Search Ideas

I ask: “If HTV is just a feature of explanations but not a criterion to form rational preferences, does that mean we could rationally adopt Persephone over axis tilt?”

The implied criticism is that that is clearly not what HTV is intended for.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)

As for ambiguity, I don’t see how it’s ambiguous, at least now, given the additional quotes and the fact that chapter 1 is in large part about preference formation, as I say in #5363.

I address the cherry-picking charge now:

… chapter 1 was in large part about HTV as a way to prefer axis tilt over Persephone. That was a central part of that chapter: to present David’s answer to how we can make rational choices, using axis tilt vs. Persephone as an example.

So, far from being cherry-picked, several pages in BoI, almost a whole chapter, are about preference formation using HTV.

Liberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”

I preemptively address that:

Let me state preemptively that I realize these quotes aren’t exclusively about HTV. There are other factors involved in rational decision-making, such as the outcomes of crucial tests (then again, David does link that to HTV in chapter 1). I give these quotes to show that David recognizes and contributes to the problem of how to form rational preferences throughout BoI from various angles.

But those quotes aren’t all about HTV.

I reply:

BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:

“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)

“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)

“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)

“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)

I reply:

The question of how we can make rational preferences has been a key philosophical problem since antiquity. Saying HTV isn’t for that is frankly a disservice to Deutsch because it demotes HTV from a genuine philosophical contribution to a mere feature of some explanations that we don’t know what to do with.

I reply: “Why care whether explanations have this feature if not to prefer them?”

There’s no contradiction there. It can be both a feature of explanations and a tool to help us make decisions.

In response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”

Ben replies that “it is one thing conjecture a theory, it is another thing to compare theories to choose which one to proceed with (tentatively)”; that HTV is meant to help with the latter.

Don’t know why the sudden reference to the rather esoteric topic of sentential logic. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_logic Nor does Brett explain what’s wrong with it.

This isn’t merely an issue of what we call things. The difference between rationality and creativity isn’t semantics.

Brett’s response:

One can *call* that “rationality”. And ok. But what I’m referring to is that process which causes behaviour in humans. We create (choices) and choose them.

If one wants to extract out “coming up with ideas” from this process, ok. But that to me looks just like sentential logic.

Ben points out to Brett that “the step of conjecturing ideas (or criticisms) is not itself rational or irrational. rationality comes in when it comes time to decide what to do, given your state of knowledge. it is about acting according to your best ideas, rather than coming up with ideas”

My response:

I disagree. Popper suggested measures of corroboration and verisimilitude for rational preference formation *given* a set of *already-created* theories (see quotes and explanations in my answer here: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/137784/relevance-of-poppers-theory-of-corroboration/140003#140003). This is the tradition of preference formation David follows in BoI. Again, we need to take care not to fudge rationality and creativity.

Brett claims/implies Veritula is no better than other online forums; remains “unconvinced it amounts [to] the ‘algorithm’ for rationality.”

I explain:

Veritula is more advanced. X only has nested commenting, like most other sites. But it has no way to distinguish between comments and criticisms and no way to count pending criticisms. It doesn’t tell you which posts you can rationally adopt. It has no version control, no clear version history, no diffing, no ability to revise most ideas outside a narrow window.

I’m not aware of any other site like Veritula that tells you which posts we can rationally adopt. No site on the market has that capability.

Worth noting that Ben had already linked to an explanation of Veritula in response, but Brett doesn’t seem to read any of the links we send him. I can tell because he keeps having more objections or questions the links already address/answer.

Brett claims/implies Veritula is no better than other online forums; remains “unconvinced it amounts [to] the “algorithm” for rationality.”

Veritula doesn’t discount that. As I point out to Brett, it “lets us submit new options at any time, and it offers writing tools to make that as easy and enjoyable as possible. It actively encourages the creation of new options.”

I think Brett is concerned that Veritula discounts the creation of new options. David is right to point in BoI chapter 13 that traditional accounts of rational decision-making focus too much on choosing from existing options according to a fixed formula while ignoring the fact that man is creative, ie can make new options.

If we can have a purely deductive process to tell whether we’re being rational or not, that’s a very good thing. The opposite of something to be concerned about.