Can qualia be separated from personhood?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4756.

This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.

#4756​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4751.

SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

#4751​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4749.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

#4748​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

  Tyler Mills criticized idea #4749.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

#4749​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4748.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

#4748​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4747.

(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

#4747​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4746.

(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

#4746​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4745.

(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

#4745​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4743.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

#4743​·​Tyler MillsOP revised about 6 hours ago

(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4741.

(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills revised idea #4739.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

(4) By A1, the programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills posted idea #4740.

Assumption A1: Only programs that are people while running constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4738.

(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.

#4738​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4737.

(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.

#4737​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.

  Tyler Mills commented on idea #4736.

(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.

#4736​·​Tyler MillsOP, about 6 hours ago

(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.

  Tyler Mills started a discussion titled ‘Can qualia be separated from personhood? ’.

Can a program which is not a person constitute an experience?

Imagine you are in a pitch black room. Before your eyes, a spotlight illuminates an apple for 5 seconds before darkness returns. Among other things, your mind will render the image of the apple for the 5 seconds, then it will not (afterimages aside). Assume the physical stimulus is identical for the whole 5 seconds.

Itemized discussion below.

The discussion starts with idea #4736.

(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.