Search Ideas
2584 ideas match your query.:
It sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
It sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
Calling people “embodied agent[s]” like they’re barely superior to video-game characters is dehumanizing and weird.
perspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns.
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.
THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY
https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/
From the paper (p. 3):
An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,5 but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…
(i) it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii) it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii) it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).
The quote uses bullet points where the original source uses none.
How Do Bounties Work?
Bounties let you invite criticism and reward high-quality contributions with real money.
Starting December 23, 2025, select users can run bounties. Anyone can participate.
Bounties are in beta. Expect things to break.
How do I participate?
Next, browse the list of bounties. Click a bounty’s dollar amount to view its page, review the bountied idea and the terms, and submit a criticism on that idea.
That’s it – you’re in.
How do I get paid?
Each bounty enters a review period roughly five days after it starts (the exact date is shown on the bounty page). The review period lasts 24 hours. During this time, the bounty owner reviews submissions and rejects only those that don’t meet the stated terms.
To be eligible for a payout, all of the following must be true:
- Your submission is a direct criticism of the bountied idea.
- Your submission has no pending counter-criticisms when the review period begins.
- Your submission meets the bounty terms and the site-wide terms.
- You’ve connected a Stripe account in good standing before the review period ends.
The bounty owner is never eligible to receive payouts from their own bounty.
Note that counter-criticisms are not constrained by the bounty-specific terms. Only direct criticisms of the bountied idea are.
How much will I get paid?
The bounty amount is prorated among all eligible submissions.
For example, if there are ten eligible criticisms and you contributed two of them, you receive 20% of the bounty.
Fractions of cents are not paid out. Amounts below USD 0.50 are not paid out.
How do I run a bounty?
Click the megaphone button next to an idea (near bookmark, archive, etc.).
Set a bounty amount and write clear terms describing the kinds of criticisms you’re willing to pay for. Then enter your credit card details to authorize the amount plus a 5% bounty fee.
Your card is authorized, not charged, when the bounty starts.
The bounty typically runs for five to seven days, depending on your card’s authorization window. After around five days, a 24-hour review period begins. During this time, review submissions and reject those that don’t meet your terms. Submissions you don’t reject are automatically accepted at the end of the review period and become eligible for payout. Your card is then charged.
If no eligible criticisms are accepted, your card is never charged.
Start a bounty today. Terms apply.
They can, but the myth says such translations are impossible.
Accurate translation can be very difficult though.
The answer to this question is 'no'. Tarski's theory says that a statement in some language, say English, is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. And Tarski's theory implies that whenever there is another language, say French, in which we can describe the same fact, then the French statement which describes this fact will be true if and only if the corresponding English statement is true. Thus it is impossible, according to Tarski's theory, that of two statements that are translations of each other, one can be true and the other false. Truth, according to Tarski's theory, is therefore not dependent on language, or relative to language.
But is not Tarski's notion of truth a relative notion? Is it not relative to the language to which the statement whose truth is being discussed belongs?
Fallibilism refutes the relativism on which the myth rests because fallibilism provides an absolute standard:
[T]here exists a very different attitude towards absolute truth, in fact a fallibilist attitude. It stresses the fact that the mistakes we make can be absolute mistakes, in the sense that our theories can be absolutely false – that they can fall short of the truth. Thus to the fallibilist the notion of truth, and that of falling short of the truth, may represent absolute standards – even though we can never be certain that we are living up to them. But since they may serve as a kind of steering compass, they may be of decisive help in critical discussions.
Popper then says that Alfred Tarsky revived this notion of absolute truth.
Fallibilism refutes the relativism on which the myth rests because fallibilism provides an absolute standard:
[T]here exists a very different attitude towards absolute truth, in fact a fallibilist attitude. It stresses the fact that the mistakes we make can be absolute mistakes, in the sense that our theories can be absolutely false – that they can fall short of the truth. Thus to the fallibilist the notion of truth, and that of falling short of the truth, may represent absolute standards – even though we can never be certain that we are living up to them. But since they may serve as a kind of steering compass, they may be of decisive help in critical discussions.
Cultural relativism and the doctrine of the closed framework are serious obstacles to the readiness to learn from others. They are obstacles to the method of accepting some institutions, modifying others, and rejecting what is bad.
The myth also stems from cultural relativism: the idea that truth is different for different cultures and that “there is no absolute or objective truth, but rather one truth for the Greeks, another for the Egyptians, still another for the Syrians, and so on.” (P. 45)
Popper opposes this relativism. He says it’s devastating when it comes to the administration of justice, say. “[W]e should try to understand and to compare [different cultures and conceptual frameworks]. We should try to find out who has the better institutions. And we should try to learn from them.” (P. 46)
The myth stems from a “disappointed over-optimism concerning the powers of reason …”. (P. 44)
People think truth should win decisively. But discussions usually don’t lead to such a decisive victory (see #3568). So then people become pessimistic about the fruitfulness of discussions.
The myth stems from a “disappointed over-optimism concerning the powers of reason …”. (P. 44)
People think truth should win decisively. But discussions usually don’t lead to such a decisive victory (see #3568). So then people become pessimistic about the fruitfulness of discussions.
“Truth is hard to come by.” (P. 44)
Don’t view discussions like debate club. The goal isn’t to win a debate or to convert others.
[E]ven the slightest clarification of one's problem - even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one's own position or that of one's opponent - is a great success.
And:
[I]t is enough, more than enough, if we feel that we can see things in a new light or that we have got even a little nearer to the truth.
Popper guesses that science started “when Thales, the founder [of the Ionian school], encouraged Anaximander, his follower, to see whether he could produce a better explanation of the apparent stability of the earth than he himself had been able to offer.” (P. 43)
Science, a tradition of criticism, is unlike other traditions, whose “function is, and has always been, to preserve the purity of the teaching of the founder of the school.” (P. 43)
Science, a tradition of criticism, is unlike previous traditions, whose “Their function is, and has always been, to preserve the purity of the teaching of the founder of the school.” (P. 43)