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Deutsch’s stance in my own words:
The distinguishing characteristic between rationality and irrationality is that rationality is the search for good explanations. We make progress by searching for good explanations.
A good explanation is hard to vary “while still accounting for what it purports to account for.” (BoI chapter 1 glossary.) A bad explanation is easy to vary.
For example, the Persephone myth as an explanation of the seasons is easy to change without impacting its ability to explain the seasons. You could arbitrarily replace Persephone and other characters and the explanation would still ‘work’. The axis-tilt explanation of the earth, on the other hand, is hard to change without breaking it. You can’t just replace the axis with something else, say.
The quality of a theory is a matter of degrees. The harder it is to change a theory, the better that theory is. When deciding which explanation to adopt, we should “choose between [explanations] according to how good they are…: how hard to vary.” (BoI chatper 9; see similar remark in chapter 8.)
The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
The act of making different types of idea jibe (propositional ideas, feelings etc.), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or inter-translatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other non-rational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other non-rational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
Thanks for asking good questions.
Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state?
Yes.
Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
Yes. Aka ‘common-preference finding’.
Some of the virtues that @benjamin-davies has put together are part of it, too.
Thanks for asking good questions.
Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state?
Yes.
Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
Yes. Aka ‘common-preference finding’ aka ‘fun’.
Some of the virtues that @benjamin-davies has put together are part of it, too.
#3672·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoAfter reading some more about Deutsch's and your definition of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
Thanks for asking good questions.
Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state?
Yes.
Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
Yes. Aka ‘common-preference finding’.
Some of the virtues that @benjamin-davies has put together are part of it, too.
#3669·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoAfter reading some more about the definitoin of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
Superseded by #3671.
#3649·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 3 days agoBy what criterion do you evaluate an explicit idea versus an implicit idea?
Maybe I don’t understand the question, but I don’t think there’s a one-size-fits-all criterion to use for that scenario. It depends on the content of the ideas and how they conflict exactly.
All I can say without more info is that we can try to criticize ideas and adopt the ones with no pending criticisms. That’s true for any kind of idea – explicit, inexplicit, conscious, unconscious, executable, etc. See #2281.
#3645·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 3 days agoDo you mean something more than finding unanimous consent between different kinds of ideas about rationality?
#3653·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 3 days agoI think that's pretty accurate. But if you believe reality simply works by executing a formal set of fundamental rules, how can you believe anything else? By this model, any system only ever has input, output, and functions that determine how that output is generated. What else is there?
[A]ny system only ever has input, output, and functions that determine how that output is generated. What else is there?
Minds don’t necessarily output anything. Also, they don’t just run existing functions, they create new ones.
#3656·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 3 days agoWhy would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body as sense perception) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?
Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body as sense perception) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?
Parochially. Culture has more impact.
#3656·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 3 days agoWhy would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas? Don't you think our particular perspective (which is filtered through the body as sense perception) affects our conceptual system and ways we understand ideas?
Why would an AGI use spacial metaphors like understand, arrive, close to understand ideas?
Because it would be a product of our culture and speak English.
#3689·Dennis HackethalOP revised 1 day agoI think I agree. But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium (which also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc.). But I agree that persons and agents should be differentiated, since people exceed the pre-given problems set by evolution.
But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium…
Yes. This tells you that people aren’t just agents. They are agents in the sense that they exist in some environment they can interact with and move around in. But they’re so much more than that.
It’s a bit like saying humans are mammals. They are, but that’s not their distinguishing characteristic, so we can’t study mammals to learn about people.
I wouldn’t bother with cog sci or any ‘agentic’ notion of people. Focus on Popperian epistemology instead. It’s the only promising route we have.
“I think I agree. But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium (which also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc.). But I agree that persons and agents should be differentiated, since people exceed the pre-given problems set by evolution.
I think I agree. But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium (which also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc.). But I agree that persons and agents should be differentiated, since people exceed the pre-given problems set by evolution.
#3660·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 2 days ago“I think I agree. But to formulate a general theory for agents, the term ‘people’ is too strong when speaking of what’s relevant for a bacterium (which also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc.). But I agree that persons and agents should be differentiated, since people exceed the pre-given problems set by evolution.
…a bacterium … also has problems that shape its actions, what it finds relevant, etc…
A bacterium has ‘problems’ in some sense but it cannot create new knowledge to solve them. It may be more accurate to say that its genes have problems.
Sounds like a criticism so I’m marking it as one
I don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
I don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
#3662·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoI don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
[T]he framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general…
That doesn’t mean static memes couldn’t have co-opted the framework to undermine man and his mind.
#3662·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoI don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
I don’t know what it means to ‘have change’, but note that even unconscious ideas evolve in our minds all the time. So those change as well, if that’s what you mean.
#3662·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoI don’t think so, but I don’t know enough of the history. But the framework emerged out of biology trying to make a theory of organisms in general (innate theories like autopoiesis/self-preservation, for example). Then it’s been used specifically in cognitive science to try and integrate the general framework with human cognition. Even though it is dehumanizing, there is some value to viewing at least parts of human cognition in these terms. Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person. I don’t think we as people derive our sense of autonomy from this world construction and pre-given coupling (we receive automatic responses/affordances). The only real change I seem to have is in every conscious moment.
Whatever creativity is, most of human experience is already pre-given moment to moment, not willed by the person.
I think what really happens is this: when we’re young, we guess theories about how to experience the world, and then we correct errors in those theories and practice them to the point they become completely automated. Much of this happens in childhood. As adults, we don’t remember doing it. So then experience seems ‘given’.
#3678·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoIt seems more plausible to me that this actually is more like the division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
the other alters
This part sounds redundant (‘other others’). Also, ‘alter’ can’t be used as a noun, only as a verb (meaning ‘to change’).
#3678·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoIt seems more plausible to me that this actually is more like the division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
I’m not sure I understand how this idea is a criticism of #3510. They sound compatible. A broken price mechanism, if bad enough, causes the division you speak of.
#3678·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoIt seems more plausible to me that this actually is more like the division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
It seems more plausible to me that this …
Unclear what “this” refers to.
It seems more plausible to me that this actually is a division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
It seems more plausible to me that this actually is more like the division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
#3510·Dennis HackethalOP, 20 days agoIn our book club today, @erik-orrje raised the issue of split personalities.
I’m wildly speculating here, but I wonder if split personalities could be the result of the price mechanism inside a mind being broken.
If the price mechanism is needed for different parts of the mind to communicate with each other, and this mechanism breaks down somehow, then the parts become isolated.
It seems more plausible to me that this actually is a division of a mind. They often recall meeting each other in dreams (seeing the other alters from their local perspective within the dream). So it seems that the split goes further, and actually gives rise to different experiences within a mind. They live and experience from different perspectives, and start communicating with each other more like distinct minds. In split-brain patients, the left and right hemispheres can disagree on what clothing to wear in the morning, and physically fight over wearing a tie or not.
If we view addiction as entrenchment of ideas (in the broad sense), why can't you have conflict between implicit and explicit preferences, which are both short-term preferences? Something in your body is addicted to a substance, but you could simultaneously, consciously, not want to take the substance because you don't like how it feels.
If we view addiction as entrenchment of ideas (in the broad sense), why can't you have conflict between implicit and explicit preferences, which are both short-term preferences? Something in your body is addicted to a substance, but you could simultaneously, consciously, not want to take the substance because you don't like how it feels.
#3561·Erik Orrje, 6 days agoAlways, because of the underlying uncertainty about the future. Please criticise!
If we view addiction as entrenchment of ideas (in the broad sense), why can't you have conflict between implicit and explicit preferences, which are both short-term preferences? Something in your body is addicted to a substance, but you could simultaneously, consciously, not want to take the substance because you don't like how it feels.
Reformulated the question after reading some more about the definition of reaason.
After reading some more about Deutsch's and your definition of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)
After reading some more about Deutsch's and your definition of reason. Is it accurate to view reason more as a process than a static state? Where the process might be summed up by
1. Being open to criticism
2. Truth-seeking (commitment to getting ideas to jibe)