How Does Veritula Work?
Showing only ideas leading to #5340 and its comments.
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With an account, you can revise, criticize, and comment on ideas.Rational Decision-Making
Expanding on #2112…
If an idea, as written, has no pending criticisms, it’s rational to adopt it and irrational to reject it. What reason could you have to reject it? If it has no pending criticisms, then either 1) no reasons to reject it (ie, criticisms) have been suggested or 2) all suggested reasons have been addressed already.
If an idea, as written, does have pending criticisms, it’s irrational to adopt it and rational to reject it – by reference to those criticisms. What reason could you have to ignore the pending criticisms and adopt it anyway?
Or, simplified:
It is rational to adopt only those ideas which, as written, don’t have pending criticisms, and to reject ideas that do.
Brett says this can’t be a fully specified criterion of rationality because it’s not an AGI.
As I wrote to him in response, rationality and creativity are different things. They’re related, and there’s overlap, but you don’t need to code creativity to code rational preference formation. You can outsource creative input to the user, as programs usually do.
Brett claims in response “the whole Popperian view is that rationality *is* creativity: the *creation* of corrections to errors once identified, etc.” He’s concerned that Veritula “seems to suggest ‘rationality’ is identical to something like ‘logic’ or a purely deductive process.”
If we can have a purely deductive process to tell whether we’re being rational or not, that’s a very good thing. The opposite of something to be concerned about.
I think Brett is concerned that Veritula discounts the creation of new options. David is right to point in BoI chapter 13 that traditional accounts of rational decision-making focus too much on choosing from existing options according to a fixed formula while ignoring the fact that man is creative, ie can make new options.
Veritula doesn’t discount that. As I point out to Brett, it “lets us submit new options at any time, and it offers writing tools to make that as easy and enjoyable as possible. It actively encourages the creation of new options.”
My response:
I disagree. Popper suggested measures of corroboration and verisimilitude for rational preference formation *given* a set of *already-created* theories (see quotes and explanations in my answer here: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/137784/relevance-of-poppers-theory-of-corroboration/140003#140003). This is the tradition of preference formation David follows in BoI. Again, we need to take care not to fudge rationality and creativity.
Ben points out to Brett that “the step of conjecturing ideas (or criticisms) is not itself rational or irrational. rationality comes in when it comes time to decide what to do, given your state of knowledge. it is about acting according to your best ideas, rather than coming up with ideas”
Brett’s response:
One can *call* that “rationality”. And ok. But what I’m referring to is that process which causes behaviour in humans. We create (choices) and choose them.
If one wants to extract out “coming up with ideas” from this process, ok. But that to me looks just like sentential logic.
This isn’t merely an issue of what we call things. The difference between rationality and creativity isn’t semantics.
Don’t know why the sudden reference to the rather esoteric topic of sentential logic. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_logic Nor does Brett explain what’s wrong with it.
Ben replies that “it is one thing conjecture a theory, it is another thing to compare theories to choose which one to proceed with (tentatively)”; that HTV is meant to help with the latter.
In response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”
There’s no contradiction there. It can be both a feature of explanations and a tool to help us make decisions.
I reply: “Why care whether explanations have this feature if not to prefer them?”
I reply:
The question of how we can make rational preferences has been a key philosophical problem since antiquity. Saying HTV isn’t for that is frankly a disservice to Deutsch because it demotes HTV from a genuine philosophical contribution to a mere feature of some explanations that we don’t know what to do with.
I reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
I preemptively address that:
Let me state preemptively that I realize these quotes aren’t exclusively about HTV. There are other factors involved in rational decision-making, such as the outcomes of crucial tests (then again, David does link that to HTV in chapter 1). I give these quotes to show that David recognizes and contributes to the problem of how to form rational preferences throughout BoI from various angles.
Liberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”
I address the cherry-picking charge now:
… chapter 1 was in large part about HTV as a way to prefer axis tilt over Persephone. That was a central part of that chapter: to present David’s answer to how we can make rational choices, using axis tilt vs. Persephone as an example.
So, far from being cherry-picked, several pages in BoI, almost a whole chapter, are about preference formation using HTV.
As for ambiguity, I don’t see how it’s ambiguous, at least now, given the additional quotes and the fact that chapter 1 is in large part about preference formation, as I say in #5363.
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)
I ask: “If HTV is just a feature of explanations but not a criterion to form rational preferences, does that mean we could rationally adopt Persephone over axis tilt?”
The implied criticism is that that is clearly not what HTV is intended for.
I give “another argument that rationality isn’t the same as creativity: we can creatively come up with ways to suppress criticism”
I reply:
Sometimes it’s *hard* to come up with new options. Like in the conflict between QM and GR. So then we have to choose from existing options because we can’t trivially just ‘be creative’ to make a new one
But #5331 relies on our ability to come up with new options to remain rational in the face of mutually exclusive options.
In #5368, I mean fully new options. Like a new theory in addition to QM and GR. Such a theory is extremely hard to come by.