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I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):
What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them… You will fail.
I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):
What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them…
Citation needed. You of all people should know to cite since you hate when others cite from memory. Don’t be a hypocrite.
I reply:
BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:
“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)
“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)
“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)
“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)
I later found more evidence running a word search for the string ‘prefer’:
“Whenever a wide range of variant theories can account equally well for the phenomenon they are trying to explain, there is no reason to prefer one of them over the others, so advocating a particular one in preference to the others is irrational.” (21, emphasis mine)
And chapter 13 is virtually all about forming rational preferences.
Then there’s TCS common-preference finding…
The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticise the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.
Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.
Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.
The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.
I reply that “Not all programs prompt users for input at runtime”
Tyler says “All known programs to date” outsource creative input to the user.
This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
This does not identify an error in #5387. It only says ‘there are no serious contenders’ can be criticised, which is exactly what #5387 is doing.”
“There are no serious contenders” is itself merely another conjecture inside the composite idea. It too can be criticised and revised recursively.
The criterion excludes comparing the strength of criticisms, not comparison altogether. ‘Serious’ could be binary: does the contender solve the same problems, reproduce GR’s successful predictions, and lack a pending criticism that prevents replacing GR?
The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.
The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticized by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.
‘X is true’ and ‘use X for purpose Y while acknowledging that X is not true’ are different proposals. A criticism of X as a true description does not necessarily criticise its bounded use.
This assumes ‘approximation’ means measurable closeness to an unknown final theory. In context, it actually means that GR’s predictions closely approximate observed gravitational behaviour in its tested domains. We can compare predictions with observations without knowing the final theory.
“Serious contender” smuggles comparison of explanations with known flaws back in.
How do we distinguish between serious and unserious contenders?
This seems to create a rewording loophole.
Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”
it’s an excellent approximation
It's an excellent approximation to what? Reality? How do we know that?
This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.
‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.
By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.
According to every physicist I have heard speak on the matter, GR and QM conflict.
@bart-vanderhaegen has also said to me that GR falsely predicts the orbit of electrons, and QM falsely predicts the mass threshold at which black holes form.
By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.