Hard to Vary or Hardly Usable?
Quote Dirk
Dirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV.
Dirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV:
Rejecting essentialism doesn't grant your ideas immunity from clarification. Being vague is not something to be proud of.
By your standard, I could invent any bullshit property of explanations, call it "glorpiness" and when you ask what it means, reply that definitions miss the point.
#5440·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoNeil Hudson emphasizes that “the procedure by which HTV is implemented cannot itself become the authority that decides which criticisms count. Its criteria, classifications and outputs would themselves have to remain conjectural and open to independent criticism - including criticism not already licensed by the procedure itself. Otherwise HTV has ceased to be a fallible aid to criticism and has become a final epistemic tribunal.”
I reply:
The UI can show a *tentative* result. The result can change with more user input. All input remains criticizable.
The UI can show a *tentative* result. The result can change with more user input. All input remains criticizable. Again, I’m not looking for a criterion of truth or some guarantee of infallibility, which I know can’t exist. I’m looking for a criterion of rationality, which I know can: https://x.com/dchackethal/status/2091272979791659054
The word “again” refers to my previous remarks about fallibility here.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson emphasizes that “the procedure by which HTV is implemented cannot itself become the authority that decides which criticisms count. Its criteria, classifications and outputs would themselves have to remain conjectural and open to independent criticism - including criticism not already licensed by the procedure itself. Otherwise HTV has ceased to be a fallible aid to criticism and has become a final epistemic tribunal.”
#5436·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoNeil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
I reply that “prompting users for creative input (within reason) would be fine, as the bounty states.”
#5436·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoNeil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
I reply that “Variations are routinely programmed in genetic programming, no genuine creativity required.”
Link to Neil’s reply
Neil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
Neil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
#5434·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoWhy is that a criticism of the bounty and not of HTV? If that’s what’s required to make HTV work, maybe HTV bit off more than it can chew.
Well, no, people do conjecture variations, and so could use HTV themselves, though maybe not program a computer to do it for them.
#5433·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoNeil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
Why is that a criticism of the bounty and not of HTV? If that’s what’s required to make HTV work, maybe HTV bit off more than it can chew.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”
#5426·Dennis HackethalOP revised 5 days agoNeil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
More on the difference between a criterion of rationality and the demand for infallibility: #5336
#5430·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoSeveral people have replied to the bounty saying it’s asking for the wrong thing; that HTV is only about rejecting ETV explanations, and that it’s only one mode of criticism among many.
They’re confused about what BoI actually says about HTV. It says HTV is central to the enlightenment and all rationality, that people use it systematically, that we should choose between explanations based on how hard to vary they are, and so on. According to BoI, HTV is not just another mode of criticism. It’s the central mode explaining progress.
As I say here, I’m personally on board with adopting a weaker form of HTV (or really ETV) where we only treat it as one mode of criticism among many and reject explanations if they have arbitrary components. But again, that’s not what BoI says. The bounty is about taking BoI seriously and rehabilitating HTV as presented there.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Several people have replied to the bounty saying it’s asking for the wrong thing; that HTV is only about rejecting ETV explanations, and that it’s only one mode of criticism among many.
#5426·Dennis HackethalOP revised 5 days agoNeil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
#5426·Dennis HackethalOP revised 5 days agoNeil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
I reply:
The word “reliably” refers to the claim in BoI that ppl search for HTV explanations “systematically”; that they follow some yet-to-be-specified system to form preferences this way.
The system/program, being man-made, would of course be fallible. Still, since BoI says HTV is at the heart of all rational endeavors, the system must be universal. Hence the requirement for any pair.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.
#5420·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoNot a mathematician but AFAIK, Hilbert basically asked if we could make a machine that answers every math question correctly. The answer to that is ‘no’. But an algorithm for rational decision-making isn’t about that.
Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
I also reply that it needs to rank any pair, not every pair.
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task.
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task. I say this in my reply.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task.
#5419·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoNeil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
Not a mathematician but AFAIK, Hilbert basically asked if we could make a machine that answers every math question correctly. The answer to that is ‘no’. But an algorithm for rational decision-making isn’t about that.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Neil Hudson says in response to the bounty:
I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?
#5417·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoBrett says “Rational decision making is not a matter of pulling a lever and cranking through a calculation.”
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable
Brett says “Rational decision making is not a matter of pulling a lever and cranking through a calculation.”
#5415·Dennis HackethalOP, 5 days agoBrett says the bounty is “impossible” because “it’s asking for a definition for something that *cannot be defined* in the way the challenge demands.”
Dirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV.
#3069·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months agoMy critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.
Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.
A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.
So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.
You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable