Are we always wrong?
The statement that “we are always wrong” is contentious, even within fallibilism. Concepts like truth and falsity, degrees of truth, or better and worse explanations all come with their own pitfalls. In this discussion, I hope we can reach a consensus on how to describe fallibilism in a way that acknowledges and addresses these challenges.
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With an account, you can revise, criticize, and comment on ideas, and submit new ideas.The above statement is correct. But instead of "conditional" I would rather use "contextual" or at the right level of abstraction. If we're talking about math, we don't need to bring in other subjects by fiat. Within math, 1+1 = 2 is 100% true. Of course that is in the context of the things being added are identical and the + sign is said to mean "collecting" or "adding." Now, this doesn't mean 1+1=2 is unquestionable, someone might say "what if we are adding an apple and an orange?" And this also doesn't mean that we get this empirically, it is still a guess. You can also know more about it. Like Brett talks about the Peano's axiom. At that point, you are going in more detail, which might be needed if it solves your problem.
My understanding so far is fallible means anyone can be wrong, which means that there is something to be right about, and as such one can be 100% right. y as things get complex and more detailed, it becomes to know which part you are 100% right about. And at that point, you go with what solves your problem, unless your problem is finding ideas that are 100% true, in which case the best you can do is guess how that idea can be false.
as things get complex and more detailed, it becomes to know which part you are 100% right about.
I think an important consideration here is that because we have no way to prove something to be 100% true (because knowledge is conjectured, not justified), that we should assume it to contain areas of improvement and can never be 100% true. The best we can do is say it's true on the condition of axioms X Y Z and the fact that I cannot think of any further criticisms.
y as things get complex and more detailed, it becomes to know which part you are 100% right about.
Typos
If we use the correspondence theory of truth, then truth consists of explanations that correspond "perfectly" to reality. In that sense all our statements are false: we don't have those explanations that perfectly correspond, all our actual statements are approximations, or deductions from approximations (1+1=2 is a deduction from a set of explanations, but that set is not entirely true - since the set is inconsistent and incomplete)