you here, @dirk-meulenbelt.)
#3780·Dennis HackethalOP revised 1 day agoDeutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chapter 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
The ancient Greeks might have found the Persephone myth extremely hard to vary, eg due to cultural constraints. They wouldn’t have agreed that one could just swap out Persephone for someone else.
But then the ease with which a criticism could be varied might have no effect on its parent. So why even bother having a notion of ‘easiness to vary’ at that point?
#3791·Dennis HackethalOP, about 16 hours agoEven so, if a criticism gets score -10, that will push the parent theory’s score above 0.
What if we simply clamp the score at 0?
#3789·Dennis HackethalOP, about 17 hours ago@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
Even so, if a criticism gets score -10, that will push the parent theory’s score above 0.
#3789·Dennis HackethalOP, about 17 hours ago@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
#3721·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days agoFrom my article:
Isn’t the assignment of positive scores, of positive reasons to prefer one theory over another, a kind of justificationism? Deutsch criticizes justificationism throughout The Beginning of Infinity, but isn’t an endorsement of a theory as ‘good’ a kind of justification?
@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
#3784·Zakery Mizell, 1 day agoLeaving the job means more time for research. It also means more time to find a much better job that allows you the energy for research.
Leaving gives space for better balance.