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Gemini's response to that tweet: "The text uses legitimate biochemical concepts—like the fact that fluoride is a potent halogen that hardens minerals and can be toxic in high doses—to build a narrative based on skewed history. It fabricates a geological explanation for Hereford, Texas, to erase the very thing that actually protected the town's teeth: naturally occurring fluoride."

Is a quale a sequence of information states? Is this true of any given computation? Does the quale "care" if the states are computed afresh or read from memory?

One idea for a global criterion is simply productivity: If a program successfully produces an output which is then used by other programs (the more the "better"), it is replicated (by the global logic). Maybe it's replicated every time it's run as part of a greater process, in that sense. Sort of fits with capitalism: make useful products, get rewarded (replicated, here).
The bookkeeping may be an issue, though.

Do the compositions have to be self-reproducing? Or can they be replicated when a predefined global condition is met? I think we agree any predefined condition will keep the system closed-ended (the evolution of programs will be steered toward those meeting the condition). But maybe that's only if the condition is specific. If the criterion for replication to occur is non-specific, maybe this allows for open-endedness? It seems like we would want a condition that only rules out programs which cannot constitute a growth in knowledge.

Drawing on the framing of your question, it seems like a "universality of landscapes" is what's needed. Perhaps: the space of programs to be explored is only ever determined by whatever the system happens to have assembled so far, the pieces it has at any given time, which is never specified. What the system contains is determined by random/blind variation and composition (of some complete set of primitives) and selection for the most fecund compositions among them.

My suspicion remains that creativity and qualia come from some kind of blind exchange between layers of emergence, of which mutations and mistakes in copying, as seen in DNA, are an example.

That's what I get for suddenly returning to this discussion after a long gap. I was thinking that any computation can be recorded and re-run at will, in principle. So qualia can too. But indeed, I have suggested in this discussion that it is the evolution of programs that causes experience, and evolution cannot be scripted. This means a quale that is recorded will not "qualiate" if it is rerun exactly as recorded.

TL;DR: I don't.

True that a person need not create new knowledge, but a looping quale is not a person, per #5035, so the claim survives this criticism.

True, knowledge could be created from each run of a quale, but a looping quale isn't a person, per #5035, so the claim in #5031 that not only people can undergo experience still stands.

Should clarify that personhood is: can create any new knowledge in principle (excluding resource constraints). A program consisting of a looping quale cannot create any possible knowledge, whether or not it is creating some each time it's run.

A looping quale is also not a person because personhood is not just: can create a given piece of new knowledge, it is: can create any knowledge (not just that created by this quale; again assuming knowledge creation defines qualia).

Not if personhood requires literal explanatory universality, in the sense of: can create any explanation, since there are explanations which can only be created by a Turing complete system..., surely.

I've been thinking about the principle that principles should not or do not admit of exceptions, else they are not principles. Yet, I've thought, we seem to not abide by this, even with something as fundamental as freedom of speech. We make exceptions for calls to violence, doxing, etc.

But I've (somehow only) just realized that those are not what we might call "standalone exceptions" -- they are overlaps with other principles, those of non-initiation of force and privacy, in this case.

So we can say: principles do not admit of exceptions, but if there is more than one principle in the system, one's exception can be another's enforcement. Which is not an inconsistency. Then the question is, which one is the higher priority? Maybe this is where the court system comes in. (I don't know much about politics).

Whether the above idea (#4751) is refuted or not, there are no viable alternative solutions to the "PROBLEM" raised in #4752.
(Criticize this with alternative solutions).

Assumption A1: Only programs that are people can, while running, constitute qualia/experience/subjectivity/consciousness.

To clarify and add on to #4805: No, we couldn't program an LLM (on its own) to do random variation in the sense constituting evolution, because all of the randomly chosen changes to its outputs are still implicit from its current knowledge (training data + design from programmers). There is also no means of criticism that are not also implicit: any niche or criterion it generates, then seeks to satisfy, was derived again from its existing knowledge. It is a closed system (whether or not we have run it such as to reveal everything it implies!).

#4806 is saying: variations of knowledge being agnostic to that knowledge's meaning means they are not implicit from it, else implicit doesn't mean anything. So #4806 is only really asking if what matters is the source of knowledge, and that isn't really a criticism of #4805.
Criticism #4875 applies to #4806, as shown.

Yes, everything is not implied by everything else, so I think what we must mean by implicit is: can be deduced from/assembled using available transformations.

For knowledge to be truly novel in the sense of having come from creativity, it must not be deducible. Ambient, unjustified substrate is "taken from the environment" and filtered by selection. What survives can be increasingly truth-containing.

Mutations to a substrate, meaning blind mutations, not specific or designed, must not be implicit from the substrate; the result of their application cannot be deduced in any way... Otherwise the knowledge they might contain would already have been present...

Upon review, we should maybe say instead that personhood should not be defined solely in terms of tractability, which the bounty terms are not clear about. As it stands (bounty aside), I find myself still seeing tractability as an important aspect of epistemology and the mystery of personhood/knowledge creation, a hunch reinforced as I continue reading through "Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity" by Scott Aaronson: https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf

I agree that tractability is related to a given problem space, and that creativity is about reshaping the problem space, among other things. Given that I've been thinking of the problem space as the space of all explanations, I'm not sure where I stand... Maybe the "space of all explanations" framing is wrongheaded, because a mind never has any actionable knowledge of that space? We can discuss the space of all explanations in some sense, but we can't organize or describe it in any substantive way...

Also, per #4865, you helped me remember that personhood could involve intractable algorithms, but ones which only ever run with small inputs, since that can still be perfectly practical. Whether or not that means the whole person is a tractable algorithm or not, I'm not sure.

Between these points I think this is enough for you to claim the bounty, because it does argue that personhood "should not be defined in terms of tractability", per the bounty terms (italics mine, here). Tractability does not help explain personhood. Or, in any case, it doesn't seem like this line of discussion will be very fruitful (but this could itself be mistaken).

"Secondarily" meaning:
Implementations of an algorithm inherit the algorithm’s asymptotic behavior. If an implementation has a different asymptotic behavior than one algorithm, it is effectively a different algorithm.

Yes, my understanding is that the standard sense of tractable, for some algorithm, is: can be executed in time that grows at worst by a polynomial function of the input size. This is the sense I mean. The fixed task would be: create a given explanation in the space of all possible explanations.

Implementations of a given algorithm can be way more or less efficient in practice, though. Maybe personhood does require intractable algorithms, but ones which only ever run with small inputs... The question of the bounty is whether can we make a case for or against this. But part of the hope is also to learn if this whole framing is mistaken.

I think I see now, and agree with the above. Partly a semantics issue (yes, I'm thinking of an algorithm in the "formal" CS sense: an abstract/mathematical finite procedure). The scare quotes were meant to suggest that one could attempt to implement one algorithm, but the implementation may in fact be more closely implementing some other unrelated algorithm, but this is confusing.

At any rate, how ChatGPT summarized it makes sense to me:
"One function → many algorithms can compute it.
One algorithm → many implementations can realize it.
Complexity attaches primarily to algorithms, secondarily to implementations, and not to functions."

"Complexity" in the sense of growth behavior with input size? Further reading is still suggesting to me that this is intrinsic to a given algorithm (or class of them). Intrinsic to the math and logic. Implementations can be faster/slower/hungrier for a given input, but if they have different limiting behavior, aren't they different algorithms? I can see how an "implementation" of one algorithm in practice can accidentally change it to another algorithm.

This is a good point, related to Dirk's #4813. As far as the bounty goes, I think my response in #4823 applies here as well, however. To refine it:
Recognizing, criticizing, and being able to understand explanations could all be requisites for tractably synthesizing any possible explanation. The bounty regards whether the tractability requirement can be done without.

It seems like a mind being able to create, recognize, understand and differentiate (etc.) good explanations are necessary but not sufficient criteria for personhood; if that process is intractable, then beyond a certain amount of current knowledge (considering that as the input to the process), the person effectively cannot continue with it... so that compromises the universality.

They must be able to create, recognize and understand any given explanation, and maintain that ability as their knowledge grows, ad infinitum...