Hard to Vary or Hardly Usable?
#3926·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days ago@liberty-fitz-claridge says (#3885) it’d be implausible for HTV to be justificationist since that would contradict the rest of Deutsch’s anti-justificationist philosophy.
I don’t think that alone means my interpretation of HTV is implausible. We’re bound to find contradictions eventually. In a good book like BoI, they’re just rare, so when we do find them, they go against the bulk of the philosophy.
#3721·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days agoFrom my article:
Isn’t the assignment of positive scores, of positive reasons to prefer one theory over another, a kind of justificationism? Deutsch criticizes justificationism throughout The Beginning of Infinity, but isn’t an endorsement of a theory as ‘good’ a kind of justification?
@liberty-fitz-claridge says (#3885) it’d be implausible for HTV to be justificationist since that would contradict the rest of Deutsch’s anti-justificationist philosophy.
#3862·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 6 days agoSo my criticism is that the HTV criterion is not a computational task (but a principle, universal statement) and Deutsch's criterion of understanding (you need a program) only applies to computational tasks.
With principle/ universal statement/ theory, I mean for example: for all masses, there is a force proportional to the inverse square of their distances/ for all integers, addition is commutative/ for all species, their evolution is governed by variation and selection, for all interpretations of moral actions, they are moral relativism when ... applies to that interpretation/ ....
- Principles/ universal statements/ theories are not computable because they speak about sets of (possible) transformations (not 1 in particular which would be a computation) and they offer a constraining criterion to those transformations in the set.
- Whereas a computer program is an abstraction capable of causing 1 particular transformation (between sets of inputs and sets of outputs)
There may be a way to quantify HTV, and thus deal with specific evaluations of how HTV of one theory is higher than another. That would be a computational task. But that is different from the criterion for HTV (which is by definition not computable). And having no program for that computational task does not imply that the criterion for HTV is irrelevant or not usable, or even fluff.
Compare for example to the theory of evolution: the theory of "variation and selection" is the criterion for a set of allowable transformations (of species), but not having a specific program (e.g. for how a particular species can evolve in some particular niche) does not imply that the criterion is useless or fluff.
I think the usefulness of the HTV criterion becomes clear when you link it to Constructor Theory, then one can argue that HTV criterion adds more than criticisms alone can do. But that's a whole other story we could get into.
HTV isn’t a principle even by your own definition. What on earth are you talking about man.
Even if HTV itself is not a computational task, the decision-making method Deutsch proposes is one, and it depends on HTV. But even if we sidestep that issue and outsource HTV completely to the user, we still run into all kinds of issues. This has all been addressed. No fancy talk about sets or constraints is going to change that.
You previously claimed you’re an engineer. I don’t think you are. You just pasted some code that was clearly written by AI and didn’t even compile, twice.
You talk about ‘sets’ and ‘constraints’ and ‘computations’ but I don’t think you understand any of them. No offense but I think those concepts are all distractions so you don’t need to actually address HTV. That’s why you need to use those big words.
Discussing with you is a waste of time. Again, no offense but I don’t think you’re qualified to weigh in on this discussion. Prove me wrong and submit working, handwritten code for HTV or Deutsch’s decision-making method. I’ll delete any further comments from you in this discussion that don’t contain working code. If you keep commenting anyway, I’ll lock your account.
#3862·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 6 days agoSo my criticism is that the HTV criterion is not a computational task (but a principle, universal statement) and Deutsch's criterion of understanding (you need a program) only applies to computational tasks.
With principle/ universal statement/ theory, I mean for example: for all masses, there is a force proportional to the inverse square of their distances/ for all integers, addition is commutative/ for all species, their evolution is governed by variation and selection, for all interpretations of moral actions, they are moral relativism when ... applies to that interpretation/ ....
- Principles/ universal statements/ theories are not computable because they speak about sets of (possible) transformations (not 1 in particular which would be a computation) and they offer a constraining criterion to those transformations in the set.
- Whereas a computer program is an abstraction capable of causing 1 particular transformation (between sets of inputs and sets of outputs)
There may be a way to quantify HTV, and thus deal with specific evaluations of how HTV of one theory is higher than another. That would be a computational task. But that is different from the criterion for HTV (which is by definition not computable). And having no program for that computational task does not imply that the criterion for HTV is irrelevant or not usable, or even fluff.
Compare for example to the theory of evolution: the theory of "variation and selection" is the criterion for a set of allowable transformations (of species), but not having a specific program (e.g. for how a particular species can evolve in some particular niche) does not imply that the criterion is useless or fluff.
I think the usefulness of the HTV criterion becomes clear when you link it to Constructor Theory, then one can argue that HTV criterion adds more than criticisms alone can do. But that's a whole other story we could get into.
You criticized your own idea. Presumably that’s not what you meant to do.
#3858·Bart Vanderhaegen, 6 days agoBecause relative criteria are fine to posit and not justificationist. We can propose criteria that claim that explanation A is better than explanation B without that being justificationism
From BoI chapter 1 glossary:
The misconception that knowledge can be genuine or reliable only if it is justified by some source or criterion.
That says nothing about absolute vs relative. Stop making up stuff.
#3860·Bart Vanderhaegen revised 6 days agoThat's because a good explanation for Deutsch is not an explanation with good points, but an explanation that is harder to vary compared to any other explanation. So again relative to other explanations.
The word "good" is indeed misleading in that sense, but he clearly qualifies it as performing better, relative to other explanations, on his HTV criterion, and not as: the explanation having scored high points.
with good points
I didn’t say the explanation doesn’t make good points, I said the explanation doesn’t get points.
So my criticism is that the HTV criterion is not a computational task (but a principle, universal statement) and Deutsch's criterion of understanding (you need a program) only applies to computational tasks.
With principle/ universal statement/ theory, I mean for example: for all masses, there is a force proportional to the inverse square of their distances/ for all integers, addition is commutative/ for all species, their evolution is governed by variation and selection, for all interpretations of moral actions, these are moral relativistic one/ ....
- Principles/ universal statements/ theories are not computable because they speak about sets of (possible) transformations (not 1 in particular which would be a computation) and they offer a constraining criterion to those transformations in the set.
- Whereas a computer program is an abstraction capable of causing 1 particular transformation (between sets of inputs and sets of outputs)
There may be a way to quantify HTV, and thus deal with specific evaluations of how HTV of one theory is higher than another. That would be a computational task. But that is different from the criterion for HTV (which is by definition not computable). And having no program for that computational task does not imply that the criterion for HTV is irrelevant or not usable, or even fluff.
Compare for example to the theory of evolution: the theory of "variation and selection" is the criterion for a set of allowable transformations (of species), but not having a specific program (e.g. for how a particular species can evolve in some particular niche) does not imply that the criterion is useless or fluff.
I think the usefulness of the HTV criterion becomes clear when you link it to Constructor Theory, then one can argue that HTV criterion adds more than criticisms alone can do. But that's a whole other story we could get into.
So my criticism is that the HTV criterion is not a computational task (but a principle, universal statement) and Deutsch's criterion of understanding (you need a program) only applies to computational tasks.
With principle/ universal statement/ theory, I mean for example: for all masses, there is a force proportional to the inverse square of their distances/ for all integers, addition is commutative/ for all species, their evolution is governed by variation and selection, for all interpretations of moral actions, they are moral relativism when ... applies to that interpretation/ ....
- Principles/ universal statements/ theories are not computable because they speak about sets of (possible) transformations (not 1 in particular which would be a computation) and they offer a constraining criterion to those transformations in the set.
- Whereas a computer program is an abstraction capable of causing 1 particular transformation (between sets of inputs and sets of outputs)
There may be a way to quantify HTV, and thus deal with specific evaluations of how HTV of one theory is higher than another. That would be a computational task. But that is different from the criterion for HTV (which is by definition not computable). And having no program for that computational task does not imply that the criterion for HTV is irrelevant or not usable, or even fluff.
Compare for example to the theory of evolution: the theory of "variation and selection" is the criterion for a set of allowable transformations (of species), but not having a specific program (e.g. for how a particular species can evolve in some particular niche) does not imply that the criterion is useless or fluff.
I think the usefulness of the HTV criterion becomes clear when you link it to Constructor Theory, then one can argue that HTV criterion adds more than criticisms alone can do. But that's a whole other story we could get into.
That's because a good explanation for Deutsch is not an explanation with good points, but an explanation that is harder to vary compared to any other explanation. So again relative to other explanations.
The word "good" is indeed misleading in that sense, but he clearly qualifies it as performing better, relative to other explanations, on his HTV criterion, and as the explanation having scored high points.
That's because a good explanation for Deutsch is not an explanation with good points, but an explanation that is harder to vary compared to any other explanation. So again relative to other explanations.
The word "good" is indeed misleading in that sense, but he clearly qualifies it as performing better, relative to other explanations, on his HTV criterion, and not as: the explanation having scored high points.
#3835·Bart Vanderhaegen, 6 days agoYes, the criterion for democracy is not a computational task, but an abstraction that constrains computational tasks. In the same way: the criterion for HTV is also not a computational task, it constrains the possible computational tasks that attempt to quantify HTV.
We understand computational tasks by being able to program them (as per Deutsch' criterion). But we understand criteria/ principles/ axioms/ theories ... (non computational tasks) in another way: by varying them and eliminating the variants that do not solve the problem the principle purported to solve.
For example:
a+b=b+a (in arithmetic) is a principle/ axiom that we understand by elimination of possible variants (a+b =/= a ... a+b =/=b ... etc)
but 3+5=5+3 is a specific transformation that should be understood via a computational task: adding 5 to 3 and then 3 to 5 and comparing both outcomes, via a program.
So my criticism is that the HTV criterion is not a computational task (but a principle, universal statement) and Deutsch's criterion of understanding (you need a program) only applies to computational tasks.
With principle/ universal statement/ theory, I mean for example: for all masses, there is a force proportional to the inverse square of their distances/ for all integers, addition is commutative/ for all species, their evolution is governed by variation and selection, for all interpretations of moral actions, these are moral relativistic one/ ....
- Principles/ universal statements/ theories are not computable because they speak about sets of (possible) transformations (not 1 in particular which would be a computation) and they offer a constraining criterion to those transformations in the set.
- Whereas a computer program is an abstraction capable of causing 1 particular transformation (between sets of inputs and sets of outputs)
There may be a way to quantify HTV, and thus deal with specific evaluations of how HTV of one theory is higher than another. That would be a computational task. But that is different from the criterion for HTV (which is by definition not computable). And having no program for that computational task does not imply that the criterion for HTV is irrelevant or not usable, or even fluff.
Compare for example to the theory of evolution: the theory of "variation and selection" is the criterion for a set of allowable transformations (of species), but not having a specific program (e.g. for how a particular species can evolve in some particular niche) does not imply that the criterion is useless or fluff.
I think the usefulness of the HTV criterion becomes clear when you link it to Constructor Theory, then one can argue that HTV criterion adds more than criticisms alone can do. But that's a whole other story we could get into.
#3838·Dennis HackethalOP, 6 days agoSo it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness.
So what? I didn’t mention an absolute criterion. My original criticism already applies to both relative and absolute criteria of quality (what you call “goodness”).
Because relative criteria are fine to posit and not justificationist. We can propose criteria that claim that explanation A is better than explanation B without that being justificationism
#3837·Dennis HackethalOP, 6 days agoSimilar to a crucial test …
But that’s exactly where HTV differs from Popper. Popper doesn’t give a theory points when it survives a crucial test. HTV does. From BoI chapter 1:
… testable explanations that have passed stringent tests become extremely good explanations …
That's because a good explanation for Deutsch is not an explanation with good points, but an explanation that is harder to vary compared to any other explanation. So again relative to other explanations.
The word "good" is indeed misleading in that sense, but he clearly qualifies it as performing better, relative to other explanations, on his HTV criterion, and as the explanation having scored high points.
#3836·Bart Vanderhaegen, 6 days agoThe criterion for HTV applied to 2 explanation is not justificationism I think. It allows to say explanation A is better than explanation B, which is equivalent to: explanation B is worse than explanation A. So it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness. Similar to a crucial test (e.g. Eddington): we refute Newton's theory and keep Einsteins, that is not a claim about the goodness of Einsteins theory, that theory merely has survived, it has not gotten "goodness points". It could be refuted always later on by any better theory, in which case we would drop it too.
So it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness.
So what? I didn’t mention an absolute criterion. My original criticism already applies to both relative and absolute criteria of quality (what you call “goodness”).
#3836·Bart Vanderhaegen, 6 days agoThe criterion for HTV applied to 2 explanation is not justificationism I think. It allows to say explanation A is better than explanation B, which is equivalent to: explanation B is worse than explanation A. So it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness. Similar to a crucial test (e.g. Eddington): we refute Newton's theory and keep Einsteins, that is not a claim about the goodness of Einsteins theory, that theory merely has survived, it has not gotten "goodness points". It could be refuted always later on by any better theory, in which case we would drop it too.
Similar to a crucial test …
But that’s exactly where HTV differs from Popper. Popper doesn’t give a theory points when it survives a crucial test. HTV does. From BoI chapter 1:
… testable explanations that have passed stringent tests become extremely good explanations …
#3721·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days agoFrom my article:
Isn’t the assignment of positive scores, of positive reasons to prefer one theory over another, a kind of justificationism? Deutsch criticizes justificationism throughout The Beginning of Infinity, but isn’t an endorsement of a theory as ‘good’ a kind of justification?
The criterion for HTV applied to 2 explanation is not justificationism I think. It allows to say explanation A is better than explanation B, which is equivalent to: explanation B is worse than explanation A. So it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness. Similar to a crucial test (e.g. Eddington): we refute Newton's theory and keep Einsteins, that is not a claim about the goodness of Einsteins theory, that theory merely has survived, it has not gotten "goodness points". It could be refuted always later on by any better theory, in which case we would drop it too.
#3799·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoDeutsch’s yardstick applies to computational tasks. It’s not meant for other things. It’s not clear to me that the criterion of democracy is a computational task.
Yes, the criterion for democracy is not a computational task, but an abstraction that constrains computational tasks. In the same way: the criterion for HTV is also not a computational task, it constrains the possible computational tasks that attempt to quantify HTV.
We understand computational tasks by being able to program them (as per Deutsch' criterion). But we understand criteria/ principles/ axioms/ theories ... (non computational tasks) in another way: by varying them and eliminating the variants that do not solve the problem the principle purported to solve.
For example:
a+b=b+a (in arithmetic) is a principle/ axiom that we understand by elimination of possible variants (a+b =/= a ... a+b =/=b ... etc)
but 3+5=5+3 is a specific transformation that should be understood via a computational task: adding 5 to 3 and then 3 to 5 and comparing both outcomes, via a program.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
He also says that “good explanations [are] essential to science…” (thanks @tom-nassis for finding this quote). Recall that a good explanation is one that is hard to vary.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
#3811·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoLiberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
It does sound like Deutsch thinks all these different criteria boil down to being about hard vs easy to vary, see #3807.
#3811·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoLiberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
The quote may be false, but I don’t see how it’s misleading. I’m not quoting Deutsch in isolation or cherry-picking information or anything like that.
#3809·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoI’m not saying hard to vary is a decision-making method. I’m saying it’s an integral part of Deutsch’s decision-making method. As I write in my article:
He argues that “we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
Liberty responded (1:39:46) that that quote is misleading because it makes it sound like hard to vary is the only criterion people use when making decisions, which can’t be true. There are other criteria, like “consistency with data”, “logical consistency”, “fitting in with existing theories”, etc.
#3808·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoLiberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
I’m fine allowing user input to sidestep the creativity problem, see #3802.
#3808·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agoLiberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
I’m not saying hard to vary is a decision-making method. I’m saying it’s an integral part of Deutsch’s decision-making method. As I write in my article:
He argues that “we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
#3707·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days agoDeutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.
Liberty said (at 1:38:39) hard to vary isn’t a method of decision-making. It’s a factor people take into account when they make decisions, but decision-making itself is a creative process.
#3806·Dennis HackethalOP, 7 days agofundamental
@zelalem-mekonnen suggested during a space (37:36) that hard to vary is just one mode of criticism.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
#3719·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 days agoFrom my article:
[I]sn’t the difficulty of changing an explanation at least partly a property not of the explanation itself but of whoever is trying to change it? If I’m having difficulty changing it, maybe that’s because I lack imagination. Or maybe I’m just new to that field and an expert could easily change it. In which case the difficulty of changing an explanation is, again, not an objective property of that explanation but a subjective property of its critics. How could subjective properties be epistemologically fundamental?
fundamental
@zelalem-mekonnen suggested during a space (37:36) that hard to vary is just one mode of criticism.