How Does Veritula Work?
#5386·Benjamin Davies, 30 days agoThis seems to create a rewording loophole.
Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”
‘X is true’ and ‘use X for purpose Y while acknowledging that X is not true’ are different proposals. A criticism of X as a true description does not necessarily criticise its bounded use.
#5385·Benjamin Davies, 30 days agoit’s an excellent approximation
It's an excellent approximation to what? Reality? How do we know that?
This assumes ‘approximation’ means measurable closeness to an unknown final theory. In context, it actually means that GR’s predictions closely approximate observed gravitational behaviour in its tested domains. We can compare predictions with observations without knowing the final theory.
#5384·Benjamin Davies, 30 days agoThis is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
“Serious contender” smuggles comparison of explanations with known flaws back in.
How do we distinguish between serious and unserious contenders?
#5384·Benjamin Davies, 30 days agoThis is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
This seems to create a rewording loophole.
Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”
#5384·Benjamin Davies, 30 days agoThis is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
it’s an excellent approximation
It's an excellent approximation to what? Reality? How do we know that?
#5382·Benjamin Davies revised 30 days agoBy this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.
According to every physicist I have heard speak on the matter, GR and QM conflict.
@bart-vanderhaegen has also said to me that GR falsely predicts the orbit of electrons, and QM falsely predicts the mass threshold at which black holes form.
This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.
By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.
According to every physicist I have heard speak on the matter, GR and QM conflict.
@bart-vanderhaegen has also said to me that GR falsely predicts the orbit of electrons, and QM falsely predicts the mass threshold at which black holes form.
#4902·Dennis HackethalOP revised 5 months agoRational Decision-Making
Expanding on #2112…
If an idea, as written, has no pending criticisms, it’s rational to adopt it and irrational to reject it. What reason could you have to reject it? If it has no pending criticisms, then either 1) no reasons to reject it (ie, criticisms) have been suggested or 2) all suggested reasons have been addressed already.
If an idea, as written, does have pending criticisms, it’s irrational to adopt it and rational to reject it – by reference to those criticisms. What reason could you have to ignore the pending criticisms and adopt it anyway?
Or, simplified:
It is rational to adopt only those ideas which, as written, don’t have pending criticisms, and to reject ideas that do.
By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.
#5369·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoBut #5331 relies on our ability to come up with new options to remain rational in the face of mutually exclusive options.
In #5368, I mean fully new options. Like a new theory in addition to QM and GR. Such a theory is extremely hard to come by.
#5368·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoI reply:
Sometimes it’s *hard* to come up with new options. Like in the conflict between QM and GR. So then we have to choose from existing options because we can’t trivially just ‘be creative’ to make a new one
But #5331 relies on our ability to come up with new options to remain rational in the face of mutually exclusive options.
#5340·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoBrett claims in response “the whole Popperian view is that rationality *is* creativity: the *creation* of corrections to errors once identified, etc.” He’s concerned that Veritula “seems to suggest ‘rationality’ is identical to something like ‘logic’ or a purely deductive process.”
I reply:
Sometimes it’s *hard* to come up with new options. Like in the conflict between QM and GR. So then we have to choose from existing options because we can’t trivially just ‘be creative’ to make a new one
#5340·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoBrett claims in response “the whole Popperian view is that rationality *is* creativity: the *creation* of corrections to errors once identified, etc.” He’s concerned that Veritula “seems to suggest ‘rationality’ is identical to something like ‘logic’ or a purely deductive process.”
I give “another argument that rationality isn’t the same as creativity: we can creatively come up with ways to suppress criticism”
#5355·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoIn response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
I ask: “If HTV is just a feature of explanations but not a criterion to form rational preferences, does that mean we could rationally adopt Persephone over axis tilt?”
The implied criticism is that that is clearly not what HTV is intended for.
#5362·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoLiberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)
#5362·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoLiberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”
As for ambiguity, I don’t see how it’s ambiguous, at least now, given the additional quotes and the fact that chapter 1 is in large part about preference formation, as I say in #5363.
#5362·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoLiberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”
I address the cherry-picking charge now:
… chapter 1 was in large part about HTV as a way to prefer axis tilt over Persephone. That was a central part of that chapter: to present David’s answer to how we can make rational choices, using axis tilt vs. Persephone as an example.
So, far from being cherry-picked, several pages in BoI, almost a whole chapter, are about preference formation using HTV.
#5359·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoI reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
Liberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”
I preemptively address that:
Let me state preemptively that I realize these quotes aren’t exclusively about HTV. There are other factors involved in rational decision-making, such as the outcomes of crucial tests (then again, David does link that to HTV in chapter 1). I give these quotes to show that David recognizes and contributes to the problem of how to form rational preferences throughout BoI from various angles.
#5359·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoI reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
But those quotes aren’t all about HTV.
#5355·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoIn response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
I reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
#5355·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoIn response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
I reply:
The question of how we can make rational preferences has been a key philosophical problem since antiquity. Saying HTV isn’t for that is frankly a disservice to Deutsch because it demotes HTV from a genuine philosophical contribution to a mere feature of some explanations that we don’t know what to do with.
#5355·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoIn response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
I reply: “Why care whether explanations have this feature if not to prefer them?”
#5355·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoIn response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
There’s no contradiction there. It can be both a feature of explanations and a tool to help us make decisions.
#5354·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoBen replies that “it is one thing conjecture a theory, it is another thing to compare theories to choose which one to proceed with (tentatively)”; that HTV is meant to help with the latter.
In response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
#5351·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoBrett’s response:
One can *call* that “rationality”. And ok. But what I’m referring to is that process which causes behaviour in humans. We create (choices) and choose them.
If one wants to extract out “coming up with ideas” from this process, ok. But that to me looks just like sentential logic.
Ben replies that “it is one thing conjecture a theory, it is another thing to compare theories to choose which one to proceed with (tentatively)”; that HTV is meant to help with the latter.