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This isn’t a criticism. A criticism must point out some shortcoming. Please read ‘How Does Veritula Work?’
But what is the import of the story to the present debate?
That sounds like a criticism. It implies that you don’t see the import.
Extra context for those interested
Most models of the mind are wrong. They treat distractions as inevitable annoyances—exploitable bugs in our evolutionary wiring—that must be overridden rather than understood. The supposed antidote is to train the ability to overcome distractions. On this view, willpower, self-control or grit is required for success: something you must strengthen so you can push through resistance. We are at war with our own minds, and many things simply suck and must be endured. Discipline = freedom.
From a Deutschian / TCS perspective, this framing is deeply mistaken. Distractions are not mere inevitabilities. They are signals—indicators that something may be wrong or misaligned. Taking those signals seriously is rational; dismissing them merely because they are “distractions” is irrational. The relevant question is not how to suppress them, but what problem they might be pointing to.
Addressing such problems does not consume willpower. It consumes creativity. Creativity is — among other things — the currency of intentional action: generating and criticizing ideas about what to do next. When we force ourselves through distraction-signals, we spend creativity to override our own warning systems—and train ourselves not to trust our minds.
Optimizing for ever-stronger defensive strategies is therefore a poor strategy. It amounts to stockpiling and mobilizing massive amounts of valuable creativity in order to do something harmful: coercing yourself through unresolved conflicts. Hyper-discipline can work —the army being an obvious example—but it often achieves productivity by damaging the inner environment, suppressing signals rather than resolving their causes.
A more effective optimization target is a life in which unwanted distractions arise less often. This shifts attention away from defense and toward shaping what we do and how we do it so fewer internal conflicts arise in the first place. And when distractions do occur, we should deal with them through rational sound judgment—by resolving the underlying problems—rather than swatting them away only for them to cause more damage and come back even fiercer.
So it is a relative claim about an explanation, relative to another, not versus some absolute criterion of goodness.
So what? I didn’t mention an absolute criterion. My original criticism already applies to both relative and absolute criteria of quality (what you call “goodness”).
Similar to a crucial test …
But that’s exactly where HTV differs from Popper. Popper doesn’t give a theory points when it survives a crucial test. HTV does. From BoI chapter 1:
… testable explanations that have passed stringent tests become extremely good explanations …
Yes, the criterion for democracy is not a computational task, but an abstraction that constrains computational tasks. In the same way: the criterion for HTV is also not a computational task, it constrains the possible computational tasks that attempt to quantify HTV.
We understand computational tasks by being able to program them (as per Deutsch' criterion). But we understand criteria/ principles/ axioms/ theories ... (non computational tasks) in another way: by varying them and eliminating the variants that do not solve the problem the principle purported to solve.
For example:
a+b=b+a (in arithmetic) is a principle/ axiom that we understand by elimination of possible variants (a+b =/= a ... a+b =/=b ... etc)
but 3+5=5+3 is a specific transformation that should be understood via a computational task: adding 5 to 3 and then 3 to 5 and comparing both outcomes, via a program.
Discipline means arbitrarily favoring one conflicting idea over another. ‘Arbitrarily’ meaning favoring without resolving the conflict.
You don’t actually know which idea is better, if any, before you resolve the conflict. So siding with one before then is irrational.
Instead of practicing discipline, practice resolving conflicts between ideas and thus finding common preferences with yourself: ideas you wholeheartedly agree with, have no reservations about.
Veritula helps you with that.
skill
Self-discipline isn’t a skill. It’s an anti-skill and irrational.
Should suffering be avoided? Not if it's useful..?
Self-coercion should be avoided, yes. When we coerce ourself, we are not creating knowledge and instead arbitrarily favoring one idea over another. If a part of you disagrees that something is useful, then don’t do it!
You can always find a common preference with yourself. Problems are soluble. Do not act on ideas that have pending criticisms.
https://veritula.com/ideas/2281-rational-decision-making-expanding-on-2112
Just because lots of things are excruciating doesn’t mean life necessarily involves those things. Life doesn’t have to be difficult in this way.
You can find a passion, have fun 100% of the time, and never coerce yourself. (That’s an ideal we can fall short of – if we ‘only’ have fun 90% of the time, that’s still infinitely better than dooming ourselves to a life we hate.)
It would be fantasy/reckless if, for example, you were in your mid 40s, had a family to take care of, and had no savings.
Why does it have to be a career? You could try it for a year or six months or whatever. If you don’t like it, you switch to something else. That’d be fine.
You didn’t mark this as a criticism, but it sounds like one. Consider revising your idea to mark it as a criticism. (No changes to the text necessary for that.)
The questions here are over what is practical, secure and strategic, all largely in the financial sense--or so I think.
There’s nothing practical about working a job you hate. There’s nothing practical about fighting yourself.
Where does one draw the line between passion and security?
There’s no security in not pursuing your passion, and there’s no need to make this kind of tradeoff anyway.
Good thought, in general. But the dislocation would take significant time and resources itself. The current lease arrangement also cannot be exited without a heavy fee. I also moved recently, I would love to not do that again for some time.
I think I've compressed other activities as much as possible. With the current job, I don't think I can increase focus on research any further. The concerns are over the tradeoffs of leaving the day job (finances, impact to employability, etc.).
Yes, very little time and energy for research while working, a handful of hours a week. The intermittence carries its own cost, I also find.
It does sound like Deutsch thinks all these different criteria boil down to being about hard vs easy to vary, see #3814.
Not according to Deutsch. He says hard to vary is epistemologically fundamental, that all progress is based on it. For example, he phrases testability in terms of hard to vary (BoI chapter 1):
When a formerly good explanation has been falsified by new observations, it is no longer a good explanation, because the problem has expanded to include those observations. Thus the standard scientific methodology of dropping theories when refuted by experiment is implied by the requirement for good explanations.
He also says that “good explanations [are] essential to science…” (thanks @tom-nassis for finding this quote). Recall that a good explanation is one that is hard to vary.
For Deutsch, hard to vary is the key mode of criticism, not just one of many.
The quote may be false, but I don’t see how it’s misleading. I’m not quoting Deutsch in isolation or cherry-picking information or anything like that.
I’m fine allowing user input to sidestep the creativity problem, see #3802.
I’m not saying hard to vary is a decision-making method. I’m saying it’s an integral part of Deutsch’s decision-making method. As I write in my article:
He argues that “we should choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.”
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now, given the strength and positivity of those terms, I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
Even if we allow creative user input, eg a score for the quality of an explanation, we run into all kinds of open questions, such as what upper and lower limits to use for the score, and unexpected behavior, such as criticisms pushing an explanation’s score beyond those limits.