Search Ideas
They can, but the myth says such translations are impossible.
Accurate translation can be very difficult though.
The answer to this question is 'no'. Tarski's theory says that a statement in some language, say English, is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. And Tarski's theory implies that whenever there is another language, say French, in which we can describe the same fact, then the French statement which describes this fact will be true if and only if the corresponding English statement is true. Thus it is impossible, according to Tarski's theory, that of two statements that are translations of each other, one can be true and the other false. Truth, according to Tarski's theory, is therefore not dependent on language, or relative to language.
But is not Tarski's notion of truth a relative notion? Is it not relative to the language to which the statement whose truth is being discussed belongs?
Fallibilism refutes the relativism on which the myth rests because fallibilism provides an absolute standard:
[T]here exists a very different attitude towards absolute truth, in fact a fallibilist attitude. It stresses the fact that the mistakes we make can be absolute mistakes, in the sense that our theories can be absolutely false – that they can fall short of the truth. Thus to the fallibilist the notion of truth, and that of falling short of the truth, may represent absolute standards – even though we can never be certain that we are living up to them. But since they may serve as a kind of steering compass, they may be of decisive help in critical discussions.
Popper then says that Alfred Tarsky revived this notion of absolute truth.
Fallibilism refutes the relativism on which the myth rests because fallibilism provides an absolute standard:
[T]here exists a very different attitude towards absolute truth, in fact a fallibilist attitude. It stresses the fact that the mistakes we make can be absolute mistakes, in the sense that our theories can be absolutely false – that they can fall short of the truth. Thus to the fallibilist the notion of truth, and that of falling short of the truth, may represent absolute standards – even though we can never be certain that we are living up to them. But since they may serve as a kind of steering compass, they may be of decisive help in critical discussions.
Cultural relativism and the doctrine of the closed framework are serious obstacles to the readiness to learn from others. They are obstacles to the method of accepting some institutions, modifying others, and rejecting what is bad.
The myth also stems from cultural relativism: the idea that truth is different for different cultures and that “there is no absolute or objective truth, but rather one truth for the Greeks, another for the Egyptians, still another for the Syrians, and so on.” (P. 45)
Popper opposes this relativism. He says it’s devastating when it comes to the administration of justice, say. “[W]e should try to understand and to compare [different cultures and conceptual frameworks]. We should try to find out who has the better institutions. And we should try to learn from them.” (P. 46)
The myth stems from a “disappointed over-optimism concerning the powers of reason …”. (P. 44)
People think truth should win decisively. But discussions usually don’t lead to such a decisive victory (see #3568). So then people become pessimistic about the fruitfulness of discussions.
The myth stems from a “disappointed over-optimism concerning the powers of reason …”. (P. 44)
People think truth should win decisively. But discussions usually don’t lead to such a decisive victory (see #3568). So then people become pessimistic about the fruitfulness of discussions.
“Truth is hard to come by.” (P. 44)
Don’t view discussions like debate club. The goal isn’t to win a debate or to convert others.
[E]ven the slightest clarification of one's problem - even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one's own position or that of one's opponent - is a great success.
And:
[I]t is enough, more than enough, if we feel that we can see things in a new light or that we have got even a little nearer to the truth.
Popper guesses that science started “when Thales, the founder [of the Ionian school], encouraged Anaximander, his follower, to see whether he could produce a better explanation of the apparent stability of the earth than he himself had been able to offer.” (P. 43)
Science, a tradition of criticism, is unlike other traditions, whose “function is, and has always been, to preserve the purity of the teaching of the founder of the school.” (P. 43)
Science, a tradition of criticism, is unlike previous traditions, whose “Their function is, and has always been, to preserve the purity of the teaching of the founder of the school.” (P. 43)
Science has two parts: myth-making and criticism. (P. 40)
Historically, Western culture is the result of culture clash between Romans and Greeks, Greeks and Egyptians, Persians, Phoenicians. (P. 38)
Such clashes led Xenophanes to draw important epistemological conclusions about truth and guesswork (p. 39). They also helped develop Greek science, including math and astronomy (p. 40).
Historically, Western culture is the result of culture clash between Romans and Greeks, Greeks and Egyptians, Persians, Phoenicians. (P. 38)
Such clashes led Xenophanes draw important epistemological conclusions about truth and guesswork (p. 39).
Historically, Western culture is the result of culture clash between Romans and Greeks, Greeks and Egyptians, Persians, Phoenicians. (P. 38)
Such clashes led Xenophanes draw important epistemological conclusions about truth and guesswork.
Historically, Western culture is the result of culture clash between Romans and Greeks, Greeks and Egyptians, Persians, Phoenicians. (P. 38)
When ideas “conflict, then at best only one of them can be true.” (P. 39)
Even without a common framework, people usually share problems, “such as the problems of survival.” (P. 38) But even if they don’t, they can still learn from each other. Success “will depend largely on our goodwill, and to some extent also on our historical situation, and on our problem situation.”
A fruitful discussion between people of different frameworks is possible, but we should not expect too much (p. 37).
Don’t expect to find agreement! If we learn “new and interesting arguments”, then even if they are “inconclusive”, the discussion is still fruitful. It can take “time and patience”.
[W]e should look with tolerance and even with respect upon customs or conventional laws that differ from our own.