Dennis Hackethal
@dennis-hackethal·Member since June 2024
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It might be worth stating that the aim of Veritula, in conjunction with the fallibilism philosophy, is that progress is both desirable and attainable, and the way to achieve progress is through rational means. This means an end to mysticism, the supernatural, and all other ideas that have an implicit underlying sentiment that a given thing is beyond our understanding.
It might be worth stating that the underlying philosophy of Veritula, in conjunction with fallibilism, says that progress is both possible and desirable, and that rational means are the only way to make progress. This means an end to mysticism and the supernatural.
#2235·Erik Orrje, 14 days agoThat pruning mechanism is what constitutes natural selection in the mind.
The pruning mechanism is part of it, but there’s more. Again, there’s also competition between ideas and even predatory behavior that can result in the elimination of ideas. All such phenomena taken together constitute natural selection in the mind.
#2042·Dennis HackethalOP, 18 days agoScience writer John Horgan wrote his own article about his experience at Rat Fest:
https://johnhorgan.org/cross-check/my-weekend-at-rat-fest
… Rat Festers cite Popper and Deutsch as if they are infallible.
Shouldn’t it be ‘as if they were infallible’?
#2047·Dennis HackethalOP, 18 days agoIf you give your students an exam on disobediance…
Typo: disobedience
Fixed as of 2025-10-08.
#2243·Dennis HackethalOP, 14 days agoThere could be an explanation somewhere stating that emoji reactions do not have epistemological relevance.
Hardly anyone reads those, and many of those who do forget.
#2160·Dennis HackethalOP, 16 days agoPeople could wrongly think they have epistemological relevance. For example, they might adopt an idea that has pending criticism just because it got positive reactions.
There could be an explanation somewhere stating that emoji reactions do not have epistemological relevance.
Those run the risk of turning Veritula into yet another social network like Reddit or messenger like Telegram.
Pasting #2079 here as it’s since been hidden in a resolved child thread and should have applied directly to #2074 in the first place.
My current view is that the only meaningful dichotomy is good vs. bad.
You say yourself in #2071 that one should “always avoid positive arguments.” Calling a theory “good” would be a positive argument.
As I say in #2065, Popperian epistemology has no room for ‘good’ or any other justification. I’m not aware that anyone has successfully proposed a way to measure the ‘hard-to-varyiness’ of theories anyway. We can criticize theories for being arbitrary (which is another word for ‘easy to vary’). That’d be fine. But Popper wouldn’t give them points for not being arbitrary. And arbitrariness isn’t the only type of criticism a theory might receive anyway.
If we follow Popper and get rid of justification, we can’t use ‘good vs bad’ because we can’t use ‘good’. The only dichotomy left standing is ‘has some bad’ vs ‘has no bad’. Another word for ‘pointing out some bad’ is ‘criticism’. So this dichotomy can be rephrased as: ‘has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’, or ‘has reasons to be rejected’ vs ‘has no reasons to be rejected’. Note that there’s a difference: if you think some idea is bad, you submit a criticism. If you think it’s good, you can still submit a criticism because it might not yet be as good as you want it to be. So regardless of how good a theory might be, it can still have pending criticisms, and thus reasons to reject it. Think of Newtonian physics, which (I’m told) is a superb theory, but it’s false and (as I understand it) has plenty of pending criticisms.
‘Has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’ is directly comparable whereas ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aren’t directly comparable. And ‘has n pending criticisms’ vs ‘has m’ or ‘has 0 pending criticisms’ are even numerically comparable.
Veritula does not implement Deutsch’s epistemology. It implements Popper’s. I don’t think they’re compatible.
(As an aside, I’m not sure how I could implement Deutsch’s epistemology even if I wanted to. Would I give each idea a slider where people can say how ‘good’ the idea is? What values would I give the slider? Would the worst value be -1,000 and the best +1,000? How would users know to assign 500 vs 550? Would a ‘weak’ criticism get a score of 500 and a ‘strong’ one 1,000? What if tomorrow somebody finds an even ‘stronger’ one, does that mean I’d need to extend the slider beyond 1,000? And so on.)
Pasting #2079 here as it’s since been hidden in a resolved child thread and should have applied directly to #2074 in the first place.
My current view is that the only meaningful dichotomy is good vs. bad.
You say yourself in #2071 that one should “always avoid positive arguments.” Calling a theory “good” would be a positive argument.
As I say in #2065, Popperian epistemology has no room for ‘good’ or any other justification. I’m not aware that anyone has successfully proposed a way to measure the ‘hard-to-varyiness’ of theories anyway. We can criticize theories for being arbitrary (which is another word for ‘easy to vary’). That’d be fine. But Popper wouldn’t give them points for not being arbitrary. And arbitrariness isn’t the only type of criticism a theory might receive anyway.
If we follow Popper and get rid of justification, we can’t use ‘good vs bad’ because we can’t use ‘good’. The only dichotomy left standing is ‘has some bad’ vs ‘has no bad’. Another word for ‘pointing out some bad’ is ‘criticism’. So this dichotomy can be rephrased as: ‘has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’, or ‘has reasons to be rejected’ vs ‘has no reasons to be rejected’. Note that there’s a difference: if you think some idea is bad, you submit a criticism. If you think it’s good, you can still submit a criticism because it might not yet be as good as you want it to be. So regardless of how good a theory might be, it can still have pending criticisms, and thus reasons to reject it. Think of Newtonian physics, which (I’m told) is a superb theory, but it’s false and (as I understand it) has plenty of pending criticisms.
‘Has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’ is directly comparable whereas ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aren’t directly comparable. And ‘has n pending criticisms’ vs ‘has m’ or ‘has 0 pending criticisms’ are even numerically comparable.
Veritula does not implement Deutsch’s epistemology. It implements Popper’s. I don’t think they’re compatible.
(As an aside, I’m not sure how I could implement Deutsch’s epistemology even if I wanted to. Would I give each idea a slider where people can say how ‘good’ the idea is? What values would I give the slider? Would the worst value be -1,000 and the best +1,000? How would users know to assign 500 vs 550? Would a ‘weak’ criticism get a score of 500 and a ‘strong’ one 1,000? What if tomorrow somebody finds an even ‘stronger’ one, does that mean I’d need to extend the slider beyond 1,000? Do I include arbitrary decimal/real numbers? Is an idea’s score reduced by the sum of its criticisms’ scores? If an idea has score 0, what does that mean – undecided? If it has -500, does that mean I should reject it ‘more strongly’ than if it had only -100? And so on. Deutsch says you haven’t understood something if you can’t program it, and I don’t think he could program his epistemology.)
#2223·Erik Orrje, 15 days agoMost people (except in Alzheimer's, etc.) don't run out of memory in the brain. If there's no scarcity for the space of ideas, why do they have to compete?
Since you’re a doctor, Erik, let me ask: is there a possibility Alzheimer’s could be explained in terms of bad software? Correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems like the prevailing view is limited to bad hardware.
I have speculated in the past that ideas compete for attention, but they also compete for any kind of memory, be it something like RAM or hard-disk memory. The RAM-like memory in the brain is presumably closely related to working memory, if not the same.
The reason most people don’t run out memory (of both kinds) isn’t that memory isn’t scarce but that there’s a pruning mechanism in the mind. And again, there’s competition. That competition can involve predatory ideas which disassemble the source code of other ideas and use it for themselves because that’s cheaper than to construct source code from scratch.
I have speculated in the past that ideas compete for attention, but they also compete for any kind of memory, be it something like RAM or hard-disk memory. The RAM-like memory in the brain is presumably closely related to working memory, if not the same.
The reason most people don’t (permanently) run out memory (of either kind) isn’t that memory isn’t scarce but that there’s a pruning mechanism in the mind. And again, there’s competition. That competition can involve predatory ideas which disassemble the source code of other ideas and use it for themselves because that’s cheaper than to construct source code from scratch.
#2223·Erik Orrje, 15 days agoMost people (except in Alzheimer's, etc.) don't run out of memory in the brain. If there's no scarcity for the space of ideas, why do they have to compete?
By the way, how is this a criticism? #2200 makes no mention of memory.
#2225·Erik Orrje, 14 days agoOf course, memory isn't infinite. But most people don't seem to run out of it in their lifetimes. Is it more accurate to say that ideas compete for working memory, which is scarcer?
I have speculated in the past that ideas compete for attention, but they also compete for any kind of memory, be it something like RAM or hard-disk memory. The RAM-like memory in the brain is presumably closely related to working memory, if not the same.
The reason most people don’t run out memory (of both kinds) isn’t that memory isn’t scarce but that there’s a pruning mechanism in the mind. And again, there’s competition. That competition can involve predatory ideas which disassemble the source code of other ideas and use it for themselves because that’s cheaper than to construct source code from scratch.
#2223·Erik Orrje, 15 days agoMost people (except in Alzheimer's, etc.) don't run out of memory in the brain. If there's no scarcity for the space of ideas, why do they have to compete?
Everyone has scarce memory. Everyone’s brain has limited storage space.
Then you counter-criticize them for whatever you think they lack (which should be easy if you’re right that they’re not good), thus addressing them and restoring the idea.
Then you counter-criticize them for whatever you think they lack (which should be easy if they really aren’t good), thus addressing them and restoring the idea.
#2219·Dennis HackethalOP, 15 days agoBut sometimes an idea has other content that shouldn’t be thrown out with the bathwater just because of some criticism that applies only to part of it.
Then the idea should be revised to adjust or exclude the criticized part(s).
#2140·Dennis HackethalOP, 17 days agoDecision-Making on Veritula
Expanding on #2112…
If an idea has no pending criticisms, it’s rational to adopt it and irrational to reject it. What reason could you have to reject it? If it has no pending criticisms, then either 1) no reasons to reject it (ie, criticisms) have been suggested or 2) all suggested reasons have been addressed already.
If an idea does have pending criticisms, it’s irrational to adopt it and rational to reject it – by reference to those criticisms. What reason could you have to ignore the pending criticisms and adopt it anyway?
But sometimes an idea has other content that shouldn’t be thrown out with the bathwater just because of some criticism that applies only to part of it.
… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.
Does #2140 help as an alternative theory?
… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.
Do #2140 and its children help as an alternative theory?
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
As a reminder, at some point we will need to do some housekeeping because any criticisms of #2108 are probably also going to be criticisms #2109 and we want an intact criticism chain.
I’m marking this as a criticism so we don’t forget. And when we’re done with the housekeeping, we can say so in a counter-criticism to ‘check off’ that todo item.
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.
Does #2140 help as an alternative theory?
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.
You do know criticisms, see #2094.
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
We can criticize theories for lacking structure, resilience, depth, reach, etc. But again, if we want to avoid justificationism, theories that do have those attributes don’t get points for having them.
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
[L]abeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument.
Labeling them good, yes. But not labeling them bad.
#2108·Edwin de Wit, 17 days agoGreat clarification of Popper’s position—and of how it differs from Deutsch’s. Very insightful. I see what you mean about there being no room for positive arguments, and that labeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument. Still, I find value in the distinctions Deutsch makes when describing theories as good, bad, better, fundamental, deep, or anti-rational. Unfortunately, I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer. I’d like to revisit this later, but I have a busy stretch coming up, and I expect the discussion will take some real research and time—so I’d rather not start it just yet.
For now, I’ll leave a few breadcrumbs (mostly notes to self) to pick up later.
Deutsch’s idea of a “good explanation” seems to involve the following elements:
Structure: Whether the explanation is built the right way—that is, whether it describes the mechanism of how and why something works rather than appealing to authority, source, or mere results. The “hard-to-vary” criterion also seems tied to this structural quality.
Resilience: Whether it stands up to repeated criticism and testing. Deutsch agrees that general relativity and quantum theory are “wrong” in the Popperian sense—since they have gaps or domains where they fail—yet he still counts them among our best explanations because they’ve been repeatedly tested and shown to work reliably within their applicable domains.
Depth and reach: A hallmark of a good explanation is that understanding it allows you to understand a range of other phenomena as well. Deutsch even suggests there’s a kind of convergence toward a unified theory of everything—hinting at a deep link between reality and its propensity to be explained.
Citations needed.
You retain that freedom. Veritula has no power over you. Being irrational is your prerogative (as long as you don’t violate anyone else’s consent in the process).
You retain that freedom. Veritula has no power over you. Being irrational is your prerogative (as long as you don’t violate anyone else’s consent in the process). Just don’t pretend to yourself or others that you’re being rational when you’re not.
You retain that freedom. Veritula has no power over you. Being irrational is your prerogative (as long as you’re not hurting anyone else in the process).
You retain that freedom. Veritula has no power over you. Being irrational is your prerogative (as long as you don’t violate anyone else’s consent in the process).