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Wait, do you view the pruning as separate from the mere competition of ideas…?

Yes. When I say ‘pruning’, I’m referring to a specific mechanism of a meta algorithm in the mind. For more details, see my book A Window on Intelligence, I think chapter 5. There is no such meta algorithm in biological evolution.

In that same vein, why couldn't we class biology (evolution) under epistemology?

Yes, but that inhirent in biology (evolution) right? I see it as part of the evolutionary strand for this reason.

Economics as a fundamental study of trade-offs.

My point is rather that it's not so clean a line between explicit and inexplicit. You're a doctor, so imagine the steps being something like:

1. Extensive description of patient's symptoms, test results, conclusion, etc, in English.
2. Same as above but mostly made out of quick notes by attending doctors and nurses.
3. Only a collection of test names and test results. Test results accompanied by Chinese.
4. Just a collection of numbers coming out of tests, without saying which test.

Arguably all the information is always there, and can be read off, but with increasing difficulty, requiring you to learn another language, or do a series of deductions.

Haha not a programmer so understood maybe half of it, but I think I see what you mean. There'll always be inexplicit parts to every explanation. My concept of explanations is that there must be at least some explicit part for it to be called an explanation. That's why genes aren't explanations.

That’s a valid point but doesn’t belong here. I have instead edited a related idea.

The pruning mechanism is part of it, but there’s more. Again, there’s also competition between ideas and even predatory behavior that can result in the elimination of ideas. All such phenomena taken together constitute natural selection in the mind.

… Rat Festers cite Popper and Deutsch as if they are infallible.

Shouldn’t it be ‘as if they were infallible’?

Fixed as of 2025-10-08.

Hardly anyone reads those, and many of those who do forget.

Pasting #2079 here as it’s since been hidden in a resolved child thread and should have applied directly to #2074 in the first place.

My current view is that the only meaningful dichotomy is good vs. bad.

You say yourself in #2071 that one should “always avoid positive arguments.” Calling a theory “good” would be a positive argument.

As I say in #2065, Popperian epistemology has no room for ‘good’ or any other justification. I’m not aware that anyone has successfully proposed a way to measure the ‘hard-to-varyiness’ of theories anyway. We can criticize theories for being arbitrary (which is another word for ‘easy to vary’). That’d be fine. But Popper wouldn’t give them points for not being arbitrary. And arbitrariness isn’t the only type of criticism a theory might receive anyway.

If we follow Popper and get rid of justification, we can’t use ‘good vs bad’ because we can’t use ‘good’. The only dichotomy left standing is ‘has some bad’ vs ‘has no bad’. Another word for ‘pointing out some bad’ is ‘criticism’. So this dichotomy can be rephrased as: ‘has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’, or ‘has reasons to be rejected’ vs ‘has no reasons to be rejected’. Note that there’s a difference: if you think some idea is bad, you submit a criticism. If you think it’s good, you can still submit a criticism because it might not yet be as good as you want it to be. So regardless of how good a theory might be, it can still have pending criticisms, and thus reasons to reject it. Think of Newtonian physics, which (I’m told) is a superb theory, but it’s false and (as I understand it) has plenty of pending criticisms.

‘Has pending criticisms’ vs ‘has no pending criticisms’ is directly comparable whereas ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aren’t directly comparable. And ‘has n pending criticisms’ vs ‘has m’ or ‘has 0 pending criticisms’ are even numerically comparable.

Veritula does not implement Deutsch’s epistemology. It implements Popper’s. I don’t think they’re compatible.

(As an aside, I’m not sure how I could implement Deutsch’s epistemology even if I wanted to. Would I give each idea a slider where people can say how ‘good’ the idea is? What values would I give the slider? Would the worst value be -1,000 and the best +1,000? How would users know to assign 500 vs 550? Would a ‘weak’ criticism get a score of 500 and a ‘strong’ one 1,000? What if tomorrow somebody finds an even ‘stronger’ one, does that mean I’d need to extend the slider beyond 1,000? Do I include arbitrary decimal/real numbers? Is an idea’s score reduced by the sum of its criticisms’ scores? If an idea has score 0, what does that mean – undecided? If it has -500, does that mean I should reject it ‘more strongly’ than if it had only -100? And so on. Deutsch says you haven’t understood something if you can’t program it, and I don’t think he could program his epistemology.)

Let's fuck with your intuitions a little bit:

Say "stop" when it's no longer an explanation:

• Didactic chapter in plain English with examples and edge cases, distilled into a concise technical note with formal definitions, invariants, and pseudocode.

• Literate program interleaving prose and code, or a heavily commented Python implementation with docstrings and tests.

• The same code stripped of comments/tests and then minified or obfuscated (e.g., Python one‑liner, obfuscated C), up through esolangs and formalisms (Brainfuck, untyped lambda calculus with Church numerals, SKI combinators).

• Operational specifications with minimal labels (Turing machine tables), then hand‑written assembly without labels and self‑modifying tricks, down to raw machine code bytes/hex and binary blobs with unknown ISA or entry point.

• The same bits recast as DNA base mapping with unknown block codec, unknown compression, encrypted archives indistinguishable from noise, arbitrary bitstrings for unspecified UTMs, or physical media (flux/RF) without modulation specs.

Hmm never thought of that, interesting! I think since the disease involves continuous loss of brain volume, harsware decay seems like the best explanation.

In general I think it makes sense to speak of diseases in neurology (e.g. Alzheimer's, Parkinsons, stroke) as bad hardware and psychiatric disease as bad software. But it could very well be that some of those diagnoses are miscategorised.

It might worth stating that the aim of Veritula, along with the fallibilism philosophy, is that progress is both desirable ant attainable, and the way to get to progress is thru rational means. This means end to mysticism, supernatural and all other ideas that have an implicit underlying sentiment that a given thing is beyond our understanding.

Makes sense, thanks Dennis. Constant pruning is the explanation that retains scarcity and competition, while making the brain seem to have much more memory than it does.

I have speculated in the past that ideas compete for attention, but they also compete for any kind of memory, be it something like RAM or hard-disk memory. The RAM-like memory in the brain is presumably closely related to working memory, if not the same.

The reason most people don’t (permanently) run out memory (of either kind) isn’t that memory isn’t scarce but that there’s a pruning mechanism in the mind. And again, there’s competition. That competition can involve predatory ideas which disassemble the source code of other ideas and use it for themselves because that’s cheaper than to construct source code from scratch.

By the way, how is this a criticism? #2200 makes no mention of memory.

Everyone has scarce memory. Everyone’s brain has limited storage space.

Then you counter-criticize them for whatever you think they lack (which should be easy if they really aren’t good), thus addressing them and restoring the idea.

Then the idea should be revised to adjust or exclude the criticized part(s).

… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.

Do #2140 and its children help as an alternative theory?

… I don’t yet know how to reconcile that, nor do I have a satisfactory alternative theory or criticism to offer.

You do know criticisms, see #2094.

We can criticize theories for lacking structure, resilience, depth, reach, etc. But again, if we want to avoid justificationism, theories that do have those attributes don’t get points for having them.

[L]abeling explanations as good or bad can itself be a form of positive argument.

Labeling them good, yes. But not labeling them bad.