Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?
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What do you think of: it’s the law of the excluded middle that constrains the universe to exist. Nothing can’t exist, so the only alternative that’s left is for something to exist.
I don’t see why nonexistence cannot also be a logical possibility.
If nonexistence is logically possible, and existence is logically possible, we need to explain why the latter has been physicalized in the first place.
(Logan Chipkin)
Well non-existence, by definition, can’t exist, right? Rules itself out.
Is non-existence really existing if there’s nothing at all?
(Logan Chipkin)
If non-existence is to mean anything at all, I think that’s it, yes.
I would be amazed if that is why there is something rather than nothing.
(Logan Chipkin)
That’s not a counterargument - so maybe that’s it, after all.
(Logan Chipkin)
I would think that the solution comes either from physics or from philosophy that comes out of some physical theory.
(Logan Chipkin)
Doesn’t physics presume the existence of physical objects and laws? Ie it presumes the existence of something physical. So it presumes existence itself. In which case physics can’t be the arbiter here.
Since you agree (#539) that logic is part of philosophy, the law of the excluded middle should satisfy you as a philosophical answer, no?
You mean to the question of existence, or in general? Cuz in general I’d think of it as a criticism.
(Logan Chipkin)
Yes, it should. I am left with no counterargument but a mild sense of dissatisfaction.
(Logan Chipkin)
Inexplicit criticism is good, maybe you can make it explicit someday and we can continue.
I’d like that.
And yes inexplicit criticism is good! And not taking infinite criticism is bad. Someone should make a list of understandable pitfalls one ought to avoid when trying to apply critical rationalism.
(Logan Chipkin)
People use the same argument to "prove" the existence of God. The existence of anything can then be proved simply by including in the definition that it must exist. Example: Dragons must exist because I can define "dragon" as what is traditionally thought of a dragon, plus the claim that it exists.
Also you can't at the same time say that non-existence is ruled out on logical grounds, and then define it as something that's clearly possible, namely the absence of the universe. It's conflating an abstract concept for a physical one.
Please don’t submit multiple criticisms in the same post. Submit one criticism per post only. Familiarize yourself with how Veritula works (#465) before you continue.
Btw I do sometimes wonder if the problem of explaining why there’s something rather than nothing is connected to the fact that there’s a difference between Platonic reality and physical reality.
(Logan Chipkin)
A useful distinction in talking of non-existence and nothingness is nothingness as a quantifier and nothingness as an object. Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Nothing as an object is inherently paradoxical. Nothingness as an object is something without properties, but paradoxically therefore has the properties of at least:
1. Immutability: it can't change, because change requires something
2. Boundarylessness
3. Indeterminacy: undefined, without qualities
I kind of relate to Graham Priest in that existence and non-existence is dependent on each other - kind of like the ying-yang symbol. For something to "be", it must be distinguished from "not-being". It might therefore not really be a resolution to the problem. Just like the rabbit in the rabbit-duck illusion is dependent on the shape of the duck, non-existence is dependent on existence.
Nothingness as a quantifier, is the concept of a universe with no objects. This doesn't have any inherent contradictions in classical logic. It would simply be a world where all objects are subtracted, as in an empty set.
Wouldn’t the universe itself be an object, as would the set itself, so you’d never have an empty set anyway?
If we talk about the quantifier nothing, you would look at the universe = all objects. So if you remove all objects the universe wouldn’t really «refer» to anything. But if you believe there exist such a thing as the object Nothingness, there could possibly exist a universe = Nothingness (as the object), which has some defined properties.
I agree that nothingness as an object makes no sense.
Regarding nothingness as a quantifier: if you removed all objects except for the universe itself, then the universe remains as an object. So then the set of all objects wouldn’t be empty. So even as a quantifier, nothingness doesn’t seem to work. At least when it refers to all of existence.
Or am I missing something?
I disagree that the universe would remain an object if we remove all objects, because an object must have properties. If we define “the universe” as the totality of all objects, then removing them leaves only a word with no metaphysical referent, and therefore can’t be thought of as “existing”. So I agree that it doesn’t work when applied to “all of existence”. This is why I think your point about the excluded middle makes nothingness impossible. But generally speaking, “nothingness” as a quantifier typically involves no logical contradictions.
Logical possibilities and possible world frameworks, only works for potential states "inside" the universe right? The state of there being something or nothing in the universe doesn't have a "causal start", because the fact of something existing is an "eternal property" of the universe.