Can qualia be separated from personhood?

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Tyler Mills’s avatar

(1) During the entire 5 seconds, your mind renders the image of the apple.

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(2) The rendering is caused by the running of some number of programs.

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(3) The programs rendering the apple imagery must be looping until stopped, since they could not have advance knowledge of when the stimulus stops.

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Only version leading to #4789 (3 total)

(4) The programs rendering the apple are not people, so cannot themselves constitute experience.

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(5) Repeated running of the same fixed program, not being a person, does not make it a person.

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(6) Repeated running of the same fixed program is automatic, requires no creativity, and cannot constitute experience.

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(7) We can be conscious of the apple imagery for the entire 5 seconds.

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2nd of 2 versions leading to #4789 (2 total)

PROBLEM: Why are we conscious of the apple rendering? Given (6), why is there an experience of it, if the programs comprising it are looping, and so are therefore predefined?

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SOLUTION: The apple programs are not the same programs one execution to the next. They are being re-evolved every time they are run. This evolution is what the person is doing, and so must be what gives rise to the experience consisting of the apple rendering.

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This implies that no two instances of experience, even if seemingly identical, are caused by the same programs.

Criticized1*
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Is all conscious experience not the running of programs, but computation that is realizing the evolution of programs? Computation which cannot be abstracted to any program, then? So in what sense can a person "be programmed"? Is personhood computational, but "non-programmatic"?

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By the Church-Turing Thesis, all computation can be specified/programmed. So the evolutionary aspect of a person can be specified/programmed, if it is computational.

Criticism of #4757
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Programs could be evolved non-computationally. But that process could itself still be simulated, per the Church-Turing-Deutsch Thesis.

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It could be simulated, but maybe it's very hard/intractable to do so. Maybe personhood harnesses physics to do the evolving, like a windmill harnesses the wind. Programs implemented such that the laws of physics cause them to evolve (unboundedly)?

Criticized1
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But if the evolution is the defining feature of personhood, and the evolution is non-computational, then the personhood is non-computational. And consciousness would then not be a software property.

Criticism of #4791