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Maybe I’m misunderstanding you but this still sounds different from languages just having different grammar. Some languages just don’t have the subject-predicate structure you spoke of. Still, people who speak them can state true things.

Then that statement, as you just wrote it, may not have any pending criticisms, in which case we assume it’s true. As long we treat ideas as discrete and immutable, even when there’s overlap, we can always still say true things.

One of the problems with cynicism, IMO, is that it ends up with pseudo-problems of language rather than genuine philosophical problems. I think that was one of the big issues with DD’s talk on statements vs. propositions.

Just pointing out that language tends to describe things as having properties. For example, "the flag is red." But that isn't really accurate; it's more that we perceive the flag as red. The flag doesn't actually possess the property of redness.

Just pointing out that language tends to describe things as having properties. For example, "the flag is red." But that isn't really accurate; it's more that we perceive the flag as red. The flag doesn't actually possess the property of redness.

Just pointing out that language tends to describe things as having properties. For example, "the flag is red." But that isn't really accurate; it's more that we perceive the flag as red. The flag doesn't actually possess the property of redness.

I spoke of different grammar, not categories.

Good idea, but one more question first. When you say a different language with different categories could also make true statements, do you mean truth is just any description that maps onto the states of the world? If so, it seems you can have multiple (indefinitely?) different carvings that all give coherent descriptions of those states.

That's true. This wasn't meant as an argument against realist truth, and it's probably beside the point I'm making anyway. I was just drawing a distinction: an absolute truth can exist, but without a god's eye view we can never know whether our theories correspond to it.

…the subject-predicate structure…

What could grammar have to do with this? A different language that uses different grammar can still make true statements.

By the way, continuing here may not be in your interest because #4930 breaks the criticism chain. If your goal is to refute the notion that ideas can be true, you’ll probably want to connect your next criticism to #4915 somehow, or one of the ideas above it.

A better framing of what I mean might be «closer to truth». If the theories are consistent with more perspectives (big objects, people, small objects etc.), it is closer to truths. Newton’s theory is in that sense closer to truth than Ptolemy’s geocentric theory.

This sounds like verisimilitude, which Popper worked on a bunch. As I recall, David Miller refuted it toward the end of Popper’s life. Popper was still around to accept the refutation.

I’m not aware that anyone restored or vindicated verisimilitude. But even if someone did, we’d need to formalize and quantify it. Just saying “Newton’s theory is in that sense closer to truth than Ptolemy’s geocentric theory” would be too vague IMO.

But to verify absolute truth you would need to know every possible criticism of an idea.

But we don’t need to verify our ideas. As I wrote in #4891, there’s no criterion of truth to tell that an idea is true. But it can still be true.

"Fact about the world" seems too strong to me. There can be many good explanations of the same reality that carve it up differently. Newton's theories still work pretty well, but Einstein's have a more complete mapping onto reality. I agree "it's raining" has something real grounding it. But "rain" as a category, the subject-predicate structure, water as droplets, just seem to be features of our description. My notion of fact might just be wrong. The idea I have in my head when I think of facts is that the concepts we use are definite ontological categories in reality.

I completely agree with the definition in 4894. But to verify absolute truth you would need to know every possible criticism of an idea. Without a god’s eye view, you can’t know if your ideas are fallible to a criticism you haven’t detected.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

A better framing of what I mean might be «closer to truth». If the theories are consistent with more perspectives (big objects, people, small objects etc.), it is closer to truths. Newton’s theory is in that sense closer to truth than Ptolemy’s geocentric theory.

When you say it's 100% true that it's raining, "the facts" you correspond to are already facts within that framework, and not reality.

I think of them as facts of reality. I don’t think about ‘frameworks’. I think the idea of frameworks invites relativism.

We don’t need the molecular level for this. Truth is a very simple concept. No need to complicate it.

[W]e have no way of verifying that our conceptual carvings track or pick out entities and relations in reality. … [This] definitely rules out absolute truth.

I don’t see how it does. That we have no way to verify our theories (“conceptual carvings”) doesn’t rule out absolute truth. It does sound like we have different notions of ‘absolute truth’ in mind. For mine, see #4894.

Ironically, your idea that theories can be “more true than others” rules out absolute truth in the sense that truth leaves absolutely no room for deviation. Absolute truth is a binary: true or false. Nothing in between.

If you agree that truth is correspondence with reality, and not with the facts within our conceptual framework, the problem reemerges.

I disagree because I think this sets up a false dichotomy.

When I wrote “Truth means correspondence with the facts”, that means with the facts of reality.

Would you agree that this notion of truth amounts to truth relative to our conceptual framework? When you say it's 100% true that it's raining, "the facts" you correspond to are already facts within that framework, and not reality.

At the molecular level there are no discrete raindrops, only a continuous distribution of H2O molecules constantly evaporating and condensing, and some of those very molecules are diffusing through the roof into the house, since no material is 100% impermeable to water vapor.

You might disagree. But when we search for truth, I think most of us are trying to understand the causal structure of the universe, not just predict it with our own fitted models. This is just a criticism of this notion of truth, which waters the concept down from what I at least think of as truth. Many incompatible theories can fit the same facts without capturing any causality. If you agree that truth is correspondence with reality, and not with the facts within our conceptual framework, the problem reemerges.

A statement carves the world into concepts standing in relations. For it to correspond with reality, those concepts must pick out genuine entities and relations in reality. But we have no way of verifying that our conceptual carvings track or pick out entities and relations in reality. This might not imply that some theories can't be more true than others. But it definitely rules out absolute truth.

When we search for truth, I think most of us are trying to understand the causal structure of the universe, not just predict it with our own fitted models. This is just a criticism of this notion of truth, which waters the concept down from what I at least think of as truth. Many incompatible theories can fit the same facts without capturing any causality. If you agree that truth is correspondence with reality, and not with the facts within our conceptual framework, the problem reemerges.

A statement carves the world into concepts standing in relations. For it to correspond with reality, those concepts must pick out genuine entities and relations in reality. But we have no way of verifying that our conceptual carvings track or pick out entities and relations in reality.

When we search for truth, I think most of us are trying to understand the causal structure of the universe, not just predict it with our own fitted models. This is just a criticism of this notion of truth, which waters the concept down from what I at least think of as truth. Many incompatible theories can fit the same facts without capturing any causality. If you agree that truth is correspondence with reality, and not with the facts within our conceptual framework, the problem reemerges.

A statement carves the world into concepts standing in relations. For it to correspond with reality, those concepts must pick out genuine entities and relations in reality. But we have no way of verifying that our conceptual carvings track the world's entities and relations. And therefore we can't know if a statement is true, or if it merely corresponds with the facts (our ideas/perceptions of the world)

In that case, I'm unclear what "100% true" means.

Perfect correspondence with the facts.

For example, if it’s currently raining, and you say it is, then your statement is 100% true.

In that case, I'm unclear what "100% true" means. If your definitions have wiggle room, then the truth is not your idea. The truth is within the bounds of your idea, but it is not identical to your idea.

…as the postmoderns pointed out…

Citation needed.

I think you misunderstand both my own argument and the meaning of ambiguity.

You’re saying that, to hold a true idea in the sense of absolute truth in my head, I’d have to have perfect definitions, which require infinite amounts of information, and having all that information is impossible. Right?

While you obviously know what those words mean, you do not have absolute, 100% defined boundaries of what they refer to and what they don't.

I think it’s enough to know what the words mean for the idea to be true. We don’t have to have “100% defined boundaries”.

Truth means correspondence with the facts (Tarski). Not infinite precision.

I think a ‘trick’ cynics use (not maliciously, still I like to call it a trick) is to set an unrealistically high standard for truth. And then, when no idea ends up being able to meet that standard, they say the idea can’t be true.

I think you misunderstand both my own argument and the meaning of ambiguity. "I'm currently located in a hemisphere" is not ambiguous in its meaning due to not knowing which hemisphere you're in. The meaning is ambiguous to the extent that we do not have absolute knowledge of what you are, what it is to be located, or what a hemisphere is - or what "in" is. While you obviously know what those words mean, you do not have absolute, 100% defined boundaries of what they refer to and what they don't. But you would have to have that to have absolute truth.

I may be wrong in this argument, but I don't see how your counterexample refutes it.