Tyler Mills
@tyler-mills·Joined Jan 2026·Ideas
#4756·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoThis implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
Actually this is not implied. One experience and an identical later one could be caused by the same program(s) being run again at a later time; if the program which is identical to the given experience is part of an "evolutionary personhood program", that still qualifies: If the second experience is identical, under the above solution that just means that the exact same evolutionary steps are taken in the second case. Maybe this would virtually never happen, but poses no problem of principle.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain way (by a person).
By the latter standard, neither nature nor random number generators are people, which is sensible; nor can nature create any given possible knowledge tractably -- this is true because the fact that all possible knowledge exists is only by way of the multiverse, which is a process that cannot be simulated in its entirety, even by a quantum computer, never mind tractability.
By the latter standard, neither nature nor random number generators are people, which is sensible; nor can nature create any given possible knowledge tractably -- this is true because the fact that all possible knowledge exists is only by way of the multiverse, which is a process that cannot be simulated in its entirety, even by a quantum computer.
#4774·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoAn alternative criterion for personhood is speed: a person is a program that can synthesize any explanation in less than the lifetime of the universe, say.
This wrongly implies speed is a property of programs, but it's a property of hardware.
#4774·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoAn alternative criterion for personhood is speed: a person is a program that can synthesize any explanation in less than the lifetime of the universe, say.
This is a bad criterion because then random program generators are sometimes people.
#4694·Tyler MillsOP revised 3 months agoBy this standard, a random number generator has universal creativity as well, and is therefore a person. So there must be a standard for personhood other than: able to generate any possible explanation. Such as: can do that tractably.
An alternative criterion for personhood is speed: a person is a program that can synthesize any explanation in less than the lifetime of the universe, say.
#4761·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoI will probably not want to learn a new language in the next year.
It is mistaken to apply probabilistic thinking to human affairs, because they involve knowledge, and the growth of knowledge cannot be predicted.
In summer in the desert, will it "probably" be sunny in the afternoon?
I'd like to clarify the status of probability-related thinking and everyday terms like "probably", "likely", "expectation", etc.
Events occur or don't, and conjectures are refuted or aren't. So is it irrational to say something will "probably happen?
#4756·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoThis implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?
#4751·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoSOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.
This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
#4748·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoPROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.
#4749·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoSOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.
#4748·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months agoPROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.
#4747·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months ago(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.
PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?
#4746·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months ago(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.
(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.
#4745·Tyler MillsOP, 3 months ago(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.
(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.
#4743·Tyler MillsOP revised 3 months ago(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.
(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.
(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.