Hard to Vary or Hardly Usable?
#5502·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil Hudson says Popper’s criterion of demarcation doesn’t give us a way to form rational preferences. He implies: so why should HTV?
I reply:
The purpose of demarcation was to delineate science from non-science. That’s different from a criterion of rationality.
For such a criterion, Popper proposes measures of corroboration and verisimilitude. And he get pretty technical in defining those.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson says Popper’s criterion of demarcation doesn’t give us a way to form rational preferences. He implies: so why should HTV?
Quote more context
Neil Hudson asks, “Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply” an algorithmic ranking?
Neil Hudson asks:
A fallible procedure can still be making the stronger claim that every admissible pair is algorithmically rankable. Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply that [such an algorithmic ranking]?
#5496·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil Hudson asks, “Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply” an algorithmic ranking?
I reply:
The task would actually be *harder* to program if we constrained it to work only for some ideas and not others.
#5496·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil Hudson asks, “Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply” an algorithmic ranking?
I reply:
Rational decision-making (involving HTV or not) is a computational task. We can’t claim to have understood such a task unless we’ve programmed it.
#5496·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil Hudson asks, “Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply” an algorithmic ranking?
I reply:
Because it’s better for error correction. If you want your life to be a beginning of infinity, if you want to make sustained progress, you need to be rational. To be rational, you need to be able to tell when you’re being irrational. So you need a criterion of rationality. The more inputs it works for, the better. Universal is best.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson asks, “Why should HTV- or rationality generally - be required to supply” an algorithmic ranking?
#5494·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil Hudson says, in short, that there’s a difference between a constraint on criticism and a ranking procedure. He says HTV is meant as a constraint, not a ranking procedure.
Like most people, he’s confused about the purpose of HTV. My blog post linked in #3069 already explains.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson says, in short, that there’s a difference between a constraint on criticism and a ranking procedure. He says HTV is meant as a constraint, not a ranking procedure.
That’s why I said it’s fine to prompt the user for creative input if necessary, within reason.
That’s why I said it’s fine to prompt the user for creative input if necessary, within reason. #5439
#5490·Dennis HackethalOP, 2 days agoNeil replies:
Programming syntactic variations is easy. The problem is conjecturing which variations are explanatorily relevant given the problem and our background explanatory knowledge. The epistemological work includes conjecturing the relevant search space itself. Otherwise I can generate billions of mutations without discovering whether changing some feature destroys the explanation or merely changes its wording.
That’s why I said it’s fine to prompt the user for creative input if necessary, within reason.
#5438·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoI reply that “Variations are routinely programmed in genetic programming, no genuine creativity required.”
Neil replies:
Programming syntactic variations is easy. The problem is conjecturing which variations are explanatorily relevant given the problem and our background explanatory knowledge. The epistemological work includes conjecturing the relevant search space itself. Otherwise I can generate billions of mutations without discovering whether changing some feature destroys the explanation or merely changes its wording.
#5442·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoDirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
Dirk replies to a bunch more points Brett has made. I won’t get into them, at least not for now. Brett’s previous arguments have too many pending criticisms, and he ignores them, so tracking additional points won’t help. Brett isn’t in truth-seeking mode, he’s in defend-Deutsch mode. If I see Brett addressing any pending criticisms on X after all, I’ll update V accordingly.
I think that was the intention behind it, but its effect has been the opposite, to an extent. Hand-wavy referrals to explanations being HTV and rationality being synonymous with creativity, without explaining in detail how these things work, turn them into a black box that may as well work magically to give us the answers we want.
Being rational requires a criterion of rationality that is clear and precise enough so you know when you stray from it. HTV isn’t.
#5442·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoDirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
Brett says HTV stands in opposition to mysticism.
#5454·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoBrett replies saying “‘Hard To Vary’ is not vague. It is a real and useful solution to a philosophical problem. All actual scientific theories are hard to vary.”
He says it isn’t vague but then never gets specific about how to tell how hard to vary an explanation is or how to compare explanations this way. Instead, he mistakenly claims that isn’t the purpose of BoI, contrary to the evidence presented to him.
#5442·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoDirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
Brett replies saying “‘Hard To Vary’ is not vague. It is a real and useful solution to a philosophical problem. All actual scientific theories are hard to vary.”
I reply that the actual explanation is that people who make progress participate in a tradition of criticism. They’re critical of ideas and try to address all (or almost all) known criticisms. That process may lead to ideas having the feature Brett calls hard to vary, but it’s strictly an effect of that critical activity, not its means.
I had previously linked Brett to my blog post containing that explanation. He liked that reply at the time so he’s definitely seen it, but he’s still ignoring it.
I reply that the actual explanation is that people who make progress participate in a tradition of criticism. They’re critical of ideas and try to address all (or almost all) known criticisms. That process may lead to ideas having the feature Brett calls hard to vary, but it’s strictly an effect of that critical activity, not its means.
I had previously linked Brett to my blog post containing that explanation. He liked that reply at the time so he’s definitely seen it, but he’s still ignoring it.
The actual explanation is that people who make progress participate in a tradition of criticism. They’re critical of ideas and try to address all (or almost all) known criticisms.
I had previously linked Brett to my blog post containing that explanation. He liked that reply at the time so he’s definitely seen it, but he’s still ignoring it.
I reply that the actual explanation is that people who make progress participate in a tradition of criticism. They’re critical of ideas and try to address all (or almost all) known criticisms. That process may lead to ideas having the feature Brett calls hard to vary, but it’s strictly an effect of that critical activity, not its means.
I had previously linked Brett to my blog post containing that explanation. He liked that reply at the time so he’s definitely seen it, but he’s still ignoring it.
#5447·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoBrett says “Denying that good explanations of the physical world are hard to vary leaves us with *no better explanation* of what has driven progress in science, history and reason broadly.”
The actual explanation is that people who make progress participate in a tradition of criticism. They’re critical of ideas and try to address all (or almost all) known criticisms.
I had previously linked Brett to my blog post containing that explanation. He liked that reply at the time so he’s definitely seen it, but he’s still ignoring it.
#5447·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoBrett says “Denying that good explanations of the physical world are hard to vary leaves us with *no better explanation* of what has driven progress in science, history and reason broadly.”
By saying HTV is central to progress, Brett contradicts his previous claim (#5355) that HTV is just a feature of explanations.
#5442·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoDirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
Brett says “Denying that good explanations of the physical world are hard to vary leaves us with *no better explanation* of what has driven progress in science, history and reason broadly.”
#5444·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoBrett replies, among other things: “Calling it ‘bullshit’ doesn’t win the argument. People have been doing that kind of thing with Popper, falsification and conjectural knowledge since the 1930s.”
Brett’s response basically ignores existing criticisms and sounds like he’s lecturing people who haven’t read Deutsch or Popper. He’s forgotten that I’ve already corrected him on several misattributions of his to Popper and his misinterpretation of BoI re preference formation.
#5444·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoBrett replies, among other things: “Calling it ‘bullshit’ doesn’t win the argument. People have been doing that kind of thing with Popper, falsification and conjectural knowledge since the 1930s.”
Dirk replies that he “called "glorpiness" bullshit, not HTV” nor Popper. Brett completely missed the point of Dirk’s argument.
#5442·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoDirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
Brett replies, among other things: “Calling it ‘bullshit’ doesn’t win the argument. People have been doing that kind of thing with Popper, falsification and conjectural knowledge since the 1930s.”