Edwin de Wit

There isn’t a clear logical or computational method for determining whether one explanation is better than another. However, David Deutsch offers useful criteria for evaluating explanations. He suggests that a good explanation is better than a rival if it explains more — meaning it has fewer errors, fewer loose ends, or a broader explanatory range (i.e., it accounts for more phenomena) <my interpretation, not a quote>.

The statement that “we are always wrong” is contentious, even within fallibilism. Concepts like truth and falsity, degrees of truth, or better and worse explanations all come with their own pitfalls. In this discussion, I hope we can reach a consensus on how to describe fallibilism in a way that acknowledges and addresses these challenges.

An idea can be either true or false — it’s a binary distinction, and some statements can be absolutely true. However, the critical nuance is that such truth is conditionally absolute. That is, it depends on the background knowledge and underlying assumptions or axioms. For example, 1 + 1 = 2 is absolutely true, but only within the framework of the Peano axioms.