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I think that's pretty accurate. But if you believe reality simply works by executing a formal set of fundamental rules, how can you believe anything else? By this model, any system only ever has input, output, and functions that determine how that output is generated. What else is there?

I'm probably critiquing a different idea of rationality. My point was simply that there seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not a sufficient criterion for evaluation. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?

By what criterion do you evaluate an explicit idea versus an implicit idea?

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.

Do you mean something more than finding unanimous consent between different kinds of ideas about rationality?

Haven't thought about it like that. The purpose of speaking of an embodied agent is to generalize cognition. To understand what's relevant to an agent, you need to understand how that agent is embodied in the world.

I'm probably critiquing a different idea of rationality. My point was simply that there seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not a sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?

There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?

How do you evaluate an implicit idea rationally?

There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reasoning?

Option 2: Go on hiatus from the day job/career, and focus on creative pursuits and research, full-time, for some number of months (duration perhaps depending on job opportunities).

Option 1: Continue working the day job and balancing the other pursuits on the side.

…feelings and other nonrational mental contents…

Feelings aren’t “nonrational” per se. There’s a rational place for feelings. See #3632: I mean no disrespect when I say this but I think you don’t yet understand the notion of rationality I use.

…rational deliberation.

Rationality isn’t the same as deliberation. Deliberation can be part of a rational process but it’s not synonymous with it.

…cannot be reduced to explicit reasons…

Favoring explicit ideas over inexplicit ones is an example of irrationality.

feelings and other nonrational mental contents

Feelings aren’t “nonrational” per se. There’s a rational place for feelings. See #3632: I mean no disrespect when I say this but I think you don’t yet understand the notion of rationality I use.

You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.

That isn’t what I mean by unity of knowledge. Of course we can’t process our knowledge in its totality at once. That’s necessarily piecemeal. But that doesn’t mean we can’t live a life guided by reason.

If you consider riding a bike an example of irrationality, and reasoning through quantum mechanics an example of rationality, then you haven’t understood Deutsch’s/my stance on rationality. I think you should study it, ask more questions about it, before you’re ready to criticize it.

I don’t think any of this addresses my original criticism that calling people “embodied agent[s]” is dehumanizing. It sounds like we’re studying rats. So what if cog-sci is dehumanizing? That doesn’t make it better.

This is also borrowed from cognitive science.

Yeah, the cog-sci guys don’t understand Popper or epistemology generally. They seem to view minds and brains as input/output machines. But that isn’t how that works.

An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.

That has nothing to do with brain regions. An AGI running on a laptop would use the same phrases.

Several typos here. Please use more care when you write ideas.

Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)

The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​