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I read “two strings” literally. The strings are the only case-specific inputs. A fact read from a database, sensor, or anywhere else is another input, whether or not it appears in the function signature.

No function of those two strings can always provide such a ranking.

The bounty says the code must accept two strings as input. It doesn’t say only or at most or exactly two. But I see now that this may not have been clear – if you think it’ll help, I can edit the bounty to say ‘at least two’.

Also, when I wrote the bounty, I meant input as in ‘part of the function signature’. If the function body later reads from a database or prompts the user for input, that doesn’t in and of itself disqualify the submission.

… we cannot avoid guesswork about which changes preserve meaning …

If a good-faith submission prompted the user for answers about changes in meaning or other creative input (within reason), that also would not automatically disqualify the submission. (The proviso “within reason” matters or else bad actors will simply prompt the user to tell the program which explanation is harder to vary. As with all other bounties, any submission will have to meet not just the bounty terms but survive all criticism it may get.)

Here also, I can edit the bounty to clarify that user input at runtime is permissible.

I hope I’ve addressed all reasons the bounty might not be doable, but let me know if I missed something.

Idea: showing the quickest way to rehabilitate an idea.

Could be a visual feature showing something like the shortest path down a discussion tree where a criticism needs to be addressed.

Or all such branches.

Such a thing has probably been done in graph theory before, could look for existing algorithms.

In #5368, I mean fully new options. Like a new theory in addition to QM and GR. Such a theory is extremely hard to come by.

But #5331 relies on our ability to come up with new options to remain rational in the face of mutually exclusive options.

I reply:

Sometimes it’s *hard* to come up with new options. Like in the conflict between QM and GR. So then we have to choose from existing options because we can’t trivially just ‘be creative’ to make a new one

I give “another argument that rationality isn’t the same as creativity: we can creatively come up with ways to suppress criticism”

I ask: “If HTV is just a feature of explanations but not a criterion to form rational preferences, does that mean we could rationally adopt Persephone over axis tilt?”

The implied criticism is that that is clearly not what HTV is intended for.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)

As for ambiguity, I don’t see how it’s ambiguous, at least now, given the additional quotes and the fact that chapter 1 is in large part about preference formation, as I say in #5363.

I address the cherry-picking charge now:

… chapter 1 was in large part about HTV as a way to prefer axis tilt over Persephone. That was a central part of that chapter: to present David’s answer to how we can make rational choices, using axis tilt vs. Persephone as an example.

So, far from being cherry-picked, several pages in BoI, almost a whole chapter, are about preference formation using HTV.

Liberty says in a previous discussion that the first quote is “just a cherry picked sentence and it's ambiguous as to the claim you're making. Neither Deutsch nor anyone else who agrees with it interprets the theory in the way you're doing.”

I preemptively address that:

Let me state preemptively that I realize these quotes aren’t exclusively about HTV. There are other factors involved in rational decision-making, such as the outcomes of crucial tests (then again, David does link that to HTV in chapter 1). I give these quotes to show that David recognizes and contributes to the problem of how to form rational preferences throughout BoI from various angles.

But those quotes aren’t all about HTV.

I reply:

BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:

“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)

“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)

“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)

“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)

I reply:

The question of how we can make rational preferences has been a key philosophical problem since antiquity. Saying HTV isn’t for that is frankly a disservice to Deutsch because it demotes HTV from a genuine philosophical contribution to a mere feature of some explanations that we don’t know what to do with.

I reply: “Why care whether explanations have this feature if not to prefer them?”

There’s no contradiction there. It can be both a feature of explanations and a tool to help us make decisions.

In response, Brett claims “that can’t be so because that’s not the purpose of ‘HTV’.” Claims it is instead “a crucial feature of good explanations.”

Ben replies that “it is one thing conjecture a theory, it is another thing to compare theories to choose which one to proceed with (tentatively)”; that HTV is meant to help with the latter.

Don’t know why the sudden reference to the rather esoteric topic of sentential logic. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_logic Nor does Brett explain what’s wrong with it.

This isn’t merely an issue of what we call things. The difference between rationality and creativity isn’t semantics.

Brett’s response:

One can *call* that “rationality”. And ok. But what I’m referring to is that process which causes behaviour in humans. We create (choices) and choose them.

If one wants to extract out “coming up with ideas” from this process, ok. But that to me looks just like sentential logic.

Ben points out to Brett that “the step of conjecturing ideas (or criticisms) is not itself rational or irrational. rationality comes in when it comes time to decide what to do, given your state of knowledge. it is about acting according to your best ideas, rather than coming up with ideas”