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See here. Lucas had asked:
Can you say more about why we need correspondence to make sense of the concept of self-similarity? I don't see why. And it seems to me that self-similarity is all we need to make sense of the universality of computation.
My response below. For others reading this, Erik has also since started a dedicated discussion on the topic of correspondence: https://veritula.com/discussions/is-correspondence-true-in-cr
The FoR glossary entry on self-similarity from chapter 4 reads:
self-similarity Some parts of physical reality (such as symbols, pictures or human thoughts) resemble other parts. The resemblance may be concrete, as when the images in a planetarium resemble the night sky; more importantly, it may be abstract, as when a statement in quantum theory printed in a book correctly explains an aspect of the structure of the multiverse.
The way I read that, it means the images in the planetarium correspond to the night sky. Otherwise we wouldn’t consider them similar.
From chapter 6, on the universality of computation and how “various parts of reality can resemble one another”:
The set of all behaviours and responses of that one object exactly mirrors the set of all behaviours and responses of all other physically possible objects and processes.
That means there is one-to-one correspondence between the behaviors and responses of the first object and those of all the other objects. This is basically another way to describe the self-similarity property of the universe.
From chapter 10, in the context of mathematics (italics mine):
… the physical behaviour of the symbols corresponds to the behaviour of the abstractions they denote.
(The same is true of the physical parts of a Turing machine harnessing the self-similarity property of the universe to correspond to other physical objects.)
From chapter 14, in the context of the creation of scientific knowledge (which, AFAIK, DD views as increasing correspondence):
The creation of useful knowledge by science … must be understood as the emergence of the self-similarity that is mandated by a principle of physics, the Turing principle.
It’s been ages since I read FoR so I’m relying on word searches in the ebook but it’s full of these links between self-similarity and correspondence.
a knowledge
I don’t think it’s correct to use the word ‘knowledge’ with an indeterminate article (meaning ‘a’ or ‘an’).
You could say ‘Finding problems that some knowledge addresses…’
At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.
Presumably, Zelalem wanted to delete the idea. Veritula purposely doesn’t have that functionality. In the future, Zelalem, just leave the idea and criticize it for being outdated or superseded or whatever reason you have for rejecting it.
When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.
That still means we solved the problem before we encountered it.
I understand you want to stress that we usually solve a problem after we identify it. Your text already covers that. So I’d still just remove the sentence “We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.” because it’s not true.
Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.
Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.
Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.
Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.
At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.
At the same time, there is a notion that I want to address that flows from fallibilism, and the reason decentralized 'things' tend to be more truth seeking. Even though a given knowledge has solved problems we haven't yet discovered, we still got that solution by solving a problem we encountered, and we can't solve problems we haven't encountered. When we try to solve a problem, we might find out that we've already solved it, but that only happens after we have looked at the problem.
Finding problems that a knowledge addresses is a form of new knowledge.
Maybe not. Figured that out as I was typing. The knowledge isn't new.
I think the 'therefore' means that the following point is a direct result of the preceding claim.
Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously true but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.
This view is mainly influenced by Popper, and errors are my own.
Fallibilism is the idea that all of our knowledge contains errors, and that nothing is obviously true but depends on what one understands about reality. This means that we can't be certain about anything, because all knowledge contains errors. Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them. We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet. We solve problems by guessing solutions and testing them. This also means we should always be careful not to destroy or even slow down the things and ideas that correct errors and thereby create knowledge. Some of which are freedom, privacy, and free markets. We are also never the passive recipients of our knowledge; we are the creators.
We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.
Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet. I would just remove this sentence.
…because all knowledge contains errors.
This isn’t true, see #2374.
Should credit Popper where applicable (with a disclaimer that any errors are yours, if you want to be careful).
We can't solve a problem we haven't encountered yet.
Some theories have enough reach to solve problems we haven’t encountered or even considered yet.
Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them.
The part “as we encounter them” implies that we address every error the minute we find it. That isn’t true. Some errors take a long time to address. We also have to prioritize some errors over others because they are more important or more urgent or both.
Knowledge, therefore, grows by addressing the errors we encounter as we encounter them.
Remove ‘therefore’
…because all knowledge contains errors
This isn’t true, see #2374.