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  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #2408.

In a gold standard society, gold doesn't need to be backed by anything. The same would be true for Bitcoin and Zcash.

#2408​·​Erik OrrjeOP, 9 months ago

The reason to back a currency with gold or some other commodity is that the commodity has other utility aside from being used as money. This sets a floor on the price, making it a store of value.

Bitcoin and Zcash have no utility beyond their transferability. The only way either would ever be money is if a government made it their legal tender, forcing transactions to be done with it exclusively.

To use US Dollar as an example again, the only reason it is money is that it has the alternative utility function of being the only thing the government will accept for tax payments. In that sense it is the only currency that keeps you out jail if you use it in its designated geographical area (!). If that weren’t the case then people would quickly swap to using something else—something that isn’t being manipulated by the government.

(To prevent any confusion, please understand that I believe governments should be completely agnostic to how people carry out their transactions, including allowing them to use any currency and even old-school barter if they wish.)

TL;DR The only way for the US Dollar, or Bitcoin, or Zcash (or any other unbacked currencies) to be useful as money is if a government makes them legal tender, and prohibits anything else being used in transactions.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #2408.

In a gold standard society, gold doesn't need to be backed by anything. The same would be true for Bitcoin and Zcash.

#2408​·​Erik OrrjeOP, 9 months ago

You misunderstood my criticism. I said the US Federal Reserve Notes used to be backed by gold, not that the gold itself was backed by something.

  Erik Orrje commented on idea #2407.

See here. Lucas had asked:

Can you say more about why we need correspondence to make sense of the concept of self-similarity? I don't see why. And it seems to me that self-similarity is all we need to make sense of the universality of computation.

My response below. For others reading this, Erik has also since started a dedicated discussion on the topic of correspondence: https://veritula.com/discussions/is-correspondence-true-in-cr


The FoR glossary entry on self-similarity from chapter 4 reads:

self-similarity Some parts of physical reality (such as symbols, pictures or human thoughts) resemble other parts. The resemblance may be concrete, as when the images in a planetarium resemble the night sky; more importantly, it may be abstract, as when a statement in quantum theory printed in a book correctly explains an aspect of the structure of the multiverse.

The way I read that, it means the images in the planetarium correspond to the night sky. Otherwise we wouldn’t consider them similar.

From chapter 6, on the universality of computation and how “various parts of reality can resemble one another”:

The set of all behaviours and responses of that one object exactly mirrors the set of all behaviours and responses of all other physically possible objects and processes.

That means there is one-to-one correspondence between the behaviors and responses of the first object and those of all the other objects. This is basically another way to describe the self-similarity property of the universe.

From chapter 10, in the context of mathematics (italics mine):

… the physical behaviour of the symbols corresponds to the behaviour of the abstractions they denote.

(The same is true of the physical parts of a Turing machine harnessing the self-similarity property of the universe to correspond to other physical objects.)

From chapter 14, in the context of the creation of scientific knowledge (which, AFAIK, DD views as increasing correspondence):

The creation of useful knowledge by science … must be understood as the emergence of the self-similarity that is mandated by a principle of physics, the Turing principle.

It’s been ages since I read FoR so I’m relying on word searches in the ebook but it’s full of these links between self-similarity and correspondence.

#2407​·​Dennis HackethalOP, 9 months ago

Thanks. Do you think there's correspondence for abstractions as well (such as mathematics, as DD seems to suggest)? As I understood, you only think we need it to explain progress in science.

  Erik Orrje addressed criticism #2378.

“Bitcoin is not backed by anything” can also be stated as “Bitcoin is not redeemable in anything”.

“POW” or “computational work” or “encryption” are not things you can redeem if you own bitcoin.

This is in contrast to gold-backed currencies, for example, which are currencies which can be redeemed in gold. The United States Federal Reserve Note only became fiat when it was no longer redeemable in gold.

#2378​·​Benjamin Davies revised 9 months ago

In a gold standard society, gold doesn't need to be backed by anything. The same would be true for Bitcoin and Zcash.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on idea #2032.

@dennis-hackethal*, could you expand your argument in Lucas' blog post that self-similarity must entail correspondence?

#2032​·​Erik Orrje, 9 months ago

See here. Lucas had asked:

Can you say more about why we need correspondence to make sense of the concept of self-similarity? I don't see why. And it seems to me that self-similarity is all we need to make sense of the universality of computation.

My response below. For others reading this, Erik has also since started a dedicated discussion on the topic of correspondence: https://veritula.com/discussions/is-correspondence-true-in-cr


The FoR glossary entry on self-similarity from chapter 4 reads:

self-similarity Some parts of physical reality (such as symbols, pictures or human thoughts) resemble other parts. The resemblance may be concrete, as when the images in a planetarium resemble the night sky; more importantly, it may be abstract, as when a statement in quantum theory printed in a book correctly explains an aspect of the structure of the multiverse.

The way I read that, it means the images in the planetarium correspond to the night sky. Otherwise we wouldn’t consider them similar.

From chapter 6, on the universality of computation and how “various parts of reality can resemble one another”:

The set of all behaviours and responses of that one object exactly mirrors the set of all behaviours and responses of all other physically possible objects and processes.

That means there is one-to-one correspondence between the behaviors and responses of the first object and those of all the other objects. This is basically another way to describe the self-similarity property of the universe.

From chapter 10, in the context of mathematics (italics mine):

… the physical behaviour of the symbols corresponds to the behaviour of the abstractions they denote.

(The same is true of the physical parts of a Turing machine harnessing the self-similarity property of the universe to correspond to other physical objects.)

From chapter 14, in the context of the creation of scientific knowledge (which, AFAIK, DD views as increasing correspondence):

The creation of useful knowledge by science … must be understood as the emergence of the self-similarity that is mandated by a principle of physics, the Turing principle.

It’s been ages since I read FoR so I’m relying on word searches in the ebook but it’s full of these links between self-similarity and correspondence.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #2399.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

#2399​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP revised 9 months ago

a knowledge

I don’t think it’s correct to use the word ‘knowledge’ with an indeterminate article (meaning ‘a’ or ‘an’).

You could say ‘Finding problems that some knowledge addresses…’

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #2404.

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

#2404​·​Dennis Hackethal revised 9 months ago

Superseded by #2395.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #2394. The revision addresses idea #2397.

Recovering this version


At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on idea #2401.

What happened here?

#2401​·​Benjamin Davies, 9 months ago

Presumably, Zelalem wanted to delete the idea. Veritula purposely doesn’t have that functionality. In the future, Zelalem, just leave the idea and criticize it for being outdated or superseded or whatever reason you have for rejecting it.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #2395.

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

#2395​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP, 9 months ago

When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

That still means we solved the problem before we encountered it.

I understand you want to stress that we usually solve a problem after we identify it. Your text already covers that. So I’d still just remove the sentence “We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.” because it’s not true.

  Benjamin Davies commented on criticism #2396.

-

#2396​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP revised 9 months ago

What happened here?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #2392.

I think the 'therefore' means that the following point is a direct result of the preceding claim.

#2392​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP, 9 months ago

Right and it’s not.

  Zelalem Mekonnen revised idea #2398. The revision addresses idea #2396.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

  Zelalem Mekonnen revised idea #2393. The revision addresses idea #2394.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

  Zelalem Mekonnen revised criticism #2394.

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

-

  Zelalem Mekonnen addressed criticism #2388.

We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.

Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet. I would just remove this sentence.

#2388​·​Dennis Hackethal revised 9 months ago

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

  Zelalem Mekonnen criticized idea #2393.

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

#2393​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP, 9 months ago

At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.

  Zelalem Mekonnen commented on criticism #2388.

We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.

Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet. I would just remove this sentence.

#2388​·​Dennis Hackethal revised 9 months ago

Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.

Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.

  Zelalem Mekonnen addressed criticism #2382.

Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them.

Remove ‘therefore’

#2382​·​Dennis Hackethal, 9 months ago

I think the 'therefore' means that the following point is a direct result of the preceding claim.

  Zelalem Mekonnen revised idea #2390. The revision addresses idea #2385.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously true but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously true but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

This view is mainly influenced by Popper, and errors are my own.

  Zelalem Mekonnen revised idea #2371. The revision addresses idea #2375.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously obvious but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously true but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #2384.

We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.

Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet.

We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.

Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet. I would just remove this sentence.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #2381.

…because all knowledge contains errors

This isn’t true, see #2374.

…because all knowledge contains errors.

This isn’t true, see #2374.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #2371.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously obvious but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

#2371​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP, 9 months ago

Should credit Popper where applicable (with a disclaimer that any errors are yours, if you want to be careful).

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #2371.

Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously obvious but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.

#2371​·​Zelalem MekonnenOP, 9 months ago

We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.

Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet.