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fundamental
@zelalem-mekonnen suggested during a space (37:36) that hard to vary is just one mode of criticism.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now, given the strength and positivity of those terms, I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
Even if we allow creative user input, eg a score for the quality of an explanation, we run into all kinds of open questions, such as what upper and lower limits to use for the score, and unexpected behavior, such as criticisms pushing an explanation’s score beyond those limits.
Huh, no. I said you found a level where the epistemology is unproblematic to specify and turned that into Veritula. I said the opposite. You misunderstood me.
As I write in my article:
… Popper did formalize/specify much of his epistemology, such as the notions of empirical content and degrees of falsifiability. So why couldn’t Deutsch formalize the steps for finding the quality of a given explanation?
Deutsch’s yardstick applies to computational tasks. It’s not meant for other things. It’s not clear to me that the criterion of democracy is a computational task.
Yes, many ideas fail Deutsch’s yardstick. But so what? That doesn’t make things better.
@dirk-meulenbelt suggested in a space (at 21:30) that a bunch of epistemology is underspecified. There are many epistemological concepts (like criterion of democracy, falsifiability, etc.) that we don’t know enough about to express in code.
Veritula and hard to vary are different in this regard. Deutsch claims that ‘hard to vary’ is epistemologically fundamental, that it’s at the core of rationality, and that all progress is made by choosing between explanations based on how hard to vary they are. In other words, he suggests (though only vaguely) a decision-making method.
Veritula has a different decision-making method: one of criticizing ideas and adopting only those with no pending criticisms. That decision-making method is fully specified, with zero vagueness or open questions (that I’m aware of).
Veritula does not pre-specify ahead of time what criticisms people can submit, this is true. But that’s not a problem. It’d be like asking Deutsch to specify ahead of time what explanations people can judge to be easy or hard to vary. That’s not the specification that’s lacking with hard to vary.
During a space, starting at around 15:00, @dirk-meulenbelt suggested that Veritula suffers from underspecification: it does not specify which kinds of criticisms users can submit. But there are lots, like Occam’s razor, hard to vary, lack of testability, etc.
Since I criticize Deutsch’s ‘hard to vary’ criterion for being underspecified, Veritula shouldn’t be underspecified either.
(Correct me if I misunderstood you here, @dirk-meulenbelt.)
The ancient Greeks might have found the Persephone myth extremely hard to vary, eg due to cultural constraints. They wouldn’t have agreed that one could just swap out Persephone for someone else.
But then the ease with which a criticism could be varied might have no effect on its parent. So why even bother having a notion of ‘easiness to vary’ at that point?
Even so, if a criticism gets score -10, that will push the parent theory’s score above 0.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
Large overlap with idea #3783 – effectively a duplicate. You could revise that idea to include finding “a much better job that allows you the energy for research.”
This seems more like a specific implementation of #3782 than a standalone criticism.
Hmm could you give examples of such addictions between implicit and explicit short-term preferences?
Have you fully used your cash to free time/energy after work?
You may have money for laundry services, cleaning, cooking, and so on. All the other things that take time in your day can be removed with money, giving you space to do research just fine
Leaving the job means more time for research. It also means more time to find a much better job that allows you the energy for research.
Leaving gives space for better balance.
How much time and energy do you really have for research while working? 1hr daily? 2 hours daily? 4 hours daily?
Leaving your job allows for the possibility of consistent high quality research daily.
Consider your current balance of working and research.
Could you cut other activities, keep the job, and increase focus on research?
Deutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chapter 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
Deutsch should instead name some examples the reader would find easier to disagree with, and then walk them through why some explanations are harder to vary than others.