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#3625·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 2 days agoThe act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
…rational deliberation.
Rationality isn’t the same as deliberation. Deliberation can be part of a rational process but it’s not synonymous with it.
#3625·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 2 days agoThe act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
…cannot be reduced to explicit reasons…
Favoring explicit ideas over inexplicit ones is an example of irrationality.
#3625·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 2 days agoThe act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
feelings and other nonrational mental contents
Feelings aren’t “nonrational” per se. There’s a rational place for feelings. See #3632: I mean no disrespect when I say this but I think you don’t yet understand the notion of rationality I use.
#3622·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 2 days agoEven if knowledge is unified at some fundamental level, we might not be able to live by means of this unified knowledge alone (because of how we function or pure complexity). Living life might require operating through other «kinds» of knowledge which are pre- cognitive. You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
That isn’t what I mean by unity of knowledge. Of course we can’t process our knowledge in its totality at once. That’s necessarily piecemeal. But that doesn’t mean we can’t live a life guided by reason.
If you consider riding a bike an example of irrationality, and reasoning through quantum mechanics an example of rationality, then you haven’t understood Deutsch’s/my stance on rationality. I think you should study it, ask more questions about it, before you’re ready to criticize it.
#3623·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoThis is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
I don’t think any of this addresses my original criticism that calling people “embodied agent[s]” is dehumanizing. It sounds like we’re studying rats. So what if cog-sci is dehumanizing? That doesn’t make it better.
#3623·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoThis is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science.
Yeah, the cog-sci guys don’t understand Popper or epistemology generally. They seem to view minds and brains as input/output machines. But that isn’t how that works.
#3623·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoThis is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
That has nothing to do with brain regions. An AGI running on a laptop would use the same phrases.
#3623·Knut Sondre Sæbø revised 2 days agoThis is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
Several typos here. Please use more care when you write ideas.
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
The act of making different types of idea jibe ((propositional ideas, feelings etc. ), doesn’t seem to me to be best explained as a rational process. They don’t have a shared metric or intertranslatability that would enable comparison. If feelings and other nonrational mental contents cannot be reduced to explicit reasons, then the process of integrating them cannot itself be arrived at through reasoning alone. This doesn’t mean reason cannot critique feelings or other nonrational content, only that the integrative process itself operates differently than rational deliberation.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's I meant was to point to the fact there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that impinge on and filters input to concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3607·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoIt sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
Even if knowledge is unified at some fundamental level, we might not be able to live by means of this unified knowledge alone (because of how we function or pure complexity). Living life might require operating through other «kinds» of knowledge which are pre- cognitive. You cannot ride a bike or maintain a relationship by thinking through quantum mechanical or propositional theories to word.
#3605·Dennis HackethalOP, 4 days agoCalling people “embodied agent[s]” like they’re barely superior to video-game characters is dehumanizing and weird.
This is also borrowed from cognitive science. But what's meant by embodied is only that there is "pre-conceptual" models, desires, attential salience etc. that's processed and taken up into concious cognition. An example is how brain regions originally used for moving the body through 3D space are repurposed cognitively to "move around" in idea-space. Some anecdotal evidence for this: notice how many movement metaphors structure propositional thinking. We say we're close to the truth, we under-stand, we grasp a concept, we arrive at a conclusion.
#3619·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 3 days agoFixed it. I meant to write perspectival knowledge, whcih is a term used in cognitive science.
Okay. When your revision addresses a criticism, remember to uncheck each version of the criticism underneath the revision form. Try revising the idea again and uncheck the criticisms you’ve addressed. Otherwise, your ideas look more problematic than they are.
#3609·Dennis HackethalOP revised 4 days agoperspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns. Maybe something about perception?
Fixed it. I meant to write perspectival knowledge, whcih is a term used in cognitive science.
Correction to criticism 3604
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
Living according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectival knowledge)
#3615·Tyler MillsOP, 3 days agoThe failure to have found roles which have a closer relationship with physics, math and design may stem from an underlying mediocrity as an optical engineer; this itself could stem from the underlying (or widespread) disinterest in it within your mind.
Empirically, roles with "a closer relationship with physics, math and design" overwhelmingly seem to be reserved for PhD-holders. So mediocrity may not be to blame for the as-yet inability to land engaging roles. However, both could be factors.
The failure to have found roles which have a closer relationship with physics, math and design may stem from an underlying mediocrity as an optical engineer; this itself could stem from the underlying (or widespread) disinterest in it within your mind.
#3613·Tyler MillsOP, 3 days agoA hiatus would incur a relatively heavy cost: the cost of living + the opportunity cost of lost salary. Earning money as quickly as possible, as early as possible, is important for long-term financial success.
The cost of living for several months is not large relative to the amount of money in savings. The opportunity cost and financial strategy points are valid, but pale in comparison to the moral cost of not pursuing what one is passionate about and good at -- especially when there is arguably some potential for value, given the state of the world regarding AI/AGI. Being an employee in an uninteresting field for years or decades is a catastrophic loss, and all too common.
A hiatus would incur a relatively heavy cost: the cost of living + the opportunity cost of lost salary. Earning money as quickly as possible, as early as possible, is important for long-term financial success.
#3611·Tyler MillsOP, 3 days agoA hiatus would create a "resume gap," weakening hireability in the field. This is to be avoided, but only assuming working in the field is itself desirable, which may not be the case, here, unless better opportunities arise (roles allowing more contact with physics, math and design -- i.e. "engineering"!).
The resume gap can be absolved by simply listing "independent research" for the period in question. Forming an LLC would also help to formalize the venture (in addition to having other uses).
I have a BS + MS in optical engineering, and have had a profitable three or so years in the field as an engineer. I enjoy learning about and applying physics, including optical physics, but this makes up a tiny percentage of the tasks performed as an "engineer" so far in my experience, and I see no sign of change on the horizon. Many of the tasks I am assigned seem eminently automatable, and performing them is excruciating for me (though I recognize my good fortune overall). Even when there are micro-problems which require creativity to solve, I still find the process painful, given that they are other people's problems rather than my own. It is the same pain of school: creativity forced to work toward answers to questions not asked.
So, where to draw the line? I think I have fallen in love with AGI research, having followed the area for years, learning and reading bits and pieces. I've been working on independent research in my free time for over a year, in addition to related content (for several years) which is meaningful, creative, educational, largely very fun to produce -- and perhaps ultimately valuable. I'm confident I could publish ideas which will be of interest to the field, and that I would be happy working on all of these things for many years to come.
The question: Should I take a hiatus from my career to pursue independent research (and related content creation), full-time, for some number of months?
A hiatus would create a "resume gap," weakening hireability in the field. This is to be avoided, but only assuming working in the field is itself desirable, which may not be the case, here, unless better opportunities arise (roles allowing more contact with physics, math and design -- i.e. "engineering"!).
perspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns.
perspectively knowledge
I’m not sure that’s what you meant to write. Adverbs don’t go in front of nouns. Maybe something about perception?
It sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
It sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
There’s a unity of knowledge. Knowledge isn’t fragmented the way you suggest. Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas, ie making different types of ideas jibe. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?
#3603·Knut Sondre Sæbø, 4 days agoLiving according to reason and rationality alone is impossible, because propositional knowledge is only a subset of needed knowledge for an embodied agent (the others being procedural, participatory- and perspectively knowledge)
It sounds like you have a different conception of knowledge and rationality from Popper’s/Deutsch’s.
Rationality means finding common preferences among ideas. Why should that not be possible for the types of knowledge you mention?