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#5738·Vincent Brunsch, 13 days agoBy “phenomenal experience” I simply mean there being something it is like to see red, feel pain, fear, etc. Your claim that animals are insentient is itself a claim that these experiences are absent.
Whether such experience can occur without universal/critical cognition is precisely what is under dispute. So saying that these distinctions may not exist, because ultimately there is one kind of information processing that gives rise to consciousness, seems to assume the package-deal hypothesis rather than provide an argument for it.
If there is an independent reason why phenomenal experience cannot occur without universal creativity, that would address the criticism. But I don’t think collapsing the distinction itself does.
… seems to assume the package-deal hypothesis rather than provide an argument for it.
It sounds like you’re using a non-Popperian epistemology, with positive reasons to adopt some stance.
I don’t think that’s right, for the reasons Popper explained. I don’t make arguments for any stance. I ask if anyone finds anything wrong with it. I keep advocating it until someone does.