Search Ideas
In everyday English, we say ‘probably’ to leave room for error and communicate some uncertainty. That’s fine because everyone knows we’re not assigning actual probabilities in the sense of the probability calculus.
In math, we use the probability calculus to describe the frequency of outcomes for underlying processes that look random. Like a coin toss. That’s also fine because we know all possible outcomes and we have a measure for each.
Things go wrong when people use probability even though they don’t know the outcomes (because of the growth of knowledge, say, as you write in #4762) or they have no measure for them or the underlying phenomena don’t behave randomly (again because of the growth of knowledge). Like Elon Musk tweeting we’re 90% likely to see AGI in 2026. (Not a literal quote but he says stuff like that sometimes.)
Some people try to steal the prestige of math and hide their ignorance by using the probability calculus illegitimately.
See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfzSE4Hoxbc. It’s been years since I watched it but it’s bound to have related ideas.
(Steel-manning the common sense view)
We assign implicit probabilities as an expression of our current state of knowledge.
"In the summer desert it will probably be sunny this afternoon" tends to come from some who has no reason to think it won't be sunny, but maybe hasn't investigated it enough to be confident. It roughly translates to "everything I know points to it being sunny this afternoon, but I don't have a grasp of all the factors involved, so I am allowing myself the slim possibility (lol) that I will be surprised".
It is mistaken to apply probabilistic thinking to human affairs, because they involve knowledge, and the growth of knowledge cannot be predicted.
I will probably not want to learn a new language in the next year.
In summer in the desert, will it "probably" be sunny in the afternoon?
Events occur or don't, and conjectures are refuted or aren't. So is it irrational to say something will "probably happen?
Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?
This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.
This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.
(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.
(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
Assumption A1: Only programs that are people while running constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.
(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.
(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.