Are AI models narrowly creative?

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised criticism #4858.

I think tractibility lacks the open-ended capacity to reformulate what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

I think this shows that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

I think tractibility lacks the open-ended capacity to reformulate what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a pre-given frame.

I might be confused about what you mean by tractible. But it seems to me that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is formally defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised criticism #4856.

I think the core of universal creativity isn't about efficiency, it's the open-ended capacity to restructure what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

I think this shows that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

I think tractibility lacks the open-ended capacity to reformulate what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

I think this shows that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø commented on criticism #4856.

I think the core of universal creativity isn't about efficiency, it's the open-ended capacity to restructure what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

I think this shows that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

#4856​·​Knut Sondre Sæbø, about 10 hours ago

An interesting example from cognitive science is the Mutilated Chessboard Problem, which asks whether a board with two same-coloured corners removed can be tiled by dominoes. As a tiling problem the search space is combinatorially explosive. But reframe it as a colour problem and the answer is easy. Every domino covers one black and one white square, and you have unequal numbers of each. The solution came not from searching harder, but from seeing the problem differently.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø addressed criticism #4694.

By this standard, a random number generator has universal creativity as well, and is therefore a person. So there must be a standard for personhood other than: able to generate any possible explanation. Such as: can do that tractably.

#4694​·​Tyler MillsOP revised 20 days ago

I think the core of universal creativity isn't about efficiency, it's the open-ended capacity to restructure what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data. Creativity is (at least partially) the ability to reformulate the problem space itself, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI and computational systems is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

I think this shows that tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised criticism #4853 and unmarked it as a criticism.

This also admits of the distinction between AI and AGI (and "universal creativity") as being whether the system is capable of creating knowledge ex nihilo, as argued by Deutsch. Only universal creativity could create knowledge from nothing. Bounded creativity must start with something.

I think DD's view is that creativity is problem-solving at a meta level. True knowledge creation occurs when the problem space itself is reformulated, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

This is why tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

This also admits of the distinction between AI and AGI (and "universal creativity") as being whether the system is capable of creating knowledge ex nihilo, as argued by Deutsch. Only universal creativity could create knowledge from nothing. Bounded creativity must start with something.

Moved the criticism of 4694

  Knut Sondre Sæbø criticized idea #4688.

This also admits of the distinction between AI and AGI (and "universal creativity") as being whether the system is capable of creating knowledge ex nihilo, as argued by Deutsch. Only universal creativity could create knowledge from nothing. Bounded creativity must start with something.

#4688​·​Tyler MillsOP, 20 days ago

This also admits of the distinction between AI and AGI (and "universal creativity") as being whether the system is capable of creating knowledge ex nihilo, as argued by Deutsch. Only universal creativity could create knowledge from nothing. Bounded creativity must start with something.

I think DD's view is that creativity is problem-solving at a meta level. True knowledge creation occurs when the problem space itself is reformulated, not by ironing out implications of existing theories. An AI is already good at ironing out the implications in our language and existing knowledge systems. But that's search within a given space, not the creation of a new one. Creativity seems to work on a higher level. It's operating at the level of problem framing, which requires things like relevance. An AI can't create new relevance, because its weights are a statistical compression of what humans have already found relevant. It inherits a frame; it doesn't generate one.

This is why tractability can't do the work the bounty asks. Tractability is defined relative to a fixed problem space. But universal creativity is (at least partially) the capacity to restructure the space, to change what counts as a problem, a solution, and relevant data.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised criticism #4850 and unmarked it as a criticism.

By Tractible, do you mean "efficient relative to fixed task"?

By Tractible, do you mean "efficient relative to fixed task"?

  Knut Sondre Sæbø criticized idea #4847.

This is a good point, related to Dirk's #4813. As far as the bounty goes, I think my response in #4823 applies here as well, however. To refine it:
Recognizing, criticizing, and being able to understand explanations could all be requisites for tractably synthesizing any possible explanation. The bounty regards whether the tractability requirement can be done without.

It seems like a mind being able to create, recognize, understand and differentiate (etc.) good explanations are necessary but not sufficient criteria for personhood; if that process is intractable, then beyond a certain amount of current knowledge (considering that as the input to the process), the person effectively cannot continue with it... so that compromises the universality.

They must be able to create, recognize and understand any given explanation, and maintain that ability as their knowledge grows, ad infinitum...

#4847​·​Tyler MillsOP, 1 day ago

By Tractible, do you mean "efficient relative to fixed task"?

  Dennis Hackethal commented on criticism #4848.

"Complexity" in the sense of growth behavior with input size? Further reading is still suggesting to me that this is intrinsic to a given algorithm (or class of them). Intrinsic to the math and logic. Implementations can be faster/slower/hungrier for a given input, but if they have different limiting behavior, aren't they different algorithms? I can see how an "implementation" of one algorithm in practice can accidentally change it to another algorithm.

#4848​·​Tyler MillsOP, 1 day ago

"Complexity" in the sense of growth behavior with input size?

Yes.

I can see how an "implementation" of one algorithm in practice can accidentally change it to another algorithm.

Not sure why you put that in scare quotes. You might be right in the CS sense where ‘algorithm’ refers to an abstract procedure whereas ‘implementation’ is concrete code realizing that algorithm. (Though as a disclaimer, I don’t have a CS degree. My experience with programming is fully on-the-job.)

My point is more that two different implementations that compute the same function can have different big O. In that case, they’re usually considered different algorithms, even if the high-level goal is the same.

Regardless, the structure of the program is by far the most important factor determining performance characteristics. If you were saying that complexity is independent of implementation only insofar as the implementation truly implements the same algorithm, then I agree. So I’m not sure whether I should mark this as a counter-criticism. For now I won’t, pending new evidence.

  Tyler Mills addressed criticism #4840.

The given algorithm has a complexity, independent of [the implementation]

No, the complexity depends on the implementation.

#4840​·​Dennis Hackethal, 5 days ago

"Complexity" in the sense of growth behavior with input size? Further reading is still suggesting to me that this is intrinsic to a given algorithm (or class of them). Intrinsic to the math and logic. Implementations can be faster/slower/hungrier for a given input, but if they have different limiting behavior, aren't they different algorithms? I can see how an "implementation" of one algorithm in practice can accidentally change it to another algorithm.

  Tyler Mills commented on criticism #4843.

"Understanding" isn't just another way of saying "can explain.". Explaining follows from understanding, but isn't synonymous. An RNG could by chance generate a good explanation, but it doesn't understand it, and therefore can't distinguish it from garbage. Understanding involves recognizing that something is a good explanation. It is conscious understanding that makes conjecture and criticism possible. Without it, you have no criticism, only random selection. What do you think of the suggestion that what's lacking from the explanatory universality definition, is an intelligent selection mechanism. A random program can generate any explanation given infinite time, but it will never select which explanation is good.

#4843​·​Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 4 days ago

This is a good point, related to Dirk's #4813. As far as the bounty goes, I think my response in #4823 applies here as well, however. To refine it:
Recognizing, criticizing, and being able to understand explanations could all be requisites for tractably synthesizing any possible explanation. The bounty regards whether the tractability requirement can be done without.

It seems like a mind being able to create, recognize, understand and differentiate (etc.) good explanations are necessary but not sufficient criteria for personhood; if that process is intractable, then beyond a certain amount of current knowledge (considering that as the input to the process), the person effectively cannot continue with it... so that compromises the universality.

They must be able to create, recognize and understand any given explanation, and maintain that ability as their knowledge grows, ad infinitum...

  Knut Sondre Sæbø revised criticism #4842.

"Understanding" isn't just another way of saying "can explain." An RNG could by chance generate a good explanation, but it doesn't understand it, and therefore can't distinguish it from garbage. Understanding involves recognizing that something is a good explanation. It is conscious understanding that makes conjecture and criticism possible. Without it, you have no criticism, only random selection. What do you think of the suggestion that what's lacking from the explanatory universality definition, is an intelligent selection mechanism. A random program can generate any explanation given infinite time, but it will never select which explanation is good.

"Understanding" isn't just another way of saying "can explain.". Explaining follows from understanding, but isn't synonymous. An RNG could by chance generate a good explanation, but it doesn't understand it, and therefore can't distinguish it from garbage. Understanding involves recognizing that something is a good explanation. It is conscious understanding that makes conjecture and criticism possible. Without it, you have no criticism, only random selection. What do you think of the suggestion that what's lacking from the explanatory universality definition, is an intelligent selection mechanism. A random program can generate any explanation given infinite time, but it will never select which explanation is good.

  Knut Sondre Sæbø addressed criticism #4808.

Maybe... but "understanding" is too vague, I think. Doesn't understanding mean: can explain? But then this is just "can create any explanation" again. I think the core question is why a random program generator isn't a person, coming from Deutsch's definition of a person as a program that has explanatory universality -- can create any explanation (my thought here is that this definition isn't good enough on its own, given the random generator point).

#4808​·​Tyler MillsOP, 6 days ago

"Understanding" isn't just another way of saying "can explain." An RNG could by chance generate a good explanation, but it doesn't understand it, and therefore can't distinguish it from garbage. Understanding involves recognizing that something is a good explanation. It is conscious understanding that makes conjecture and criticism possible. Without it, you have no criticism, only random selection. What do you think of the suggestion that what's lacking from the explanatory universality definition, is an intelligent selection mechanism. A random program can generate any explanation given infinite time, but it will never select which explanation is good.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #4822.

Ah, so if I understand correctly, there are two knobs affecting speed (elapsed time) for a given algorithm: the hardware, and the implementation of the algorithm. The given algorithm has a complexity, independent of those two, which is how the time and memory scales with an input.

#4822​·​Tyler MillsOP, 5 days ago

The given algorithm has a complexity, independent of [the implementation]

No, the complexity depends on the implementation.

  Tyler Mills commented on criticism #4813.

Creativity isn't defined by its outputs but by its process. RNGs do not recognise or criticise ideas.

#4813​·​Dirk Meulenbelt, 6 days ago

Agreed on both counts, but I think the bountied idea survives this...
Recognizing and criticizing ideas could be a requisite for tractably synthesizing any possible explanation (I suspect as much).

  Tyler Mills commented on criticism #4816.

Speed is a property of programs, too. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_O_notation

#4816​·​Dennis Hackethal, 5 days ago

Ah, so if I understand correctly, there are two knobs affecting speed (elapsed time) for a given algorithm: the hardware, and the implementation of the algorithm. The given algorithm has a complexity, independent of those two, which is how the time and memory scales with an input.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #4809.

A random number generator does not have universal creativity, because it is not a universal explainer: it can only generate explanations by accident. Universal explainers seek good explanations through conjecture and criticism.

#4809​·​Dirk Meulenbelt revised 6 days ago

Universal explainers

In the context of how AGI may work – which seems to be what Tyler is mostly interested in – the concept of a universal explainer might not get us very far. Creativity is the more fundamental concept, I think.

A person is a universal explainer, yes, but he could also use his creativity to come up with reasons not to create explanations.

https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/explain-irrational-minds

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #4809.

A random number generator does not have universal creativity, because it is not a universal explainer: it can only generate explanations by accident. Universal explainers seek good explanations through conjecture and criticism.

#4809​·​Dirk Meulenbelt revised 6 days ago

Universal explainers seek good explanations…

You sounded persuaded by https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable. As in, you agreed that people don’t seek good/hard-to-vary explanations.

So why still speak of good explanations?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #4776.

This wrongly implies speed is a property of programs, but it's a property of hardware.

#4776​·​Tyler MillsOP, 8 days ago

Speed is a property of programs, too. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_O_notation

  Dirk Meulenbelt criticized idea #4812.

We could say a person is a program that can synthesize any possible explanation in finite time, excluding memory limitations. But this would again grant personhood to RNGs. For that matter, a counting program could just enumerate all possible binary strings up to its memory limit, in finite time...

#4812​·​Tyler MillsOP, 6 days ago

Creativity isn't defined by its outputs but by its process. RNGs do not recognise or criticise ideas.

  Tyler Mills commented on criticism #4807.

Doesn't it? All explanatory knowledge is in the set of all possible programs, and a random program (or number) generator can generate any of those, given infinite time.

#4807​·​Tyler MillsOP, 6 days ago

We could say a person is a program that can synthesize any possible explanation in finite time, excluding memory limitations. But this would again grant personhood to RNGs. For that matter, a counting program could just enumerate all possible binary strings up to its memory limit, in finite time...

  Dirk Meulenbelt commented on criticism #4807.

Doesn't it? All explanatory knowledge is in the set of all possible programs, and a random program (or number) generator can generate any of those, given infinite time.

#4807​·​Tyler MillsOP, 6 days ago

You're right and I revised my criticism.

  Dirk Meulenbelt revised criticism #4781.

A random number generator does not create explanatory knowledge.

A random number generator does not have universal creativity, because it is not a universal explainer: it can only generate explanations by accident. Universal explainers seek good explanations through conjecture and criticism.

  Tyler Mills addressed criticism #4783.

Understanding explanatory knowledge seems like a better criterion

#4783​·​Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 8 days ago

Maybe... but "understanding" is too vague, I think. Doesn't understanding mean: can explain? But then this is just "can create any explanation" again. I think the core question is why a random program generator isn't a person, coming from Deutsch's definition of a person as a program that has explanatory universality -- can create any explanation (my thought here is that this definition isn't good enough on its own, given the random generator point).

  Tyler Mills addressed criticism #4781.

A random number generator does not create explanatory knowledge.

#4781​·​Dirk Meulenbelt, 8 days ago

Doesn't it? All explanatory knowledge is in the set of all possible programs, and a random program (or number) generator can generate any of those, given infinite time.