Can qualia be separated from personhood?

SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

This suggests that programs can be “run differently” to result in a different computation. This is false because it violates Substrate Independence: the instantiation of a program is unaffected by its physical implementation. If a “context” changes what the program is computing, then that’s a different program. Suggesting that a person running the apple programs “makes them” conscious therefore is not sound. The programs are either conscious or not. If they were, by (A1), they would be people.

SOLUTION: The apple programs give rise to consciousness only in a given context. Only when run a certain why, by a person.

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

Assumption A1: Only programs that are people while running constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.

(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.

Can a program which is not a person constitute an experience?

Imagine you are in a pitch black room. Before your eyes, a spotlight illuminates an apple for 5 seconds before darkness returns. Among other things, your mind will render the image of the apple for the 5 seconds, then it will not (afterimages aside). Assume the physical stimulus is identical for the whole 5 seconds.

Itemized discussion below.

(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.