Search Ideas

Well, no, people do conjecture variations, and so could use HTV themselves, though maybe not program a computer to do it for them.

Why is that a criticism of the bounty and not of HTV? If that’s what’s required to make HTV work, maybe HTV bit off more than it can chew.

Neil Hudson says the bounty “would require programming the creative process by which relevant variations are conjectured in the first place.”

More on the difference between a criterion of rationality and the demand for infallibility: #5336

They’re confused about what BoI actually says about HTV. It says HTV is central to the enlightenment and all rationality, that people use it systematically, that we should choose between explanations based on how hard to vary they are, and so on. According to BoI, HTV is not just another mode of criticism. It’s the central mode explaining progress.

As I say here, I’m personally on board with adopting a weaker form of HTV (or really ETV) where we only treat it as one mode of criticism among many and reject explanations if they have arbitrary components. But again, that’s not what BoI says. The bounty is about taking BoI seriously and rehabilitating HTV as presented there.

Several people have replied to the bounty saying it’s asking for the wrong thing; that HTV is only about rejecting ETV explanations, and that it’s only one mode of criticism among many.

I also reply that “Since a fully programmed replacement for HTV already exists that meets all these conditions [mentioned in #5428], I’m not sure it’d be fair to hold HTV to a lesser standard.”

I reply:

The word “reliably” refers to the claim in BoI that ppl search for HTV explanations “systematically”; that they follow some yet-to-be-specified system to form preferences this way.

The system/program, being man-made, would of course be fallible. Still, since BoI says HTV is at the heart of all rational endeavors, the system must be universal. Hence the requirement for any pair.

Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed. Otherwise, “reliably compare” would be a demand for infallibility.

Neil replies fallibility means the criterion must be able to get answers wrong or not deliver an answer at all sometimes. And if that’s the case, not any pair should be needed.

I also reply that it needs to rank any pair, not every pair.

Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?

Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task. I say this in my reply.

Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?

Because, per BoI, we can’t claim to have understood a computational task if we can’t program it. The formation of rational preferences is a computational task.

Not a mathematician but AFAIK, Hilbert basically asked if we could make a machine that answers every math question correctly. The answer to that is ‘no’. But an algorithm for rational decision-making isn’t about that.

Neil Hudson says in response to the bounty:

I wonder if this objection risks making a Hilbertian mistake: assuming that an objective criterion must provide a universal decision procedure. Gödel taught us not to equate objectivity with decidability. Why should HTV need to algorithmically rank every pair of explanations to be meaningful?

I point out that he and I have already discussed that. He has so far ignored the tentative outcome of that discussion, which leaves my stance with zero pending criticisms and his with five (at the time of writing), see #5340.

Brett says “Rational decision making is not a matter of pulling a lever and cranking through a calculation.”

Dirk replies that the bounty doesn’t ask for essentialist definitions. It instead asks for clarity around how to actually use HTV.

Brett says the bounty is “impossible” because “it’s asking for a definition for something that *cannot be defined* in the way the challenge demands.”

Related: #5354 and comments.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):

What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them… You will fail.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):

What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them…

Citation needed. You of all people should know to cite since you hate when others cite from memory. Don’t be a hypocrite.

I reply:

BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:

“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)

“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)

“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)

“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)

I later found more evidence running a word search for the string ‘prefer’:

“Whenever a wide range of variant theories can account equally well for the phenomenon they are trying to explain, there is no reason to prefer one of them over the others, so advocating a particular one in preference to the others is irrational.” (21, emphasis mine)

And chapter 13 is virtually all about forming rational preferences.

Then there’s TCS common-preference finding…

The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticise the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.