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#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 26 days agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.