Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?
Discussion started by Dennis Hackethal
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With an account, you can revise, criticize, and comment on ideas, and submit new ideas.A discussion with Logan Chipkin. Shared with permission. Others are welcome to contribute.
Ayn Rand writes:
[A]lthough few people today believe that the singing of mystic incantations will bring rain, most people still regard as valid an argument such as: “If there is no God, who created the universe?”
To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic constituent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe—from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life—are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved. Nature is the metaphysically given—i.e., the nature of nature is outside the power of any volition.
In short, she argues that “the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated […]”. Which means that investigations into the origin of the universe are metaphysically invalid because they contradict the primacy of existence.
Sounds like she treats existence or nature or the law of identity as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Sounds like she treats existence as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Sounds like she treats existence or nature as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Sounds like she treats existence or nature or the law of identity as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
I disagree. Existence is something to be explained.
(Logan Chipkin)
She does explain it by referring to the law of identity.
She does explain it by referring to the law of identity.
I disagree. Existence is something to be explained.
(Logan Chipkin)
Ayn Rand writes:
[A]lthough few people today believe that the singing of mystic incantations will bring rain, most people still regard as valid an argument such as: “If there is no God, who created the universe?”
To grasp the axiom that existence exists, means to grasp the fact that nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated, that it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic constituent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe—from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life—are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved. Nature is the metaphysically given—i.e., the nature of nature is outside the power of any volition.
In short, she argues that “the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated […]”. Which means that investigations into the origin of the universe are metaphysically invalid because they contradict the primacy of existence.
Sounds like she treats existence as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Sounds like she treats existence or nature as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Sounds like she treats existence or nature or the law of identity as an ultimate bedrock. Foundationalism.
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should all of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘exist as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes. Which doesn’t problematize most of her other ideas, fortunately.
But my guess is that any false idea could, if not corrected, result in humanity’s demise. So, should any of Rand’s ideas spread to fixation, we could have her to thank for going the way of the dodo.
Of course the fact that this ‘existence as foundationalism’ idea does not problematize her other ideas goes both ways - opponents of Objectivism cannot appeal to that idea as a wholesale refutation of Objectivism.
(Logan Chipkin)
What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.
Since the law of the excluded middle is a corollary of the law of identity, Rand kind of implies this idea when she says that nature “is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity.”
Since the law of the excluded middle is a corollary of the law of identity, Rand kind of implies this idea when she says that nature “is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity.”
I think this explanation holds if you assume the law of the excluded middle is true. The only remaining criticism I can see, is if you throw out the law of the excluded middle (like paraconsistent- and intutionist logic.)
I think this explanation holds if you assume the law of the excluded middle is true. The only remaining criticism I can see, is if you throw out the law of the excluded middle (like paraconsistent- and intutionist logic.)
[…] it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist.
That isn’t a sentence.
[…] it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist.
That isn’t a sentence.
@knut-sondre-saebo, you write in the explanation for this revision:
I think the the law of excluded middle is more a property or constraint of existence, rather than a cause. Since we can treat universe as being something as a given, the reason it can't be something else is because the law of excluded middle constrains it to be what it is.
Revision explanations are meant to be short, eg ‘Fixed typo’ or ‘Clarified x’. Since the quote above contradicts #521, it might be worth submitting it as a criticism of #521, or as a separate idea. It doesn’t really work as a revision because revisions are for incremental changes, not for introducing contradictions.
@knut-sondre-saebo, you write in the explanation for this revision:
I think the the law of excluded middle is more a property or constraint of existence, rather than a cause. Since we can treat universe as being something as a given, the reason it can't be something else is because the law of excluded middle constrains it to be what it is.
Revision explanations are meant to be short, eg ‘Fixed typo’ or ‘Clarified x’. Since the quote above contradicts #521, it might be worth submitting it as a criticism of #521, or as a separate idea. It doesn’t really work as a revision because revisions are for incremental changes, not for introducing contradictions.
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
I think that’s just a word game.
(Logan Chipkin)
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Is logic part of philosophy?
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
I’d like that.
And yes inexplicit criticism is good! And not taking infinite criticism is bad. Someone should make a list of understandable pitfalls one ought to avoid when trying to apply critical rationalism.
(Logan Chipkin)
I’d like that.
And yes inexplicit criticism is good! And not taking infinite criticism is bad. Someone should make a list of understandable pitfalls one ought to avoid when trying to apply critical rationalism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Please don’t submit multiple criticisms in the same post. Submit one criticism per post only. Familiarize yourself with how Veritula works (#465) before you continue.
Please don’t submit multiple criticisms in the same post. Submit one criticism per post only. Familiarize yourself with how Veritula works (#465) before you continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right?
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the former has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right?
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
What do you think of: it’s the law of the excluded middle that causes the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.
Since the law of the excluded middle is a corollary of the law of identity, Rand kind of implies this idea when she says that nature “is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity.”
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the former has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right?
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
What do you think of: it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.
Since the law of the excluded middle is a corollary of the law of identity, Rand kind of implies this idea when she says that nature “is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the Law of Identity.”
I think this explanation holds if you assume the law of the excluded middle is true. The only remaining criticism I can see, is if you throw out the law of the excluded middle (like paraconsistent- and intutionist logic.)
[…] it’s the fact that the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist.
That isn’t a sentence.
@knut-sondre-saebo, you write in the explanation for this revision:
I think the the law of excluded middle is more a property or constraint of existence, rather than a cause. Since we can treat universe as being something as a given, the reason it can't be something else is because the law of excluded middle constrains it to be what it is.
Revision explanations are meant to be short, eg ‘Fixed typo’ or ‘Clarified x’. Since the quote above contradicts #521, it might be worth submitting it as a criticism of #521, or as a separate idea. It doesn’t really work as a revision because revisions are for incremental changes, not for introducing contradictions.
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the former has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right?
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a qunatifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Knut has fixed the typo. @knut-sondre-saebo, be sure to check off addressed criticisms when you revise an idea. Underneath the revision form, there’s a list of criticisms that you can check and uncheck.
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a qunatifier [sic], is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work.
Or am I missing something?
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Good point - philosophy, then.
(Logan Chipkin)
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
To the question of existence.
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.