What Makes One Idea Better Than Another?
Be more specific about what ‘having programmed it’ means
Preference formation is a computational task. (#5255) To claim we’ve understood a computational task, we must have programmed it (Deutsch). Popper never programmed it, so he didn’t understand it.
(To his credit though, he got pretty technical in defining verisimilitude, logical vs. empirical content, etc.)
Preference formation is a computational task. (#5255) To claim we’ve understood a computational task, we must have programmed it (Deutsch). Popper never programmed it, so he didn’t understand it. (To Popper’s credit though, he got pretty technical in defining verisimilitude, logical vs. empirical content, etc.)
Satisfying Deutsch’s yardstick means, in my professional opinion as a software engineer: writing working code to industry standards. It must compile, implement the desired feature with no known bugs, be as performant as the feature reasonably requires, have clean syntax, etc.
#6078·Moritz Wallawitsch, 7 days ago·AI-assistedThis rules out partial understanding. I understand aspects of how capitalism works even though I couldn’t build a faithful simulation of a capitalist economy. Not having programmed preference formation doesn’t show that Popper understood nothing about it. What specific part did he fail to understand?
Not having programmed preference formation doesn’t show that Popper understood nothing about it.
#5256 doesn’t say Popper understood nothing about it. I think he understood it fairly well, far better than other philosophers, but we now understand it better today than he did.
#6078·Moritz Wallawitsch, 7 days ago·AI-assistedThis rules out partial understanding. I understand aspects of how capitalism works even though I couldn’t build a faithful simulation of a capitalist economy. Not having programmed preference formation doesn’t show that Popper understood nothing about it. What specific part did he fail to understand?
I understand aspects of how capitalism works
Capitalism isn’t a computational task.
#6080·Moritz Wallawitsch, 7 days ago·AI-assistedHow do we decide which test is more severe? That judgment seems to do the work of forming the preference here. The criticism tree records the judgment, but what explains how we reach it?
Again I think it depends on the test. I don’t think it’s a fundamental problem for the theoretician, more so for the applied epistemologist. But in general terms, you can just guess that one is more severe, and if nobody has a pending criticism of that guess, you can rationally go ahead with it.
#5948·Dennis Hackethal, 18 days agoGood q. I think it would depend on the tests. For example, idea C could say: ‘Both A and B fail a test, but test 1 is more severe than test 2, so A is preferable.’
How do we decide which test is more severe? That judgment seems to do the work of forming the preference here. The criticism tree records the judgment, but what explains how we reach it?
#5256·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoPreference formation is a computational task. (#5255) To claim we’ve understood a computational task, we must have programmed it (Deutsch). Popper never programmed it, so he didn’t understand it.
(To his credit though, he got pretty technical in defining verisimilitude, logical vs. empirical content, etc.)
The requirement to have ‘programmed it’ is imprecise. Would precise pseudocode count, or must it be executable code? If pseudocode fully specifies the procedure, what additional understanding does translating it into Python require?
#5256·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoPreference formation is a computational task. (#5255) To claim we’ve understood a computational task, we must have programmed it (Deutsch). Popper never programmed it, so he didn’t understand it.
(To his credit though, he got pretty technical in defining verisimilitude, logical vs. empirical content, etc.)
This rules out partial understanding. I understand aspects of how capitalism works even though I couldn’t build a faithful simulation of a capitalist economy. Not having programmed preference formation doesn’t show that Popper understood nothing about it. What specific part did he fail to understand?
#5750·Zelalem Mekonnen, 29 days agoThis works if the tests are identical. What happens if idea A passes test 1 but fails test 2, while idea B passes test 2 but fails test 1?
Good q. I think it would depend on the tests. For example, idea C could say: ‘Both A and B fail a test, but test 1 is more severe than test 2, so A is preferable.’
#5265·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoThere’s no need to single out corroboration or verisimilitude as special kinds of criticism.
Preference formation using either can easily be reduced to the method of counting pending criticisms:
Idea A fails to survive two tests.
Idea B fails to survive only one of the two.
Idea C says: I have only A and B; I don’t have time to create another; although both are false, I have to act; so for now I prefer B since at least it passes a test A doesn’t.If idea C has no pending criticisms, then we should adopt it. (And thus ‘transitively’ adopt B.)
This works if the tests are identical. What happens if idea A passes test 1 but fails test 2, while idea B passes test 2 but fails test 1?
Related Popper reading: ‘Preference for Theories and the Search for Truth’
#5276·Benjamin DaviesOP, 3 months agoFrom #1497, emphasis mine:
Discussion title: problem
Top-level ideas in the discussion: proposed solutions
Nested ideas: criticisms, counter-criticisms, and further solutionsThis is what I was going off. Did I misunderstand #1497?
You can structure discussions any way you like as long as you make sure the structure won’t break criticism chains.
Comments are for commentary or criticism, not elaborations on the same idea. The same idea shouldn’t be spread over multiple posts. That breaks criticism chains.
Veritula threads don’t work like Twitter/X threads, where people post elaborations on the same idea in comments. They used to have to do that because Twitter enforced a character limit. Now they still do it by tradition. And I’m guessing it’s an adjustment coming to Veritula.
If you realize you need to add more info to an existing idea, put it in a revision, not a comment. Again, #5250 seems like a revision of #5249. The revision of #5249 would then be a combination of both.
#5276·Benjamin DaviesOP, 3 months agoFrom #1497, emphasis mine:
Discussion title: problem
Top-level ideas in the discussion: proposed solutions
Nested ideas: criticisms, counter-criticisms, and further solutionsThis is what I was going off. Did I misunderstand #1497?
Dennis Hackethal#5270·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoThis approach breaks search functions, where the system only goes off the ‘Criticized’ flag. Now the system shows some ideas as rationally adoptable even though they aren’t.
Would it be better to make them all root ideas?
But the UI won’t reflect that automatically. Now you have to remember which threads have structure and which don’t. Will you remember that, say, six months from now?
But the UI won’t reflect that automatically. Now you have to remember which threads have this structure and which don’t. Will you remember that, say, six months from now?
#5267·Benjamin DaviesOP revised 3 months agoThey are separate ideas, and the latter ideas depend on their formers. If there is a flaw in former ideas, they apply to latter ideas, but if there is a flaw in latter ideas, they don’t necessarily apply to the former. So arranging them like this was intentional, to respect that hierarchy.
This approach breaks search functions, where the system only goes off the ‘Criticized’ flag. Now the system shows some ideas as rationally adoptable even though they aren’t.
#5267·Benjamin DaviesOP revised 3 months agoThey are separate ideas, and the latter ideas depend on their formers. If there is a flaw in former ideas, they apply to latter ideas, but if there is a flaw in latter ideas, they don’t necessarily apply to the former. So arranging them like this was intentional, to respect that hierarchy.
But the UI won’t reflect that automatically. Now you have to remember which threads have structure and which don’t. Will you remember that, say, six months from now?
They are seperate ideas, and the latter ideas depend on the former. If there is a flaw in former ideas, they apply to latter ideas, but if there is a flaw in latter ideas, they don’t necessarily apply to the former. So arranging them like this was intentional, to respect that hierarchy.
They are separate ideas, and the latter ideas depend on their formers. If there is a flaw in former ideas, they apply to latter ideas, but if there is a flaw in latter ideas, they don’t necessarily apply to the former. So arranging them like this was intentional, to respect that hierarchy.
#5262·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoThere’s a risk in posting follow-up thoughts as nested comments. The risk is that criticism chains won’t bubble up far enough.
If you want to add more information to an idea, I suggest revising it.
They are seperate ideas, and the latter ideas depend on the former. If there is a flaw in former ideas, they apply to latter ideas, but if there is a flaw in latter ideas, they don’t necessarily apply to the former. So arranging them like this was intentional, to respect that hierarchy.
#5253·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoPopper says to prefer ideas that are better corroborated, more truthlike. I wrote about this recently, pasting it here:
Corroboration was meant to help us form rational preferences between ideas. From The Logic of Scientific Discovery (pp. 281-282):
We can sometimes rationally justify the preference for a theory in the light of its corroboration, that is, of the present state of the critical discussion of the competing theories, which are critically discussed and compared from the point of view of assessing their nearness to the truth (verisimilitude). The current state of this discussion may, in principle, be reported in the form of their degrees of corroboration.
Specifically, corroboration helps you form a rational preference between two theories that have both been shown to be false while there are no known alternatives. From Conjectures and Refutations (p. 318):
… even after t2 has been refuted in its turn, we can still say that it is better than t1, for although both have been shown to be false, the fact that t2 has withstood tests which t1 did not pass may be a good indication that the falsity-content of t1 exceeds that of t2 while its truth-content does not. Thus we may still give preference to t2, even after its falsification, because we have reason to think that it agrees better with the facts than did t1.
That “t2 has withstood tests which t1 did not pass” means t2 is better corroborated than t1.
There’s no need to single out corroboration or verisimilitude as special kinds of criticism.
Preference formation using either can easily be reduced to the method of counting pending criticisms:
Idea A fails to survive two tests.
Idea B fails to survive only one of the two.
Idea C says: I have only A and B; I don’t have time to create another; although both are false, I have to act; so for now I prefer B since at least it passes a test A doesn’t.
If idea C has no pending criticisms, then we should adopt it. (And thus ‘transitively’ adopt B.)
We can rationally prefer A over B if and only if A has no pending criticisms whereas B has at least one.
The property you mention is the existence of pending criticisms.
We can rationally prefer A over B if A has no pending criticisms whereas B has at least one.
The property you mention is the existence of pending criticisms.
#5258·Dennis Hackethal, 3 months agoWe can rationally prefer A over B if and only if A has no pending criticisms whereas B has at least one.
The property you mention is the existence of pending criticisms.
You can still prefer A over B if neither has pending criticisms. The “if and only if” is too strict.
#5250·Benjamin DaviesOP, 3 months agoThe more HTV an explanation is, the more closely it corresponds to reality.
There’s a risk in posting follow-up thoughts as nested comments. The risk is that criticism chains won’t bubble up far enough.
If you want to add more information to an idea, I suggest revising it.
#5246·Benjamin DaviesOP, 3 months agoWhen we reject explanation B in favour of explanation A, there must be some property of the explanations that comprehensively distinguishes A as better than B.
Progress does not require a complete ranking of every live explanation. If B has a fatal flaw while no fatal flaw is currently known in A or C, the flaw in B is enough to reject B while A and C both remain live. There does not need to be one property that all three explanations possess to different degrees.