Can qualia be separated from personhood?
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With an account, you can revise, criticize, and comment on ideas.Assumption A1: Only programs that are people can, while running, constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.
A quale can be recorded and replayed later, arbitrarily many times. That looping program is not a person: it can only create whatever knowledge it originally did, not any possible knowledge, maybe until freed from the loop. Yet it still constitutes experience.
So people are not the only programs that can be qualia.
A quale can be recorded and replayed later, arbitrarily many times.
How do you know this?
Assuming qualia are classical, there is nothing stopping every step in the computation comprising them from being measured, like any computation. Then, nothing is stopping that recording/program from being rerun.
Is a quale a sequence of information states? Is this true of any given computation? Does the quale "care" if the states are computed afresh or read from memory?