Search Ideas

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.

Do you mean something more than finding unanimous consent between different kinds of ideas about rationality?

Haven't thought about it like that. The purpose of speaking of an embodied agent is to generalize cognition. To understand what's relevant to an agent, you need to understand how that agent is embodied in the world.

I'm probably critiquing a different idea of rationality. My point was simply that there seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not a sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?

There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?

How do you evaluate an implicit idea rationally?

There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reasoning?

Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)

The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.

Even if knowledge is unified at some fundamental level, we might not be able to live by means of this unified knowledge alone (because of how we function or pure complexity). Living life might require operating through other «kinds» of knowledge which are pre- cognitive. You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.

This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.

Fixed it. I meant to write perspectival knowledge, whcih is a term used in cognitive science.

Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)

Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)

If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.

A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.

I think you run into circular dependence if you exhaustively try to account for brain function by information processing. Even Claud Shannon’s definition of information is dependent upon a «mind/perspective» defining a range of possible states. The world devoid of any perspective would have infinite states and systems depending on how you «view the world». An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) Three body problem. This computation is dependent on a mind defining states and logical relations.

If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».

If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».

If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.

A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.

Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.

Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.

I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.

A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.

Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities

I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.