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But an AGI might not develop such phrases independently. (See #3730.)

One part of mye question was whether a formal criterion can be applied universally. If the citerion itself must be chosen, like for instance what brings more fun, meaning, practical utility, then by what criterion do we choose the criterion? Or is the answer simply to apply the same process of critical examination to everything that arises, until a coherent path emerges?

The other part was how you actually critize an implicit or unconcious idea. If you have an unconcious idea that gives rise to a conflicting feeling for instance, how do you critisize a feeling?

Aah, then I agree. I thought you meant AGI would develop the same metaphors independently.

The act of making different types of idea jibe (propositional ideas, feelings etc.), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or inter-translatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other non-rational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other non-rational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

Thanks for asking good questions.

Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state?

Yes.

Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)

Yes. Aka ‘common-preference finding’ aka ‘fun’.

Some of the virtues that @benjamin-davies has put together are part of it, too.

Thanks for asking good questions.

Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state?

Yes.

Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)

Yes. Aka ‘common-preference finding’.

Some of the virtues that @benjamin-davies has put together are part of it, too.

Superseded by #3671.

Maybe I don’t understand the question, but I don’t think there’s a one-size-fits-all criterion to use for that scenario. It depends on the content of the ideas and how they conflict exactly.

All I can say without more info is that we can try to criticize ideas and adopt the ones with no pending criticisms. That’s true for any kind of idea – explicit, inexplicit, conscious, unconscious, executable, etc. See #2281.

Yeah. I mean finding unanimous consent between different kinds of ideas generally, not just between ideas about rationality. See also #3049 and #2281.

[A]ny system only ever has input, output, and functions that determine how that output is generated. What else is there?

Minds don’t necessarily output anything. Also, they don’t just run existing functions, they create new ones.

Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body as sense perception) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?

Parochially. Culture has more impact.

Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas?

Because it would be a product of our culture and speak English.

But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium…

Yes. This tells you that people aren’t just agents. They are agents in the sense that they exist in some environment they can interact with and move around in. But they’re so much more than that.

It’s a bit like saying humans are mammals. They are, but that’s not their distinguishing characteristic, so we can’t study mammals to learn about people.

I wouldn’t bother with cog sci or any ‘agentic’ notion of people. Focus on Popperian epistemology instead. It’s the only promising route we have.

I think I agree. But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium (which also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc.). But I agree that persons and agents should be differentiated, since people exceed the pre-given problems set by evolution.

…a bacterium … also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc…

A bacterium has ‘problems’ in some sense but it cannot create new knowledge to solve them. It may be more accurate to say that its genes have problems.

I don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.

[T]he framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general…

That doesn’t mean static memes couldn’t have co-opted the framework to undermine man and his mind.

The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.

I don’t know what it means to ‘have change’, but note that even unconscious ideas evolve in our minds all the time. So those change as well, if that’s what you mean.

Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person.

I think what really happens is this: when we’re young, we guess theories about how to experience the world, and then we correct errors in those theories and practice them to the point they become completely automated. Much of this happens in childhood. As adults, we don’t remember doing it. So then experience seems ‘given’.

After reading some more about Deutsch's and your definition of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)

After reading some more about Deutsch's and your definition of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)

After reading some more about the definitoin of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)

Even a non-living system, can build up constraints at an aggregate which have downwards causation. After a Crystal is formed the lattice constrains which vibrational modes are possible for individual atoms. In other words being part of a larger strucutre (which follows other rules) has downard causation on "parts" following fundamental rules. There might be other emergent structures that expose other fundamental rules not encompassed by the known fundamental rules.

Even a non-living system, can build up constraints at an aggregate which have downwards causation. After a Crystal is formed the lattice constrains which vibrational modes are possible for individual atoms. In other words being part of a larger strucutre (which follows other rules) has downard causation on "parts" following fundamental rules. There might be other emergent structures that exposes other fundamental rules, which is not encompassed by fundamental rules

What is the evidence for strong emergence as opposed to just vieweing every phenomena as the processing of fundamental laws?