Hard to Vary or Hardly Usable?

  Dennis Hackethal revised idea #3716.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs bad explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #3722.

From my article:

[T]he assignment of positive values enables self-coercion: if I have a ‘good’ explanation worth 500 points, and a criticism worth only 100 points, Deutsch’s epistemology (presumably) says to adopt the explanation even though it has a pending criticism. After all, we’re still 400 in the black! But according to the epistemology of Taking Children Seriously, a parenting philosophy Deutsch cofounded before writing The Beginning of Infinity, acting on an idea that has pending criticisms is the definition of self-coercion. Such an act is irrational and incompatible with his view that rationality is fun in the sense that rationality means unanimous consent between explicit, inexplicit, unconscious, and any other type of idea in one’s mind.

In short does the search for good explanations enable self-coercion and contradict TCS?

From my article:

[T]he assignment of positive values enables self-coercion: if I have a ‘good’ explanation worth 500 points, and a criticism worth only 100 points, Deutsch’s epistemology (presumably) says to adopt the explanation even though it has a pending criticism. After all, we’re still 400 in the black! But according to the epistemology of Taking Children Seriously, a parenting philosophy Deutsch cofounded before writing The Beginning of Infinity, acting on an idea that has pending criticisms is the definition of self-coercion. Such an act is irrational and incompatible with his view that rationality is fun in the sense that rationality means unanimous consent between explicit, inexplicit, unconscious, and any other type of idea in one’s mind.

In short, does the search for good explanations enable self-coercion and contradict TCS?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3716.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3716·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 days ago

Our explanations do get better the more criticisms we address, but Deutsch has it backwards: the increasing quality of an explanation is the result of critical activity, not its means.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3716.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3716·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 days ago

From my article:

[T]he assignment of positive values enables self-coercion: if I have a ‘good’ explanation worth 500 points, and a criticism worth only 100 points, Deutsch’s epistemology (presumably) says to adopt the explanation even though it has a pending criticism. After all, we’re still 400 in the black! But according to the epistemology of Taking Children Seriously, a parenting philosophy Deutsch cofounded before writing The Beginning of Infinity, acting on an idea that has pending criticisms is the definition of self-coercion. Such an act is irrational and incompatible with his view that rationality is fun in the sense that rationality means unanimous consent between explicit, inexplicit, unconscious, and any other type of idea in one’s mind.

In short does the search for good explanations enable self-coercion and contradict TCS?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3716.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3716·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 days ago

From my article:

Isn’t the assignment of positive scores, of positive reasons to prefer one theory over another, a kind of justificationism? Deutsch criticizes justificationism throughout The Beginning of Infinity, but isn’t an endorsement of a theory as ‘good’ a kind of justification?

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #3715.

From my article:

[I]sn’t the difficulty of changing an explanation at least partly a property not of the explanation itself but of whoever is trying to change it? If I’m having difficulty changing it, maybe that’s because I lack imagination. Or maybe I’m just new to that field and an expert could easily change it. In which case the difficulty of changing an explanation is, again, not an objective property of that explanation but a subjective property of its critics. How could subjective properties be epistemologically fundamental?

From my article:

[I]sn’t the difficulty of changing an explanation at least partly a property not of the explanation itself but of whoever is trying to change it? If I’m having difficulty changing it, maybe that’s because I lack imagination. Or maybe I’m just new to that field and an expert could easily change it. In which case the difficulty of changing an explanation is, again, not an objective property of that explanation but a subjective property of its critics. How could subjective properties be epistemologically fundamental?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3716.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3716·Dennis HackethalOP revised 10 days ago

From my article:

[D]epending on context, being hard to change can be a bad thing. For example, ‘tight coupling’ is a reason software can be hard to change, and it’s considered bad because it reduces maintainability.

  Dennis Hackethal revised idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. All progress comes from the search for good explanations. So the distinction between good vs explanations is epistemologically fundamental.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

From my article:

[I]sn’t the difficulty of changing an explanation at least partly a property not of the explanation itself but of whoever is trying to change it? If I’m having difficulty changing it, maybe that’s because I lack imagination. Or maybe I’m just new to that field and an expert could easily change it. In which case the difficulty of changing an explanation is, again, not an objective property of that explanation but a subjective property of its critics. How could subjective properties be epistemologically fundamental?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Deutsch says rationality means seeking good explanations, so without a step-by-step guide on how to seek good explanations, we cannot know when we are being irrational. That’s bad for error correction.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3711.

Isn’t this asking for a formalization of creativity, which is impossible?

#3711·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Popper formalized much of his epistemology, such as the notions of empirical content and degrees of falsifiability. Why hold Deutsch to a different standard? Why couldn’t he formalize the steps for finding the quality of a given explanation?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3711.

Isn’t this asking for a formalization of creativity, which is impossible?

#3711·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

No, it’s asking for a formalization of rational decision-making, which is a related but separate issue. Given a set of explanations (after they’ve already been created), what non-creative sorting algorithm do we use to find the best one?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3707.

Deutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.

#3707·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Isn’t this asking for a formalization of creativity, which is impossible?

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3709.

Isn’t this basically asking for a specification of the creative program? Isn’t this effectively an AGI project?

#3709·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

No, see #3706. I’m open to user input (within reason). That covers any creative parts. The non-creative parts can be automated by definition.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3707.

Deutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.

#3707·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Isn’t this basically asking for a specification of the creative program? Isn’t this effectively an AGI project?

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Deutsch says to choose between explanations “according to how good they are” – note the plural.

What if I can only come up with one explanation? Can I just go with that one? What if it’s bad but still the best I could do? He leaves such questions open.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Deutsch contradicts his yardstick for understanding a computational task. He says that you haven’t understood a computational task if you can’t program it. His method of decision-making based on finding good explanations is a computational task. He can’t program it, so he hasn’t understood it.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Even if we allow creative user input, eg a score for the quality of an explanation, we run into all kinds of open questions, such as what upper and lower limits to use for the score, and unexpected behavior, such as criticisms pushing an explanations score beyond those limits.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on criticism #3549.

Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ? Also, I would think that criteria for sufficiency must always be subjective ones (e.g. a working computerprogram cannot be itself a proof of meeting an some objective sufficiency criterium)? So I don't see how insufficiency points to a conflict of ideas/ contradiction

#3549·Bart Vanderhaegen, 23 days ago

Isn't every theory infinitely underspecified ?

This stance is presumably a version of the epistemological cynicism I identify here.

  Dennis Hackethal criticized idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

#3703·Dennis HackethalOP, 10 days ago

Deutsch leaves open how we find out how hard to vary an explanation is. We need more details. In some cases it’s obvious, but we need a general description for less-obvious cases.

  Dennis Hackethal submitted idea #3703.

Deutsch’s stance in my own words:

The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.

A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.

For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.

The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)

  Dennis Hackethal revised criticism #3530. The revision addresses ideas #3599 and #3600.

Fix quote issues

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the paper (p. 3):

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,5 but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

(i) it seems not to account for its explicanda; or
(ii) it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or
(iii) it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3530.

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

#3530·Fitz Doud, 24 days ago

The quote uses bullet points where the original source uses none.

  Dennis Hackethal addressed criticism #3530.

I think your challenge asks for the wrong kind of thing. Deutsch’s “hard to vary” is a guideline for criticizing explanations, not a step by step decision algorithm. In this paper he says scientific methodology does not prescribe exact procedures, and that “better” explanations are not always totally rankable in a clean, mechanical way. “Hard to vary” mainly means avoiding explanations that can be tweaked to fit anything, because then they explain nothing, so the lack of a universal scoring program does not refute the idea.

THE LOGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL TESTS, PARTICULARLY OF EVERETTIAN QUANTUM THEORY

https://www.constructortheory.org/portfolio/logic-experimental-tests/

From the Paper:

An explanation is better the more it is constrained by the explicanda and by other good explanations,[5] but we shall not need precise criteria here; we shall only need the following: that an explanation is bad (or worse than a rival or variant explanation) to the extent that…

  • (i)

    it seems not to account for its explicanda; or

  • (ii)

    it seems to conflict with explanations that are otherwise good; or

  • (iii)

    it could easily be adapted to account for anything (so it explains nothing).

#3530·Fitz Doud, 24 days ago

The quote should be formatted as a quote.

  Dennis Hackethal commented on idea #3562.

Do you have examples of such algorithms?

#3562·Erik Orrje, 15 days ago
(defn add [a b]
  (if (zero? b)
    a
    (recur (inc a) (dec b))))