Badges
Activity
#2260·Dirk Meulenbelt, 2 days agoIn that same vein, why couldn't we class biology (evolution) under epistemology?
I still see epistemology as distinct, and I'll try to make my case for it. Epistemology explains how humans create explanatory knowledge — unlike biological evolution, which also produces knowledge, but not explanations. Explanatory knowledge is special because it allows us to understand the world. Deutsch even suggests that this kind of knowledge tends toward convergence — a unified theory of everything — implying a deep connection between reality and its capacity to be explained.
Economics, on the other hand, isn’t distinct in the same way. It deals with trade-offs and scarcity — principles already fundamental to biology. Life itself is about managing limited resources and the trade-offs that come with them. Evolution, in turn, discovered increasingly effective strategies for doing so — including cooperation, exchange, and other relationships between and across lifeforms that facilitate these trades.
Yes, but that inhirent in biology (evolution) right? I see it as part of the evolutionary strand for this reason.
#2090·Erik Orrje, 7 days agoYeah (3) is interesting. Constructor theory is the contender I can think of for a future fifth strand. Any other suggestions?
I currently see Constructor Theory as a meta-theory. A different mode of explanation. But it raises an interesting question: does CT actually qualify as a deeper theory than the four strands? Even if we were to express all four strands in constructor-theoretic terms, that alone wouldn’t make it explain more or have greater reach. So when would it truly deserve to be considered a strand/theory of everything?
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism can either be counter-criticized or it can be an unresolved error. If it’s a bad criticism, you just counter-criticize it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply counter-criticize bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly countering poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
That being said, I agree with the points you brought up in #2061, namely that there can be no positive arguments for an idea. By extension, if Veritula would require a specific format or mode of criticism, we’d fall into the very error Popper warns about with the Myth of the Framework—the mistaken belief that criticism requires a shared framework or language. So, Veritula should functionally remain as it is. At most, you might consider adding guidelines on what constitutes good versus poor criticism, so that critics can improve their skills. But I agree: the person who created the idea should remain solely responsible for addressing the criticisms they receive, not dismissing them as “bad” and moving on.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism can either be counter-criticized or it can be an unresolved error. If it’s a bad criticism, you quickly counter it—say, by clarifying why it’s irrelevant—and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply counter-criticize bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly countering poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
That being said, I agree with the points you brought up in #2061, namely that there can be no positive arguments for an idea. By extension, if Veritula would require a specific format or mode of criticism, we’d fall into the very error Popper warns about with the Myth of the Framework—the mistaken belief that criticism requires a shared framework or language. So, Veritula should functionally remain as it is. At most, you might consider adding guidelines on what constitutes good versus poor criticism, so that critics can improve their skills. But I agree: the person who created the idea should remain solely responsible for addressing the criticisms they receive, not dismissing them as “bad” and moving on.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
#2094·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoPasting #2079 here as it’s since been hidden in a resolved child thread and should have applied directly to #2074 in the first place.
My current view is that the only meaningful dichotomy is good vs. bad.
You say yourself in #2071 that one should “always avoid positive arguments.” Calling a theory “good” would be a positive argument.
As I say in #2065, Popperian epistemology has no room for ‘good’ or any other justification. I’m not aware that anyone has successfully proposed a way to measure the ‘hard-to-varyiness’ of theories anyway. We can criticize theories for being arbitrary (which is another word for ‘easy to vary’). That’d be fine. But Popper wouldn’t give them points for not being arbitrary. And arbitrariness isn’t the only type of criticism a theory might receive anyway.
If we follow Popper and get rid of justification, we can’t use ‘good vs bad’ because we can’t use ‘good’. The only dichotomy left standing is ‘has some bad’ vs ‘has no bad’. Another word for ‘pointing out some bad’ is ‘criticism’. So this dichotomy can be rephrased as: ‘has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’, or ‘has reasons to be rejected’ vs ‘has no reasons to be rejected’. Note that there’s a difference: if you think some idea is bad, you submit a criticism. If you think it’s good, you can still submit a criticism because it might not yet be as good as you want it to be. So regardless of how good a theory might be, it can still have pending criticisms, and thus reasons to reject it. Think of Newtonian physics, which (I’m told) is a superb theory, but it’s false and (as I understand it) has plenty of pending criticisms.
‘Has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’ is directly comparable whereas ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aren’t directly comparable. And ‘has n pending criticisms’ vs ‘has m’ or ‘has 0 pending criticisms’ are even numerically comparable.
Veritula does not implement Deutsch’s epistemology. It implements Popper’s. I don’t think they’re compatible.
(As an aside, I’m not sure how I could implement Deutsch’s epistemology even if I wanted to. Would I give each idea a slider where people can say how ‘good’ the idea is? What values would I give the slider? Would the worst value be -1,000 and the best +1,000? How would users know to assign 500 vs 550? Would a ‘weak’ criticism get a score of 500 and a ‘strong’ one 1,000? What if tomorrow somebody finds an even ‘stronger’ one, does that mean I’d need to extend the slider beyond 1,000? And so on.)
Great clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
I see where the confusion comes from, but I thought clarifying my viewi in #2073 already addressed the criticism. What else would you suggest I do?
I see where the confusion comes from, but I thought clarifying my current view in #2073 already addressed the criticism. What else would you suggest I do?
#2076·Dennis HackethalOP, 8 days agoWell, you start #2074 by referencing the “mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments”, and calling a criticism small is a common way to call it weak. They’re often used as synonyms in this context.
I see where the confusion comes from, but I thought clarifying my viewi in #2073 already addressed the criticism. What else would you suggest I do?
Deutsch says our body of knowledge keeps growing both deeper—better explanations—and wider—new fields, more facts, rules of thumb. He thinks depth is winning. It might be interesting to asses what that balance looks like in 2025.
Deutsch says our body of knowledge keeps growing both deeper—better explanations—and wider—new fields, more facts, rules of thumb. He thinks depth is winning. It might be interesting to asses what that balance looks like in 2025.
Perhaps it’s premature, but I’d love to discuss:
why DD thinks the four strands already amount to a theory of everything
why DD presents quantum mechanisms as having already subsumed general relativity
what other (proto)strands we could envision and why they are indeed a meaningful addition to the 4 strands
Deutsch says our body of knowledge keeps growing both deeper—better explanations—and wider—new fields, more facts, rules of thumb. He thinks depth is winning. It might be interesting to asses what that balance looks like in 2025.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism can either be counter-criticized or it can be an unresolved error. If it’s a bad criticism, you just counter-criticize it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply counter-criticize bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly countering poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism can either be counter-criticized or it can be an unresolved error. If it’s a bad criticism, you just counter-criticize it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply counter-criticize bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly countering poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
That being said, I agree with the points you brought up in #2061, namely that there can be no positive arguments for an idea. By extension, if Veritula would require a specific format or mode of criticism, we’d fall into the very error Popper warns about with the Myth of the Framework—the mistaken belief that criticism requires a shared framework or language. So, Veritula should functionally remain as it is. At most, you might consider adding guidelines on what constitutes good versus poor criticism, so that critics can improve their skills. But I agree: the person who created the idea should remain solely responsible for addressing the criticisms they receive, not dismissing them as “bad” and moving on.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
#2070·Dennis HackethalOP, 8 days agoThere’s another issue with disregarding ‘small’/‘weak’ criticisms: some criticisms may look small at first, but as you investigate, you realize they’re actually a big deal.
I realized this the other day on the topic of macOS UI bugs during a Twitter space. Somebody said that many of the issues I had pointed out with the new Tahoe OS were just minor UI glitches (in other words: ‘weak criticisms’). But then somebody else pointed out that those are still worrisome because severe security holes, like being able to bypass authentication, have presented as minor UI glitches in the past!
I agree with the premise that small does not mean insignificant. My current view is that the only meaningful dichotomy is good vs. bad. I may have used labels like weaker or stronger, smaller or bigger, minor or major in the past, but I now see that was a mistake—they have no place when judging a criticism. So in this case, I don’t think the criticism applies because we’re not in disagreement.
#2063·Dennis HackethalOP, 8 days agoWhile I could simply refute bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly refuting poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all.
That’s a fair concern if you’re talking about duplicate criticisms, which public intellectuals do field. The solution here is to publicly write a counter-criticism once and then refer to it again later. It is then on the other party to present some new reasoning or evidence, pending which you don’t need to change your mind or focus any more attention on the matter.
For example, people’s knee-jerk reaction to libertarianism is ‘who would build the roads if there were no government?’ That’s one of the reasons Logan and I wrote the Libertarian FAQ, which answers that question. We can now just link to that whenever it comes up.
If you’re talking about new criticisms, however, I think you should address and not dismiss them.
Makes sense. I’ve noticed you often refer to your blog posts or Veritula ideas during arguments.
#2065·Dennis HackethalOP, 8 days agoWell, it’s as you say: if a criticism is bad/weak/whatever, people should argue their case and explain why it’s bad, in the form of a counter-criticism. If the first criticism truly is weak, that should be easy to do. If anyone could just assert that something is bad without giving any reasoning, that would be arbitrary. It would allow them to reject any criticism on whim.
In my understanding, Popper’s epistemology operates on contradiction and non-contradiction. It does not assign strengths or weaknesses. By rejecting justificationism, it rejects positive reasons for preferring one theory over another and instead emphasizes the critical attitude as the only way to make progress. So it does use negative reasons for preferring one theory over another (by rejecting one theory and not another). It looks for reasons against, not reasons for. It seeks to eliminate error.
Speaking of error elimination, Popper’s epistemology does not say to eliminate some errors and ignore others whenever we feel like it. I’m not aware that it makes any distinction between better or worse criticisms. It says to eliminate errors, period.
Great point! It's a good reminder to always avoid positive arguments. By extension, if Veritula would require a specific format or mode of criticism, we’d fall into the very error Popper warns about with the Myth of the Framework—the mistaken belief that criticism requires a shared framework or language. So, Veritula should remain as it is.
At most, you might consider adding guidelines on what constitutes good versus poor criticism, so that critics can improve their skills. But I agree: the person who created the idea should remain solely responsible for addressing the criticisms they receive, not dismissing them as “bad” and moving on.
#2062·Dennis HackethalOP, 8 days agoJust a clarification because you seem to be fudging refutation and criticism:
A refutation is an explanation for why something cannot be true, ie must be false. For example, some guy claims his grandfather fought in WW2. But you checked his birth certificate and he was born in 1950. So he couldn’t have fought in WW2.
A criticism just points out some shortcoming. It could be any shortcoming, even something as small as a typo.
Any refutation is also a criticism, but not every criticism is a refutation.
Thanks for clarifying! I changed the text to phrase it as counter-criticize because that's indeed more accurate here.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism is a criticism: it can either be refuted or it has outstanding criticism. If it’s a bad criticism, you just refute it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply refute bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly refuting poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism can either be counter-criticized or it can be an unresolved error. If it’s a bad criticism, you just counter-criticize it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply counter-criticize bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly countering poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism is a criticism: it can either be refuted or it has outstanding criticism. If it’s a bad criticism, you just refute it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction here). While I could simply refute bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly refuting poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism is a criticism: it can either be refuted or it has outstanding criticism. If it’s a bad criticism, you just refute it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction: for instance, bad explanations are easy to vary or point to authorities to justify themselves rather than offering a hard-to-vary account of how and why something works). While I could simply refute bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly refuting poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
@dennis-hackethal you have regularly pointed out to me that it’s a mistake to assign strengths or weaknesses to arguments—for example, in #1809 and #1927. I’d love to get to the bottom of that.
On one hand, I see what you mean. A criticism is a criticism: it can either be refuted or it has outstanding criticism. If it’s a bad criticism, you just refute it or deem it irrelevant and move on.
I also see why talking about a “gradient” or comparative strength between arguments is problematic: there’s no objective criterion to measure them against. We can only say one theory is better than another when both attempt to explain the same phenomenon—then we can evaluate them using properties such as hard-to-varyness and other criteria Deutsch describes. (We can get into that if you’d like, though I don’t think that’s our main disagreement.). But this comparison doesn’t apply when we’re dealing with very different criticisms of a single idea, because there’s no common standard to measure them against. Comparing their “strength” becomes arbitrary.
However, I still think there are good and bad criticisms, just as there are good and bad explanations (following Deutsch’s distinction here). While I could simply refute bad criticisms and move on, there’s also the matter of efficiency and opportunity cost: I don’t want to waste time repeatedly refuting poor criticisms, or worse, get stuck in circular debates with people who don’t recognize that some arguments aren’t good criticisms at all. I’d rather focus my attention on good criticisms.
To clarify what I mean, here’s an excerpt from my book:
The most important principle to remember while criticizing is: Criticize, don’t defend or attack. Good explanations invite criticism of their intrinsic content—whether the explanation itself works, solves the problem, and avoids worse side effects. Bad explanations, by contrast, deflect criticism onto irrelevant, extrinsic properties such as authority or track record—e.g., “this is the method that successful company X uses,” “I believe strongly in this approach,” or “it’s coming from person Y, so it’s worthless.”
That kind of “criticism” isn’t real criticism at all. It’s just attacking or defending. And when we play that game, the explanation itself stays untouched and stagnant. The idea doesn’t get scrutinized or improved—it only gets shielded or dismissed for irrelevant reasons.
Tagging @bart-vanderhaegen because he and I have discussed this at length—in fact, I got the defending/attacking framing from him.
#1806·Dennis Hackethal, about 1 month agoAnother problem with the term ‘statement’ is that not every statement encodes knowledge. Only some statements do.
For example, trivial or tautological statements aren’t knowledge, neither in the Popperian nor common sense of the word.
It’s a valid criticism, but off-topic here. In both my book and video, I define these labels specifically as types of knowledge—not as trivial utterances or noise. So the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to directly address that concern, since I’ll make it clear upfront that all of them are knowledge types.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise. Therefore, the label I’m looking for doesn’t need to address this criticism, since I’ll clarify beforehand that all are types of knowledge.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
#1863·Dennis Hackethal, 25 days agoIn light of (at the time of writing) three outstanding criticisms of your new terminology (#1630), what do you plan to do, if anything?
Some ideas: if you disagree with the criticisms, we could discuss further; if you agree, we could come up with ways to correct the error, like (just spitballing here) revising your terminology going forward or posting disclaimers on previous publications.
Either way, it would be good to reach some sort of conclusion.
Thanks for the reminder! Yes, I agree it’s good to strive for some form of resolution. My current take is that I’m still satisfied with Intuitions and Drives as more accessible labels. But the shortcomings you’ve raised in Statement are severe, and I hope to find a better alternative. Unfortunately, I haven’t had much success on my own. I’ll share my current thoughts here — perhaps we can continue exploring alternatives for Statement if you think that’s worthwhile. If, however, you believe all three labels are a mistake and that it’s irrational for me to pursue them, I of course understand if you’d prefer not to continue the discussion.
Problems with Statement
1) By definition a statement is a verbalized expression, whereas explicit knowledge doesn’t need to be verbalized. It just needs to be verbalizable. Calling it a Statement is confusing, as people might think it must be verbalized, while my point is simply that it can be verbalized.
2) It also carries the figurative meaning of “making a statement” through non-verbal actions (e.g., wearing a certain outfit, defying a social norm), which causes confusion, as you pointed out in #1700.
3) You say that statements don’t necessarily need to contain knowledge (see #1806), but can also be trivial or tautological. While I agree, I don’t see this as a relevant criticism of my labels, since in my book and video I define them as types of knowledge — not as trivial utterances or noise.
Given these problems, I’ve tried to find a more suitable word. The only candidate I’ve found so far is Formulations. It conveys explicitness, but it doesn’t fully address problem 1), since it still carries the connotation of being expressed rather than merely expressible.
Curious to hear your thoughts, as always.
#1700·Dennis Hackethal, about 2 months agoMy dictionary app says for ‘statement’ (bold emphasis mine):
the expression of an idea or opinion through something other than words: their humorous kitschiness makes a statement of serious wealth.
That’s the opposite of what you mean. Another reason not to introduce new terms.
Interesting. Yes, you’re right that statement is also used figuratively—for example, in the phrase “making a statement”, where it means expressing something without words.
But the more literal definition is a clear expression in words:
Oxford English:
a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing.
Nevertheless, I think your criticism is valid: statement could indeed be misinterpreted in different ways, depending on the context.
I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.
I don’t take this personally, and I understand your intention isn’t to attack or belittle. To keep our exchange enjoyable and productive, I’ll make an effort to be more attentive to spelling, terminology, and precision. That said, I’m generally less concerned with exact spelling or perfect terminology, since my focus is usually on parsing the meaning or reasoning behind a theory or criticism. I try to be as charitable as possible in interpreting what someone is trying to say, focusing on the intended idea rather than the precise wording. Still, I recognize that clarity of wording may matter more to others—especially in discussions—so I’ll do my best to be more precise.
#1731·Dennis Hackethal, about 2 months agoYour new comment notwithstanding, I invite you to be more critical of your English. I’ve pointed out several issues already (which, to your credit, you did fix), and you’ve since made more mistakes (eg see #1729, and in a recent DM you wrote “criticizems”). A typo of that magnitude plausibly indicates deeper issues.
Again, I don’t mean to get too personal here – forgive me if that’s how it comes across.
I think this is off-topic because my carelessness that caused my typos had no effect on my choice of new terminology. (Derived from your suggestion in #1808)
#1813·Dennis HackethalOP, about 1 month agoFor example, I had to manually notify Edwin in #1811 of a revision I had made to address a criticism of his. Without this notification, he might miss the revision. If he disagrees that the revision addresses his criticism, that’s a potential error that might not get corrected.
good idea!