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#3795·Dennis HackethalOP, about 10 hours agoDuring a space, starting at around 15:00, @dirk-meulenbelt suggested that Veritula suffers from underspecification: it does not specify which kinds of criticisms users can submit. But there are lots, like Occam’s razor, hard to vary, lack of testability, etc.
Since I criticize Deutsch’s ‘hard to vary’ criterion for being underspecified, Veritula shouldn’t be underspecified either.
(Correct me if I misunderstood you here, @dirk-meulenbelt.)
Veritula and hard to vary are different in this regard. Deutsch claims that ‘hard to vary’ is epistemologically fundamental, that it’s at the core of rationality, and that all progress is made by choosing between explanations based on how hard to vary they are. In other words, he suggests (though only vaguely) a decision-making method.
Veritula has a different decision-making method: one of criticizing ideas and adopting only those with no pending criticisms. That decision-making method is fully specified, with zero vagueness or open questions (that I’m aware of).
Veritula does not pre-specify ahead of time what criticisms people can submit, this is true. But that’s not a problem. It’d be like asking Deutsch to specify ahead of time what explanations people can judge to be easy or hard to vary. That’s not the specification that’s lacking with hard to vary.
#3049·Dennis HackethalOP revised about 2 months agoHow Does Veritula Work?
Veritula (Latin for ‘a bit of truth’) can help you live a life guided exclusively by reason.
To reason, within any well-defined epistemology, means to follow and apply that epistemology. Unreason, or whim, is an undue departure from it. Epistemology is the study of knowledge – basically, the study of what helps knowledge grow, what hinders its growth, and related questions.
Veritula follows, and helps you apply, Karl Popper’s epistemology, Critical Rationalism. It’s a continuation of the Athenian tradition of criticism and the only known epistemology without major flaws.1
Critical Rationalism says that ideas are assumed true until refuted. This approach leaves us free to make bold guesses and use the full arsenal at our disposal to criticize these guesses in order to solve problems, correct errors, and seek truth. It’s a creative and critical approach. Critical Rationalism is a fallibilist philosophy: there is no criterion of truth to determine with certainty whether some idea is true or false. We all make mistakes, and by an effort, we can correct them to get a little closer to the truth. Rejecting all forms of mysticism and the supernatural, Veritula recognizes that progress is both possible and desirable, and that rational means are the only way to make progress.
Veritula is a programmatic implementation of Popper’s epistemology.
Veritula provides an objective, partly automated way to tentatively determine whether a given idea is problematic. It does not tell you what to think – it teaches you how to think.
Consider an idea
I:ISince it has no criticisms, we tentatively consider
Iunproblematic. It is rational to adopt it and act in accordance with it. Conversely, it would be irrational to reject it, consider it problematic, or act counter to it. (See #2281 for more details on rational decision-making.)Next, someone submits a criticism
C1:I | C1The idea
Iis now considered problematic so long as criticismC1is not addressed. How do you address it? You can reviseIso thatC1doesn’t apply anymore, which restores the previous state with just the standaloneI(now calledI2to indicate the revision):Revise I ------------> I2 | C1To track changes, Veritula offers beautiful diffing and version control for ideas.
If you cannot think of a way to revise
I, you can counter-criticizeC1, thereby neutralizing it with a new criticism,C2:I | C1 | C2Now,
Iis considered unproblematic again, sinceC1is problematic and thus can’t be a decisive criticism anymore.If you can think of neither a revision of
Inor counter-criticism toC1, your only option is to accept thatIhas been (tentatively) defeated. You should therefore abandon it, which means: stop acting in accordance with it, considering it to be unproblematic, etc.Since there can be many criticisms (which are also just ideas) and deeply nested counter-criticisms, the result is a tree structure. For example, as a discussion progresses, one of its trees might look like this:
I / | \ C11 C12 C13 / \ \ C21 C22 C23 / \ C31 C32In this tree,
Iis considered problematic. AlthoughC11has been neutralized byC21andC22,C12still needs to be addressed. In addition,C23would have neutralizedC13, butC31andC32makeC23problematic, soC13makesIproblematic as well.You don’t need to keep track of these relationships manually. Veritula marks ideas accordingly, automatically.
Because decision-making is a special case of, ie follows the same logic as, truth-seeking, you can use such trees for decision-making, too. Veritula implements unanimous consent as defined by Taking Children Seriously, a parenting philosophy that builds on Popper’s epistemology. When you’re planning your next move but can’t decide on a city, say, Veritula helps you criticize your ideas and make a rational decision – meaning a decision you’ll be happy with. Again, it’s rational to act in accordance with ideas that have no pending criticisms.
All ideas, including criticisms, should be formulated as concisely as possible, and separate ideas should be submitted separately, even if they’re related. Otherwise, you run the risk of receiving ‘bulk’ criticisms, where a single criticism seems to apply to more content than it actually does.
Again, criticisms are also just ideas, so the same is true for criticisms. Submitting each criticism separately has the benefit of requiring the proponent of an idea to address each criticism individually, not in bulk. If he fails to address even a single criticism, the idea remains problematic and should be rejected.
The more you discuss a given topic, the deeper and wider the tree grows. Some criticisms can apply to multiple ideas in the tree, but that needs to be made explicit by submitting them repeatedly.
Comments that aren’t criticisms – eg follow-up questions or otherwise neutral comments – are considered ancillary ideas. Unlike criticisms, ancillary ideas do not invert their respective parents’ statuses. They are neutral.
One of the main benefits of Veritula is that the status of any idea in a discussion can be seen at a glance. If you are new to a much-discussed topic, adopt the displayed status of the ideas involved: if they are marked problematic, reject them; if they are not, adopt them.
Therefore, Veritula acts as a dictionary for ideas.
One of the problems of our age is that people have same discussions over and over again. Part of the reason is widespread irrationality, expressed in the unwillingness to change one’s mind; another is that it’s simply difficult to remember or know what’s true and what isn’t. Discussion trees can get complex, so people shouldn’t blindly trust their judgment of whether some idea is true or problematic, whether nested criticisms have been neutralized or not. Going off of memory is too error prone.
Veritula solves this problem: it makes discussion trees explicit so you don’t have to remember each idea and its relation to other ideas. Veritula therefore also enables you to hold irrational people accountable: if an idea has pending criticisms, the rational approach is to either abandon it or to save it by revising it or addressing all pending criticisms.
Many people don’t like to concede an argument. But with Veritula, no concessions are necessary. The site just shows you who’s right.
Using Veritula, we may discover a bit of truth.
Popperian epistemology has some flaws, like verisimilitude, but Veritula doesn’t implement those.
During a space, starting at around 15:00, @dirk-meulenbelt suggested that Veritula suffers from underspecification: it does not specify which kinds of criticisms users can submit. But there are lots, like Occam’s razor, hard to vary, lack of testability, etc.
Since I criticize Deutsch’s ‘hard to vary’ criterion for being underspecified, Veritula shouldn’t be underspecified either.
(Correct me if I misunderstood you here, @dirk-meulenbelt.)
#3780·Dennis HackethalOP revised 1 day agoDeutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chapter 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
The ancient Greeks might have found the Persephone myth extremely hard to vary, eg due to cultural constraints. They wouldn’t have agreed that one could just swap out Persephone for someone else.
But then the ease with which a criticism could be varied might have no effect on its parent. So why even bother having a notion of ‘easiness to vary’ at that point?
#3791·Dennis HackethalOP, about 15 hours agoEven so, if a criticism gets score -10, that will push the parent theory’s score above 0.
What if we simply clamp the score at 0?
#3789·Dennis HackethalOP, about 17 hours ago@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
Even so, if a criticism gets score -10, that will push the parent theory’s score above 0.
#3789·Dennis HackethalOP, about 17 hours ago@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
But calling a theory ‘good’ sounds like an endorsement. Deutsch also writes (BoI chapter 10) that a “superb” theory is “exceedingly hard to vary”. Ultimately we’d have to ask him, but for now I think it’s fair to conclude that he means ‘hard to vary’ as an endorsement.
#3721·Dennis HackethalOP, 3 days agoFrom my article:
Isn’t the assignment of positive scores, of positive reasons to prefer one theory over another, a kind of justificationism? Deutsch criticizes justificationism throughout The Beginning of Infinity, but isn’t an endorsement of a theory as ‘good’ a kind of justification?
@lola-trimble suggested during a space that a theory is hard to vary if it’s not easy to vary. So the maximum score would be 0, not +1,000 or whatever. In which case ‘hard to vary’ isn’t an endorsement.
#3784·Zakery Mizell, 1 day agoLeaving the job means more time for research. It also means more time to find a much better job that allows you the energy for research.
Leaving gives space for better balance.
#3785·Zakery Mizell, 1 day agoHave you fully used your cash to free time/energy after work?
You may have money for laundry services, cleaning, cooking, and so on. All the other things that take time in your day can be removed with money, giving you space to do research just fine
This seems more like a specific implementation of #3782 than a standalone criticism.
#3675·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 4 days agoIf we view addiction as entrenchment of ideas (in the broad sense), why can't you have conflict between implicit and explicit preferences, which are both short-term preferences? Something in your body is addicted to a substance, but you could simultaneously, consciously, not want to take the substance because you don't like how it feels.
Hmm could you give examples of such addictions between implicit and explicit short-term preferences?
#3639·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoOption 2: Go on hiatus from the day job/career, and focus on creative pursuits and research, full-time, for some number of months (duration perhaps depending on job opportunities).
Have you fully used your cash to free time/energy after work?
You may have money for laundry services, cleaning, cooking, and so on. All the other things that take time in your day can be removed with money, giving you space to do research just fine
#3638·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoOption 1: Continue working the day job and balancing the other pursuits on the side.
Leaving the job means more time for research. It also means more time to find a much better job that allows you the energy for research.
Leaving gives space for better balance.
#3638·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoOption 1: Continue working the day job and balancing the other pursuits on the side.
How much time and energy do you really have for research while working? 1hr daily? 2 hours daily? 4 hours daily?
Leaving your job allows for the possibility of consistent high quality research daily.
#3639·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoOption 2: Go on hiatus from the day job/career, and focus on creative pursuits and research, full-time, for some number of months (duration perhaps depending on job opportunities).
Consider your current balance of working and research.
Could you cut other activities, keep the job, and increase focus on research?
Fix typo
Deutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
Deutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chapter 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
Add missing word
Deutsch should instead name some examples the reader would easier to disagree with, and then walk them through why some explanations are harder to vary than others.
Deutsch should instead name some examples the reader would find easier to disagree with, and then walk them through why some explanations are harder to vary than others.
This is solved by actively doing some visible stuff you'd want to do anyway as an AGI researcher.
This is solved by actively doing some visible stuff you'd want to do anyway as an AGI researcher.
This is solved by actively doing some visible stuff you'd want to do anyway as an AGI researchers.
This is solved by actively doing some visible stuff you'd want to do anyway as an AGI researcher.
#3613·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoA hiatus would incur a relatively heavy cost: the cost of living + the opportunity cost of lost salary. Earning money as quickly as possible, as early as possible, is important for long-term financial success.
You could spend some time in a cheap country.
#3611·Tyler MillsOP, 6 days agoA hiatus would create a "resume gap," weakening hireability in the field. This is to be avoided, but only assuming working in the field is itself desirable, which may not be the case, here, unless better opportunities arise (roles allowing more contact with physics, math and design -- i.e. "engineering"!).
This is solved by actively doing some visible stuff you'd want to do anyway as an AGI researchers.
I don’t know what kind of phone you use, but iPhone keyboards have support for multiple languages. You can switch between them. Should make false autocorrects rarer.
I don’t know what kind of phone you use, but iPhone keyboards have support for multiple languages. You can switch between them. Should make false autocorrects rarer.
#3743·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 3 days agoThat was autocorrect from my cellphone. Mye means alot in Norwegian. Not a good idea to have autocorrect on when you're writing in two languages..
I don’t know what kind of phone you use, but iPhone keyboards have support for multiple languages. You can switch between them. Should make false autocorrects rarer.
#3654·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 5 days agoThis is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what I meant was to point to the fact that there are “pre-conceptual” models, desires, attentional salience etc. that impinge on and filter input to conscious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to “move around” in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we’re close to the truth, we understand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
Humans use flight-related words even though we can’t fly. From ChatGPT:
- Elevated (thinking, mood, language)
- High-level (ideas, overview)
- Soar (ambitions, prices, imagination)
- Take off (projects, careers)
- Grounded (arguments, people)
- Up in the air (uncertain)
- Overview (“over-see” from above)
- Perspective (originally spatial vantage point)
- Lofty (ideals, goals)
- Aboveboard (open, visible)
- Rise / fall (status, power, ideas)
- Sky-high (expectations, costs)
- Aerial view (conceptual overview)
- Head in the clouds (impractical thinking)
#3755·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoI think that depends on the "embodiment" of the AGI; that is, what it's like to be that AGI and how its normal world appears. A bat (if it were a person) would probably prefer different metaphors than a human would. Humans are very visual, which makes spatial features very salient to us. Metaphors work because they leverage already-salient aspects of experience to illuminate other things. So to train an AGI, I would think it's more useful for that AGI to leverage the salient aspects that are pre-given.
I think that depends on the "embodiment" of the AGI; that is, what it's like to be that AGI and how its normal world appears.
Yeah maybe but again (#3693), those are parochial factors, starting points. Ideas are more important. AGI could just switch bodies rapidly anyway.