Activity Feed

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3069.

My critique of David Deutsch’s The Beginning of Infinity as a programmer. In short, his ‘hard to vary’ criterion at the core of his epistemology is fatally underspecified and impossible to apply.

Deutsch says that one should adopt explanations based on how hard they are to change without impacting their ability to explain what they claim to explain. The hardest-to-change explanation is the best and should be adopted. But he doesn’t say how to figure out which is hardest to change.

A decision-making method is a computational task. He says you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. He can’t program the steps for finding out how ‘hard to vary’ an explanation is, if only because those steps are underspecified. There are too many open questions.

So by his own yardstick, he hasn’t understood his epistemology.

You will find that and many more criticisms here: https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable

#3069​·​Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 months ago

Brett says the bounty is “impossible” because “it’s asking for a definition for something that *cannot be defined* in the way the challenge demands.”

  Dennis Hackethal posted idea #5414.

Related: #5354 and comments.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #5410.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):

What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):

What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them
… You will fail.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #5365. The revision addresses idea #5409.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like (p. 27):

What if you’d rather not know? You may not like these predictions.
Your friends and colleagues may ridicule them. You may try to modify
the explanation so that it will not make them

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #5365.

I don’t care whether people agree with me about this. I care about what’s true, what the ideas imply, as written. (Ironically, chapter 1 also says theories can have implications their authors did not intend or may not like.)

#5365​·​Dennis HackethalOP, 14 days ago

Citation needed. You of all people should know to cite since you hate when others cite from memory. Don’t be a hypocrite.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #5359.

I reply:

BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:

“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)

“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)

“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)

“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)

I reply:

BoI is full of remarks about preference formation. Doing word searches for “choose between” and “rival explanation”, we can find, for example:

“… we should choose between [policies or theories] not on the basis of their origin, but according to how good they are as explanations: how hard to vary.” (209)

“… how does the ‘dictator’ itself choose between rival explanations …?” (341)

“[The] main use [of experience] is to choose between theories that have already been guessed.” (4)

“The role of experiment and observation is to choose between existing theories…” (32)

I later found more evidence running a word search for the string ‘prefer’:

“Whenever a wide range of variant theories can account equally well for the phenomenon they are trying to explain, there is no reason to prefer one of them over the others, so advocating a particular one in preference to the others is irrational.” (21, emphasis mine)

And chapter 13 is virtually all about forming rational preferences.

Then there’s TCS common-preference finding…

  Benjamin Davies revised criticism #5400.

Embarrassing amount of typo revisions at this point


The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.

The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticise the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #5402 and unmarked it as a criticism.

Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.

Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #5330.

Brett Hall says Newtonian physics has pending criticisms but we can adopt it rationally in many situations so my criterion of rationality must be false.

#5330​·​Dennis HackethalOP, 15 days ago

Ben explored and addressed this criticism in more detail, see #5382.

  Benjamin Davies revised criticism #5391.

Double eww


The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.

The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticised idea becomes adoptable this way.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #5398.

Tyler says “All known programs to date” outsource creative input to the user.

#5398​·​Dennis HackethalOP, 13 days ago

I reply that “Not all programs prompt users for input at runtime”

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #5333.

As I wrote to him in response, rationality and creativity are different things. They’re related, and there’s overlap, but you don’t need to code creativity to code rational preference formation. You can outsource creative input to the user, as programs usually do.

#5333​·​Dennis HackethalOP, 15 days ago

Tyler says “All known programs to date” outsource creative input to the user.

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #5384. The revision addresses idea #5396.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #5384.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

#5384​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

Quote missing italics.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5394.

“There are no serious contenders” is itself merely another conjecture inside the composite idea. It too can be criticised and revised recursively.

#5394​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

This does not identify an error in #5387. It only says ‘there are no serious contenders’ can be criticised, which is exactly what #5387 is doing.”

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5387.

“Serious contender” smuggles comparison of explanations with known flaws back in.

How do we distinguish between serious and unserious contenders?

#5387​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

“There are no serious contenders” is itself merely another conjecture inside the composite idea. It too can be criticised and revised recursively.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5387.

“Serious contender” smuggles comparison of explanations with known flaws back in.

How do we distinguish between serious and unserious contenders?

#5387​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

The criterion excludes comparing the strength of criticisms, not comparison altogether. ‘Serious’ could be binary: does the contender solve the same problems, reproduce GR’s successful predictions, and lack a pending criticism that prevents replacing GR?

  Benjamin Davies revised criticism #5390.

Eww American spelling


The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticized by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.

The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticised by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5386.

This seems to create a rewording loophole.

Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”

#5386​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

The wrapper provides no immunity. If X’s flaw defeats the proposed use, that flaw can criticize the new policy too. ‘This bridge design collapses, but keep using it’ is criticized by the danger of collapse. Therefore, not almost any criticized idea becomes adoptable this way.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5386.

This seems to create a rewording loophole.

Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”

#5386​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

‘X is true’ and ‘use X for purpose Y while acknowledging that X is not true’ are different proposals. A criticism of X as a true description does not necessarily criticise its bounded use.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5385.

it’s an excellent approximation

It's an excellent approximation to what? Reality? How do we know that?

#5385​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

This assumes ‘approximation’ means measurable closeness to an unknown final theory. In context, it actually means that GR’s predictions closely approximate observed gravitational behaviour in its tested domains. We can compare predictions with observations without knowing the final theory.

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5384.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

#5384​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

“Serious contender” smuggles comparison of explanations with known flaws back in.

How do we distinguish between serious and unserious contenders?

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5384.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

#5384​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

This seems to create a rewording loophole.

Almost any criticised idea could be made adoptable this way: “X has criticisms, but keep using X”

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5384.

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.

#5384​·​Benjamin Davies, 13 days ago

it’s an excellent approximation

It's an excellent approximation to what? Reality? How do we know that?

  Benjamin Davies addressed criticism #5382.

By this criterion, it is irrational to adopt or advocate either GR or QM, as they have pending criticisms.

According to every physicist I have heard speak on the matter, GR and QM conflict.

@bart-vanderhaegen has also said to me that GR falsely predicts the orbit of electrons, and QM falsely predicts the mass threshold at which black holes form.

#5382​·​Benjamin Davies revised 13 days ago

This is addressed in section 5 of Dennis' paper: The Structure of Rational Thought.

‘How can we rationally proceed when all known ideas have pending criticisms?’
By treating ideas as immutable and discrete, even if content overlaps. For example, as a description of reality, general relativity has pending criticisms. But there are no serious contenders. Instead, take the idea: ‘Although GR has pending criticisms as a true description of reality, it’s an excellent approximation, makes precise predictions, and powers technology such as GPS. So we keep using it until we find a replacement.’ As written, this idea has no pending criticisms, so its advocacy is rational.