Search Ideas

The main thread is ambiguous currently, by that reasoning: it's always gray. Having the whole thing red to indicate one or more pending criticisms below seems useful, and cool. And the offshoots from the main thread (the little curly part leading to each sub-idea) can have the new colors.

E.g.: User scrolls down the main bright red thread, past gray comment offshoots and dim red refuted criticism offshoots, until reaching the bright red pending criticisms offshoot that is the cause of the main thread being bright red. (!)

And dimmer red for refuted criticisms, brighter red for pending ones! Default gray for comments.

The link could be put in a new tooltip, or something. Or kept as is, just without the yellow bubble, frankly.

It should be made not red. Gray. Arguable even without the red criticism line idea above, since it already conflicts with the "red = criticism" motif.

Is it handy? I have yet to want to open the criticized idea in a new tab. I have only ever wanted to scroll up to see it, which is slightly irksome with the current yellow bubble hashtag-matching method. And when the criticized idea is clearly immediately above, the yellow bubbles serve no real purpose, only add visual clutter.

Reiterating/refining #3904: I think the yellow "Criticism of" bubbles can and should be replaced by a graphical indication that is much easier on the eyes. The dropdown line can be made red if the comment it leads to is a criticism, and the bubble on the criticism can be eliminated. Reading the yellow bubble to get the idea # it is referring to, then searching the ideas above for the matching # is inelegant (even if it is usually the one right above).

Thoughts on an optional "implies" relation for ideas? I find myself commenting on one idea something which it implies, then criticizing that, but the original idea is not marked criticized. Being able to chain or bundle ideas avoids the bookkeeping issue of having to make new criticisms for each step in the chain, if one is criticized.

Ah, so if I understand correctly, there are two knobs affecting speed (elapsed time) for a given algorithm: the hardware, and the implementation of the algorithm. The given algorithm has a complexity, independent of those two, which is how the time and memory scales with an input.

Universal explainers

In the context of how AGI may work – which seems to be what Tyler is mostly interested in – the concept of a universal explainer might not get us very far. Creativity is the more fundamental concept, I think.

A person is a universal explainer, yes, but he could also use his creativity to come up with reasons not to create explanations.

https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/explain-irrational-minds

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Universal explainers seek good explanations…

You sounded persuaded by https://blog.dennishackethal.com/posts/hard-to-vary-or-hardly-usable. As in, you agreed that people don’t seek good/hard-to-vary explanations.

So why still speak of good explanations?

Speed is a property of programs, too. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_O_notation

I think this clarifies it, thanks. Used in common speech to express uncertainty and leave room for error, valid mathematically only when all outcomes are known and have a measure.

No, it will or it won't, but "probably" expresses one's awareness of a lack of battletested explanations, or of their own uncertainty or lack of confidence in the prediction, etc. (cf. #4764).

Creativity isn't defined by its outputs but by its process. RNGs do not recognise or criticise ideas.

You're right and I revised my criticism.

Doesn't it? All explanatory knowledge is in the set of all possible programs, and a random program (or number) generator can generate any of those, given infinite time.

But an AI programmed to make random variations to its conjectures (English or otherwise) can only do so by choosing from an existing set of variations. Again, that knowledge is pre-existing. True evolution must involve variations to the substrate on which the knowledge is based; variations must be agnostic to the semantics of whatever they are acting upon, else they are already implicit from it, in which case their application does not constitute a truly novel conjecture (in the sense defining creativity).

Whatever new "explanations" it creates are derivable from (and by?) the knowledge in the training data. It isn't evolution if all of the variations and selection criteria are stored ahead of time. That's just a search process, as in the case of Move 37 per AlphaGo.

The definition of fitness for DNA also originated outside it, so this doesn't in itself suggest the system isn't actually creating new knowledge.

A person could create the same knowledge that biological evolution does, if only by simulating it. But it could still be true that only people can create explanatory knowledge. (That they can create all possible explanatory knowledge is Deutsch's criterion for personhood.)

"No unconscious creativity" seems the simpler option. But here we arrive again at biological evolution, which is unconscious, yet is creating knowledge. Does this serve as a distinction between explanatory knowledge and non? Explanatory knowledge can only be created by a conscious process?

Either there is no unconscious creativity, or only evolutionary/creative epochs with certain properties are conscious. The most obvious candidate for the property is complexity (in the sense of sophistication): only programs (existing knowledge) of a certain sophistication, once subjected to the evolutionary process, necessitates consciousness. Complex problem solving seems to require consciousness. Meanwhile, we do not seem to be conscious of "simpler" creative tasks, like... Like what? What is a "simple" creative task? What is an example of a creative task we perform unconsciously? How could we determine it was an act of creation (new knowledge), and not an act of deductive inference of the kind characterizing AI?

This suggests that all experience is determined by what programs are being subjected to evolution at any given time, the niches that are being adapted to. But why is not all creativity in the mind conscious? (All consciousness might necessarily be creativity).

But if the evolution is the defining feature of personhood, and the evolution is non-computational, then the personhood is non-computational. And consciousness would then not be a software property.