Knut Sondre Sæbø
@knut-sondre-saebo·Joined Sep 2024·Ideas
How do you evaluate an implicit idea rationally?
By what criterion do you evaluate an explicit idea versus an implicit idea?
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.
#3629·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 months agoAn example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
That has nothing to do with brain regions. An AGI running on a laptop would use the same phrases.
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Ideas can be grasped in alot of different ways, which is why the metapahors we use to understand reality matters.
#3636·Dennis HackethalOP revised 3 months ago…feelings and other nonrational mental contents…
Feelings aren’t “nonrational” per se. There’s a rational place for feelings. See #3632: I mean no disrespect when I say this but I think you don’t yet understand the notion of rationality I use.
Do you mean something more than finding unanimous consent between different kinds of ideas about rationality?
#3631·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 months agoI don’t think any of this addresses my original criticism that calling people “embodied agent[s]” is dehumanizing. It sounds like we’re studying rats. So what if cog-sci is dehumanizing? That doesn’t make it better.
Haven't thought about it like that. The purpose of speaking of an embodied agent is to generalize cognition. To understand what's relevant to an agent, you need to understand how that agent is embodied in the world.
There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?
I'm probably critiquing a different idea of rationality. My point was simply that there seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not a sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?
There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reasoning?
There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reason?
#3634·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 months ago…cannot be reduced to explicit reasons…
Favoring explicit ideas over inexplicit ones is an example of irrationality.
How do you evaluate an implicit idea rationally?
#3632·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 months agoYou cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
That isn’t what I mean by unity of knowledge. Of course we can’t process our knowledge in its totality at once. That’s necessarily piecemeal. But that doesn’t mean we can’t live a life guided by reason.
If you consider riding a bike an example of irrationality, and reasoning through quantum mechanics an example of rationality, then you haven’t understood Deutsch’s/my stance on rationality. I think you should study it, ask more questions about it, before you’re ready to criticize it.
There seems to exist arational domains where rationality (as critique of propositional content) is not an sufficient criterion for evaluation, arational domains. In other words, the knowledge of riding a bike is only partially possible to critique by reason. But to get a sense of what you mean. Do you think there always exist a way to get all ideas to jibe that's achieavable through reasoning?
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
Even if knowledge is unified at some fundamental level, we might not be able to live by means of this unified knowledge alone (because of how we function or pure complexity). Living life might require operating through other «kinds» of knowledge which are pre- cognitive. You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
#3605·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 months agoCalling people “embodied agent[s]” like they’re barely superior to video-game characters is dehumanizing and weird.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3609·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 months agoperspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns. Maybe something about perception?
Fixed it. I meant to write perspectival knowledge, whcih is a term used in cognitive science.
Correction to criticism 3604
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
#215·Dennis HackethalOP, almost 2 years agoAnything that processes information is a computer.
The brain processes information.
Therefore, the brain is a computer.
I think you run into circular dependence if you exhaustively try to account for brain function by information processing. Even Claud Shannon’s definition of information is dependent upon a «mind/perspective» defining a range of possible states. The world devoid of any perspective would have infinite states and systems depending on how you «view the world». An example I have previously given is the flickering flags computation in the tv show (books) Three body problem. This computation is dependent on a mind defining states and logical relations.
Will move this criticism as a criticism of the main idea, since it is a criticism of the first premise.
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
#513·Dennis HackethalOP, over 1 year agoYes re OR gate.
Re light switches: as I understand it, they either inhibit or permit the flow of electricity. But there’s no information there, let alone processing of information. So the example is flawed, I think.
If we use Claud Shannon’s framework of understanding information as reducing uncertainty, a light switch doesn’t contain information. But the problem with all kinds of information is that it is dependent on how you subjectively define states and uncertainty. Information is always relative to a certain «perspective».
If we define a computer as anything that processes information, the brain is at least partly a computer, since it also processes information. But that doesn't necessarily mean that a brain is only a computer. Information processing can be done without subjective experience or qualia.
A brain's properties therefore transcend information processing. It is completely conceivable that you can construct a physical brain with identical information processing without accompanying experience (zoombie argument), unless you wan't to say that this instance of information process is dependent on also having the experience.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.
Wouldn't the more correct framing be the mind has automatic programs and consciousness? In other words, the mind has a dual process of explicit thoughts and conscious reflection on the one hand, and ingrained habits or "mental programs" on the other.